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Since  the  mid-1990s,  bank  interest  rates  in
Greece have recorded a significant decline. The
rate on loans without a defined maturity to enter-
prises, for instance, stood at 7.35% at the end of
2006, compared with 26.40% at the end of 1994.
Similarly,  the  rate  on  savings  deposits  fell  to
1.09% at the end of 2006, from 15.10% at the end
of 1994. This development in bank interest rates
was largely related to the Greek economy’s nom-
inal convergence process in view of the country’s
participation  in  Stage  III  of  EMU,  while  for  the
period after the country’s entry into the monetary
union it reflects the monetary stability that Greece
benefits from as a member of the euro area. At the
same time, interest rate developments have been
affected  by  the  process  of  deregulation  of  the
banking  system,  which  was  completed  in  this
period – a step that was to some extent necessary
for  the  country  to  qualify  for  EMU  entry.
Specifically, the elimination of the public sector’s
privileged access to the banking system and the
alignment of the framework regarding banks’ min-
imum reserves deposited with the Bank of Greece
with that of the Eurosystem have removed these
cost  elements  that  previously  weighed  on  the
bank intermediation process.
However, despite the significant decline in inter-
est rates and the single monetary policy pursued
throughout the euro area, bank interest rates in
Greece in general continue to stand above euro
area averages, and in fact the differential in the
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comments. The article reflects the views of the authors and not
necessarily those of the Bank of Greece.case of some banking products is considerable.
For instance, in consumer loans without a defined
maturity the differential of the Greek rate over the
euro area average was 3.77 percentage points at
the end of 2006, while in consumer loans with a
fixed rate for a period of more than one and up to
five years it was 2.85 percentage points.1 It must
be noted of course that rates higher than the euro
area average are also observed in other members
of the monetary union2,3 and that the differentials
of the Greek rates over the euro area rates are
generally on a downward path. Whereas rates on
deposits in Greece are also higher than in the euro
area, the interest rate spread4 in the Greek bank-
ing system is wider (by 1.53 percentage points at
the end of 2006), although this margin has shrunk
in recent years.5
The persistence of the Greek rates and interest
rate spread above euro area levels has fuelled a
public debate, as it implies a higher bank inter-
mediation cost compared with the average in the
monetary  union,  with  possible  implications  for
the  consumption  and  investment  decisions  of
households and enterprises, and by extension for
growth,  perhaps  even  for  income  distribution
within the economy. The present study aims at
contributing  to  this  discussion,  by  presenting  a
review of the literature on the determinants that
shape bank interest rates and rate spreads inter-
nationally, and by attempting to identify factors
that  may  explain  the  differentials  between  the
Greek and the corresponding euro area rates.
The following section reviews the major theoreti-
cal approaches proposed in the literature for the
determination of interest rate spread levels. The
third section goes through the key determinants
of rates and rate spreads cited in the theoretical
and  empirical  literature  and  attempts  to  relate
them to the Greek experience. The fourth section
makes specific reference to the rate differentials
among the euro area countries, while the fifth sec-
tion presents some concluding remarks.
2. Theoretical approaches for the 
determination of the interest rate spread
The theoretical approaches that have been pro-
posed in the international literature on the deter-
mination  of  bank  interest  rates  generally  fall
within  the  domain  of  the  theory  of  industrial
organisation.  From  this  perspective,  banks  are
seen not as one industry —as is the case e.g. in
monetary theory (Freixas and Rochet, 1997)— but
as independent firms that respond to the external
financial  environment.  Moreover,  banks  are
thought to operate —simultaneously— as buyers
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 8
1 These  differentials  are  mentioned  here  indicatively,  since  to
some extent they reflect the different compositions of the specific
loan categories in Greece and the euro area average as regards the
individual products they comprise (e.g. loans through credit cards
and credit lines).
2 See European Central Bank (2006a).
3 Interest rate differentials have also been recorded within indi-
vidual countries – see e.g. Jappelli (1987) on interest rate differ-
entials between ¡orth and South Italy, as well as the historical
study by Eichengreen (1984) on the States of the US at the end of
the 19th century. However, more recently a much lower interest
rate dispersion is detected among the States of the US than among
the  countries  of  the  euro  area  –  see  European  Central  Bank
(2005a), pp. 127-28).
4 The interest rate spread is defined as the difference between the
weighted average interest rate on the total of bank loans and the
respective interest rate on the total of bank deposits. In general
however, the interest rate spread is measured as the difference
between interest income and interest expenses, as a percentage of
the  average  interest-bearing  assets  (interest  rate  margin).
Although the two terms are not necessarily identical, following the
practice  usually  observed  in  the  literature  (see  e.g.  Ho  and
Saunders,  1981;  Wong,  1997;  and  Saunders  and  Schumacher,
2000) they are used here interchangeably.
5 In the five-year period between 2001 and 2005 the interest rate
spread narrowed by 1.21 percentage points – see Bank of Greece
(2006b).of  deposits  and  sellers  of  loans,  and  therefore
their  decisions  about  the  levels  of  deposit  and
lending rates are directly interconnected.6 Thus,
the focus of attention is the study of the factors
that  shape  the  difference  between  these  two
rates, i.e. the interest rate spread. At the same
time, owing mainly to the considerable entry bar-
riers  that  characterise  the  banking  industry,
approaches based on markets that operate under
conditions  of  imperfect  competition  (see  e.g.
Klein, 1971; and Monti, 1972) are considered to
be  more  appropriate  for  the  study  of  banking
firms  compared  with  models  that  assume  per-
fectly competitive markets.
Two basic theoretical paradigms have been pro-
posed  in  the  literature  for  the  determination  of
interest rate spreads, the dealership model and the
microeconomic  model  of  the  banking  firm.  The
dealership model was originally used for studying
the differential between ask and bid prices set by
stock market dealers (see e.g. Stoll ,1978). Ho and
Saunders  (1981)  used  this  model  to  study  the
determination of the interest rate spread, viewing
the bank as an intermediary between the financial
entities  supplying  funds  and  those  demanding
them. During this intermediation the bank faces
uncertainty as it cannot know the exact level of
deposits it will receive or of loans it will be called
on to extend, nor the precise timing of this supply
and demand of funds. Given that the bank deter-
mines  its  rates  at  the  start  of  each  period,  this
uncertainty entails a cost for it: if in the end the
demand for loans exceeds the supply of deposits,
the  bank  will  have  to  obtain  liquidity  from  the
money market at a higher cost; conversely, if the
supply of deposits finally exceeds the demand for
loans, it will be forced to channel this excess liq-
uidity to the money market earning a lower rate.
Therefore, according to the dealership model, the
existence of the interest rate spread is essentially a
result  of  the  uncertainty  banks  face  when  they
accept deposits or extend loans at each particular
point  in  time,  and  of  the  cost  this  uncertainty
implies. The same model argues that the optimum
interest rate spread depends on: (i) the structure
of the banking market (i.e. the degree of competi-
tion  that  characterises  the  particular  market); 
(ii)  the  volume  of  banking  transactions  (i.e.  the
average  level  of  deposits  and  loans);  (iii)  the
volatility of the interest rates; and (iv) the degree
to which the bank’s management is risk averse.7
The Ho and Saunders (1981) model provides a
simple, yet well-grounded theoretical framework
that accounts for the interest rate spread and is
empirically  readily  applicable,  but  nevertheless
has important limitations. In particular, this model
takes  no  account  of  the  credit  risk  inherent  in
loans  or  the  “production”  cost  entailed  by  the
intermediation  process,8 and  also  assumes  that
the bank accepts only one type of deposit and
offers only one type of loan. Later studies tackle
the shortcomings of this original model through
more comprehensive variations of the dealership
model. More specifically, Allen (1988) presents an
extension of the above model in which the bank
offers numerous types of deposits and loans. Her
model  shows  that  the  dispersion  of  the  uncer-
tainty-associated risk across more banking prod-
Determinants of bank interest rates and comparisons between Greece and the euro area
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6 Alternatively, it may be considered that banks make decisions
regarding the level of the deposits they will receive and the loans
they will extend, given the demand they are faced with.
7 The dealership model assumes that the bank’s management
exhibits some degree of risk aversion. This assumption has been
extensively established in the literature (see e.g. McShane and
Sharpe, 1985; and Angbazo, 1997).
8 Criticism of the absence of the production cost from the model
propounded by Ho and Saunders (1981) was expressed by Lerner
(1981).ucts  reduces  the  interest  rate  spread  that  such
uncertainty  can  justify.  McShane  and  Sharpe
(1985)  propose  a  dealership  model  where  the
interest-rate risk stems from the volatility of the
rate in the money market and not of the deposit
or lending rates as in the Ho and Saunders (1981)
model. Angbazo (1997) introduces credit risk as
well  in  this  approach;  while  Maudos  and
Ferna ’ndez  de  Guevara  (2004)  also  take  into
account the bank’s operating cost in the interme-
diation process.
The other basic approach9 proposed for the deter-
mination of interest rate spreads involves, as men-
tioned  above,  the  microeconomic  model  of  the
banking  firm.  Zarruk  (1989)  used  this  approach
seeing the bank as a firm that seeks to maximise
the expected utility of its profits. The advantage of
this approach is that it easily allows the model to
include the cost of banking operations. In Zarruk’s
model the bank faces uncertainty as to the level of
deposits it will be offered, while the demand for
loans function is known. Aside from the risk asso-
ciated with this uncertainty, this model does not
take into account any other banking risks, a fact
held  by  Wong  (1997)  to  be  the  reason  why
Zarruk’s conclusions contrast with the theoretical
and empirical results of Ho and Saunders (1981).
Correspondingly,  in  the  model  by  Zarruk  and
Madura (1992), which also adopts this approach,
the sole source of uncertainty is the —unknown—
probability of the borrower’s default on payment
obligations,  which  implies  some  credit  risk.  By
contrast, Wong (1997) presents a more compre-
hensive model that takes into account both credit
and interest-rate risks, as well as cost elements
and characteristics of the institutional framework
(e.g. the bank’s obligations regarding capital ade-
quacy). The conclusions drawn from this theoreti-
cal  analysis  confirm  the  findings  of  Ho  and
Saunders (1981) with respect to the direction of
the various factors’ effect on the size of the inter-
est rate spread.
3. Determinants of bank interest rates and
interest rate spreads
The theoretical models briefly presented in the
previous  section  suggest  certain  factors  that
affect  the  size  of  the  interest  rate  spread.10
However, there are also other determinants that
are not taken into account in these models, either
because it is hard to include the respective vari-
ables in these theoretical approaches, or because
these  determinants  refer  to  specific  banking
products and thus only affect the corresponding
rates. Hence, empirical studies on the issue also
integrate some ad hoc variables that do not stem
directly  from  specific  theoretical  models.  This
section  presents  the  interest  rate  spread  and
bank rate determinants proposed in the theoreti-
cal and empirical literature.11 At the same time, it
presents quantitative evidence on Greece and the
euro area with respect to the most important of
these determinants, attempting to identify those
that can explain the observed interest rate differ-
entials between Greece and the monetary union
as a whole.
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9 This approach was not taken up in the literature as extensively
as the one adopting the dealership model, perhaps due to the dif-
ficulty of using it in empirical applications, but maybe also due to
the  partly  contrasting  conclusions  reached  by  the  studies  that
employ it.
10 By affecting the lending rates, the deposit rates, or both.
11 Given that the present study approaches this issue in the light
of the interest rate differentials observed among the euro area
countries, it narrows its scope to the factors for which there is het-
erogeneity among these countries and which can therefore con-
tribute to the explanation of these differentials.Banking market structure
The  dealership  model  provides  a  direct  link
between  the  structure  of  a  banking  market,
regarding its level of competition, and the size of
the interest rate spread. Specifically, according
to this model, banks’ market power allows them
to apply higher interest rate spreads and thus to
obtain  higher  rents  (Ho  and  Saunders,  1981;
Saunders  and  Schumacher,  2000).  This  theo-
retical prediction is confirmed by the empirical
results  of  Ho  and  Saunders  (1981)  for  the 
US, McShane and Sharpe (1985) for Australia,
Saunders  and  Schumacher  (2000)  for  six
European  countries  and  the  US,  as  well  as
Maudos and Ferna ’ndez de Guevara (2004) for
five EU countries.
Although a banking market’s competitive condi-
tions depend on numerous parameters,12 a large
part of the relevant literature examines in par-
ticular the banking system’s concentration level,
i.e. the degree to which a small number of credit
institutions  has  a  large  share  in  the  market.
From a theoretical perspective, the concentra-
tion level may have either a positive or a nega-
tive effect on the interest rate spread, depending
on the cause that leads to high concentration
(Berger  and  Hannan,  1989).  According  to  the
structure performance hypothesis, high concen-
tration  leads  banks  to  adopt  non-competitive
behaviour with a view to extracting monopolis-
tic rents, which results, among other things, in a
high level of interest rate spreads. By contrast,
the efficient structure hypothesis suggests that
banks differ as to their efficiency,13 and conse-
quently the more efficient banks grow faster or
absorb  the  less  efficient  ones,  a  development
that leads to higher concentration. In this case,
concentration  results  from  the  more  efficient
banks’  preponderance,  and  their  higher  effi-
ciency will be reflected, to some extent, in lower
interest rate spreads.
The relevant empirical literature includes a sub-
stantial number of studies that examine, among
other things, the effect of the banking system’s
concentration level on the interest rate spread.
Demirgüç-Kunt  and  Huizinga  (1999),  using  a
sample  of  banks  from  80  countries  over  the
1988-1995  period,  find  no  statistically  signifi-
cant  effect  of  the  concentration  level  of  each
country’s  banking  system  on  the  respective
interest  rate  spread.14 Demirgüç-Kunt  et  al.
(2004), in a sample of more than 1,400 banks
from 72 countries over the 1995-1999 period,
initially detect a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect, which is nevertheless minor from an
economic standpoint, as it only explains a rela-
tively small part of the interest rate spread dif-
ferentials observed among the countries in the
sample. Moreover, when national differences in
the  institutional  and  macroeconomic  environ-
ment are also taken into account, the concen-
tration  level  loses  much  of  its  explanatory
power.  Similar  conclusions  are  reached  by
Claeys and Vander Vennet (2003), using a sam-
ple of 18 Central and Eastern European coun-
tries.  By  contrast,  Martinez  Peria  and  Mody
(2004)  find  a  significant  positive  relationship
between the concentration level and the interest
Determinants of bank interest rates and comparisons between Greece and the euro area
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12 E.g. the existence of administrative or economic barriers to
entering the market, the existence of limitations in the activities of
credit  institutions,  the  existence  of  competition  by  non-bank
financial institutions, etc. – see Claessens and Laeven (2004).
13 Possibly due to the existence of economies of scale in the bank
intermediation process – see e.g. Diamond (1984).
14 Nevertheless, they detect a positive and statistically significant
relation between concentration level and bank profitability.rate spread in a sample of banks from five South
American countries.
Another strand in the empirical literature investi-
gates  the  relationship  between  the  banking  sys-
tem’s concentration level and certain categories of
bank  interest  rates.  Berger  and  Hannan  (1989),
examining a sample of US banks, find a negative
relationship between the interest rates on various
categories of deposits and the concentration level
of  the  local  banking  markets.15 Neumark  and
Sharpe (1992), also using a sample of US banks,
arrive at the same conclusion. In addition, they find
that the banks’ response to changes in money mar-
ket rates is asymmetrical, i.e. in case of a decline in
money market rates they reduce their deposit rates
faster than they raise them in case of an increase in
money market rates.16 This asymmetry is more pro-
nounced  for  banks  operating  in  markets  charac-
terised by higher concentration. As regards banking
markets  in  the  euro  area,  Corvoisier  and  Gropp
(2002) calculate concentration indices for 4 cate-
gories  of  lending  products  and  3  categories  of
deposit  products  in  each  of  the  10  countries
included in their sample,17 and examine the effect
of these indices, along with other variables, on the
differential of the respective interest rates over the
money  market  rate.  This  approach  allows  the
researchers  to  estimate  the  extent  to  which  the
effect  of  the  concentration  level  on  the  interest
rates differs among banking products. Corvoisier
and Gropp (2002) find that an increased concen-
tration level is associated with 100 to 200 basis
points higher interest rates in the case of loans, and
roughly as much lower ones in the case of demand
deposits. By contrast, as regards savings deposits
and time deposits, increased concentration is asso-
ciated with interest rates that are about 100 to 200
basis points higher.18
Regarding the structure of the Greek banking
system, its concentration level, as measured by
the Herfindahl index, although higher than the
euro  area  average,  is  significantly  lower  than 
in  the  countries  with  the  highest  concentra-
tion (Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland, see
Chart 1).19,20 A rise in concentration is observed
between 1997 and 2005 —as is the case for all
euro area countries— which is mainly due to
the  bank  mergers  and  acquisitions  that  took
place at the later half of the previous decade
and early in the current one, partly within the
context of reducing the public sector’s involve-
ment in the domestic banking system.
However, the use of the concentration level as a
proxy for measuring the competitive conditions
prevailing  in  a  market  has  been  criticised  in 
the relevant literature (see e.g. Claessens and
Laeven, 2004). More specifically, the view cur-
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15 In more detail, they estimate that the deposit rates offered by
banks operating within markets with the highest concentration are
25 to 100 basis points lower than those offered by banks operat-
ing within markets with the lowest concentration.
16 Gropp et al. (2007) detect a similar asymmetry in the euro
area countries.
17 Their study was carried out before Greece entered the monetary
union,  and  it  also  does  not  include  Luxembourg.  Concentration
indices for the basic categories of loan banking products available
to households in Greece are presented in a study by Chalamandaris
(2006),  which  also  includes  a  comparative  presentation  of  the
respective interest rates in Greece and the euro area.
18 Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) attribute this to the fact that, as
regards savings and time deposits, savers appear more willing to
incur the cost entailed in finding the most favourable terms of
deposit, and therefore systematically search for higher interest
rates. High concentration in this case facilitates their search and
enhances competition between banks.
19 The literature examining the effect of concentration level on
the profitability of banks in Greece does not allow any clear con-
clusions to be drawn as to whether it is the efficient structure
hypothesis or the structure performance hypothesis that holds
(see  Eichengreen  and  Gibson,  2001;  Gibson,  2005;  and
Athanassoglou et al., 2006).
20 It should be noted however that the euro area average is affected
by  the  low  concentration  level  observed  in  some  countries  (e.g.
Germany, Italy and Luxembourg) for historical or other reasons.rently upheld in industrial organisation theory is
that the factor decisively determining the behav-
iour of market participants is the threat of new
entrants (i.e. the market’s “contestability”, see
Besanko and Thakor, 1992), an aspect that can-
not be captured by the concentration level. In
this respect, the segments of the banking mar-
ket in which physical proximity to the customer
is  important  (e.g.  retail  banking  markets)  are
less “contestable”. Indeed, such markets show
relatively large interest rate differentials among
euro  area  countries  (European  Central  Bank,
2006a). By contrast, in markets where physi-
cal proximity is not important (e.g. the repos
market) the respective yields tend to be the
same or to differ only slightly. To overcome
these  weaknesses  of  the  concentration
indices,  Van  Leuvensteijn  et  al. (2007)  use  a
new measure of the competitive conditions pre-
vailing in the banking markets of 8 euro area
countries, the Boone index.21 Their findings con-
firm  the  existence  of  a  negative  relationship
between  the  level  of  competition  and  lending
rates. However, Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007)
find  that  increased  competition  is  associated
with lower interest rates on deposits as well.
Linked to the competitive pressure banks face is
the availability of non-bank sources of financing
and savings options. Thus, for instance, the exis-
tence of developed capital markets is expected to
reduce bank lending rates, as it offers alternative
sources  of  financing  (issuance  of  shares  and
bonds), at least to enterprises that have access to
them. Correspondingly, it offers savers alternative
investment  opportunities,  making  the  supply  of
Determinants of bank interest rates and comparisons between Greece and the euro area
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21 The Boone index is a new way of measuring the competitive
conditions prevailing in a market, which has been proposed in the
industrial organisation theory literature (see e.g. Boone, 2004). In
brief, it can be said that the Boone index measures the extent of
the correlation between the market share a business holds and its
efficiency.deposit  facilities  more  elastic  and  pushing  the
respective interest rates upwards. Indeed, Affinito
and Farabullini (2006) find that in the euro area
countries the availability of alternative investment
opportunities is associated with increased deposit
rates.22 Nevertheless, in contrast to the theoretical
prediction, their estimates suggest that increased
issuance  of  shares  by  enterprises  is  associated
with increased lending rates.
Banks’ operating costs
Both  the  microeconomic  model  of  the  banking
firm  (Wong,  1997)  and  the  dealership  model
(Maudos and Ferna ’ndez de Guevara, 2004) sug-
gest a positive relationship between banks’ oper-
ating costs and the interest rate spread. For Wong
(1997) this relationship stems from the fact that
as a bank’s operating costs increase its revenue
decreases,  and  consequently  its  risk  aversion
becomes  stronger.23 Thus,  in  order  to  limit  its
exposure to risks, the bank reduces the amount of
loans  it  grants,  raising  its  lending  rate  and  by
extension its interest rate spread. A positive rela-
tionship  between  the  interest  rate  spread  and
operating costs also emerges from the monopo-
listic banking firm model proposed by Monti and
by Klein (Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972), according to
which banks pass their operating costs through to
their customers in the form of higher lending rates
and lower deposit rates.
Overall,  the  empirical  literature  confirms  these
theoretical predictions. In more detail, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999) using a large interna-
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 14
22 Moreover, Gropp et al. (2007) find that, in the euro area coun-
tries, the intensity of the competition that banks face from non-
bank financial institutions is positively associated with the speed
with which they adjust their interest rates when money market
rates change.
23 Wong  (1997)  assumes  a  negative  relationship  between  the
income of a bank and the degree of its risk aversion.tional  sample,  Maudos  and  Ferna ’ndez  de
Guevara (2004) using a sample of five EU coun-
tries, and Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) with
data from banks from five South American coun-
tries find a statistically significant, positive rela-
tionship between banks’ operating costs and the
interest rate spread.
The Greek banking system, despite the improve-
ment recorded in recent years, is characterised
by the highest operating costs as a percentage of
total assets among the euro area countries (see
Chart 2). To some extent, this fact is associated
with the small size of the country’s banking sys-
tem,  measured  on  the  basis  of  total  assets  of
either  all  the  banks  (see  Chart  3)  or  the  five
larger ones (see Chart 4).24 Specifically, the small
size of banks in Greece does not allow them to
take  full  advantage  of  the  economies  of  scale
that  characterise  the  bank  intermediation
process, a feature observed globally with respect
to relatively small banks (Demirgüç-Kunt et al.,
2004).25 Moreover, in Greece the average level
of deposits and loans is relatively low, a fact that
leads to higher operating costs for banks as it
entails a larger number of bank transactions for
a given level of deposits or loans.
Credit risk
Both the extended dealership model proposed by
Angbazo (1997) and the microeconomic models
of  the  banking  firm  suggested  by  Zarruk  and
Madura  (1992)  and  Wong  (1997)  stress  the
Determinants of bank interest rates and comparisons between Greece and the euro area
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24 A simple examination of the statistical relationship between
operating costs and size in the banking systems of the euro area
countries,  based  on  Kendall’s  rank  correlation  coefficient,  pro-
vides  evidence  of  a  weak  negative  relationship.  This  notwith-
standing, drawing any definite conclusions would require a thor-
ough econometric investigation of the issue.
25 Regardless of operating costs, smaller banks may also face
higher financing costs since often, due to their small size, they
receive a lower credit rating, which increases their cost of financ-
ing from the market.importance of credit risk as a determinant of the
interest  rate  spread.  Credit  risk  arises  to  the
extent that some —unknown with any certainty—
portion of the loans extended will finally not be
repaid. To compensate for undertaking such risk,
banks  demand  a  risk  premium  on  the  lending
rate, the size of which increases proportionately
to the credit risk involved. This gives rise to a pos-
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 16itive relationship between the interest rate spread
and credit risk, which is confirmed by the empiri-
cal results of Angbazo (1997) for the US and of
Maudos and Ferna ’ndez de Guevara (2004) for five
EU countries.26
An —imperfect— measure extensively used in the
literature for the quantitative approximation of the
size of the credit risk banks are exposed to is the
percentage of non-performing loans.27 According
to this measure, credit risk in the Greek banking
system  is  considerably  higher  than  in  the  euro
area. In more detail, at the end of 2004 non-per-
forming loans in Greece corresponded to 7.0% of
total loans, while the respective percentage in the
euro area was 3.1%.28
An issue associated with credit risk and its effect
on bank lending rates is the availability of infor-
mation  required  for  the  assessment  by  credit
institutions of the creditworthiness of prospec-
tive borrowers. Access to more complete infor-
mation allows banks to assess more accurately
the credit risk they undertake and to price it more
appropriately in each case. In Greece, despite the
progress recorded in recent years with the initia-
tives taken by Tiresias SA, there are still consid-
erable limitations to the availability of informa-
tion regarding the financial behaviour of individ-
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26 However, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) in their empirical
study of a sample of five South American countries find a statisti-
cally insignificant albeit positive relation between the interest rate
spread and credit risk.
27 The percentage of non-performing loans refers to borrowers
who have defaulted on some payment obligation. However, this
percentage does not necessarily reflect the entire potential risk
that is inherent in banks’ portfolios and has not yet manifested
itself, which in an environment of strong credit expansion may be
quite high. Furthermore, it offers no information regarding the
part of total receivables that can be recovered, e.g. through the
sale of assets serving as collateral for the loan. Finally, as there is
no internationally established definition of non-performing loans,
comparisons of non-performing loan ratios between countries are
not always instructive.
28 At the end of 2005, for the medium-sized banks of the entire EU,
the respective ratio was 2.9%, while in Greece it was 6.3% – see
Bank of Greece (2006a) and European Central Bank (2005b, 2006c).uals and legal entities. Thus, the relevant cover-
age in Greece is narrower than in the other euro
area countries, except for France and Finland (see
Chart  5).29 Another  parameter  associated  with
the effect of credit risk on bank rates is the per-
centage of the amount receivable that the bank
will finally be able to collect in case a borrower
does not repay his/her loan. This percentage is to
a great extent related with the institutional frame-
work governing the protection of creditors’ rights
in each country, as well as with the effectiveness
of the judicial system in safeguarding creditors’
rights. As Chart 6 shows, according to the rele-
vant index published by the World Bank,30 among
the euro area countries Greece and Italy are the
ones with the weakest legal protection of credi-
tors.31 Moreover, the Greek judicial system does
not appear to be particularly effective in protect-
ing creditors, as, according to World Bank data,32
Greece ranks second to Italy among the euro area
countries  with  respect  to  the  number  of  days
required for a commercial dispute to be settled
through  judicial  channels  (see  Chart  7).  Even
when the receivable at issue is covered by real
collateral (e.g. prenotation or mortgage on real
estate in the case of housing or other loans),
the  process  for  collecting  the  amount  due
through sale of the underlying asset is particu-
larly protracted in Greece (at least 24 months,
see  Chart  8).  This  weaker  legal  protection  of
creditors’ rights along with the lower effective-
ness of the judicial system in safeguarding these
rights entail a higher cost for credit institutions,
which may affect bank rates.
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 18
29 In  addition,  given  that  the  collection  of  financial  behaviour
data  (risk  concentration  system)  in  Greece  has  started  only
recently (2003), there is no clear evidence of how such behaviour
is affected by cyclical downturns.
30 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/GettingCredit/.
31 For the index’s construction methodology, see Djankov et al.
(2006).
32 See  http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/Enforcing
Contracts/.Macroeconomic environment
The  two  fundamental  theoretical  models  pre-
sented in the previous section do not consider the
prevailing macroeconomic conditions as playing
any  special  role  in  shaping  bank  rates  and  the
interest rate spread.33 Nevertheless, there are sig-
nificant theoretical reasons on account of which
some  macroeconomic  environment  parameters
are expected to affect bank rates.
According to Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993),
real GDP growth has a positive effect on lending
rates,  as  the  improved  economic  environment
increases the number of investment projects that
will finally prove to be profitable (in terms of pos-
itive net present value), and so demand for credit
increases.  Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1993)  empha-
sise that only permanent increases in GDP bear
such  a  result,  while  transitory  ones  lead  enter-
prises to increase their internal financing, thereby
decreasing  the  demand  for  bank  credit.  At  the
same time, however, according to Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), by
exerting a positive effect on corporate net worth,
GDP  growth  increases  banks’  willingness  to
extend  loans  since  they  face  lower  risks.  As  a
result,  it  will  tend  to  push  lending  rates  down-
wards.  Consequently,  the  overall  effect  of  GDP
growth on lending rates is a priori ambiguous.
As regards deposit rates, income growth is asso-
ciated with a higher supply of savings, which
may put downward pressures on interest rates.
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33 Of course, the dealership model takes into account that inter-
est  rate  volatility,  which  is  associated  with  the  stability  of  the
macroeconomic environment, has an effect on the interest rate
spread. However, as this study aims at identifying the determi-
nants that can explain the differential of the Greek interest rates
over the respective euro area ones, and given that a single money
market operates within the monetary union and so interest rate
volatility is the same for all euro area countries, this factor is not
investigated any further.These  pressures  will  be  stronger  if  income
growth is transitory.
Bank rates are also affected by the level of infla-
tion, first of all through the Fisher effect, accord-
ing to which the same level of the real interest
rate can correspond to several different nominal
interest  rates,  depending  on  the  inflation
expected  each  time.  Moreover,  Huybens  and
Smith  (1998,  1999)  note  that  inflation  exacer-
bates  the  information  asymmetries  existing
between lenders and borrowers, increasing the
interest rate spread.34
The theoretical ambiguity regarding the relation-
ship between GDP growth and the interest rate
spread is also reflected in the empirical literature,
which  does  not  allow  drawing  definite  conclu-
sions.  More  specifically,  Demirgüç-Kunt  and
Huizinga (1999) do not identify any statistically
significant effect of the real GDP growth rate on
the interest rate spread in their sample of banks
from 80 countries, a conclusion reached also by
Demirgüç-Kunt  et  al. (2004)  with  respect  to  a
sample  of  banks  from  72  countries.  Brock  and
Rojas Suarez (2000) and Martinez Peria and Mody
(2004) also arrive at similar results for the South
American  countries  they  study.  Finally,  while
detecting a positive effect of the real GDP growth
rate on the interest rate spread for the Western
European  countries  included  in  their  sample,
Claeys and Vander Vennet (2003) find no such
relationship  for  the  Eastern  European  ones.  By
contrast,  the  upward  effect  of  inflation  on  the
interest rate spread has repeatedly been recorded
in  the  empirical  literature.  Such  an  effect  is
detected  by  Hanson  and  Rocha  (1986)  at  an
aggregate  level  for  29  economies,  as  well  as 
by  Demirgüç-Kunt  and  Huizinga  (1999)  and
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34 This argument is also put forward by Boyd et al. (2001).Demirgüç-Kunt et  al.  (2004)35 in  samples  that
include data at bank level from large numbers of
countries. A positive relationship between infla-
tion and the interest rate spread is also found by
Brock and Rojas Suarez (2000) in the four of the
five South American countries they examine,36 as
well as by Claeys and Vander Vennet (2003) in the
countries of both Western and Eastern Europe.
With respect to the Greek economy, the real GDP
growth rate in the 2001-2005 period was consid-
erably higher than the euro area average, second
only to the one in Ireland within the monetary
union (see Chart 9). However, the inflation rate in
Greece was also high in the same period, main-
taining a differential over the euro area (1.2 per-
centage  points  on  average,  see  Chart  10).  Still,
this differential is not wide enough to be exacer-
bating information asymmetries to such an extent
as  to  justify  the  higher  interest  rate  spread  in
Greece compared with the euro area.37
Special and technical factors
In addition to the aforementioned economic fac-
tors, bank rates and their differentials among euro
area countries are also affected by some technical
factors associated e.g. with the statistical classifi-
cation of the various banking products, as well as
with differences in established banking practices
or other national idiosyncrasies.
The  weighted  average  lending  rate  and  the
weighted average deposit rate —and by extension
the interest rate spread— reflect, in addition to the
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35 Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) note, however, that the effect of
inflation on the interest rate spread, although statistically signifi-
cant,  is  not  very  strong  from  an  economic  point  of  view.
Specifically, they estimate that a rise of 9 percentage points in
inflation leads to a widening of the interest rate spread by only 36
basis points.
36 In the case of Argentina, Brock and Rojas Suarez (2000) detect
a negative effect of inflation on the interest rate spread.
37 See also footnote 33.level of interest rates on individual loan and deposit
products, the composition of those two groups of
products.38 Thus,  if  a  large  part  of  household
indebtedness  relates  to  loans  through  credit
cards,39 which carry a high interest rate, this will
contribute to a high weighted average lending rate.
Correspondingly, if a large part of deposits are sav-
ings  deposits,40 which  have  low  yields,  the
weighted average deposit rate will be low. This fac-
tor is relevant not only for the weighted average
interest rate on total loans or deposits, but for that
on individual categories as well. For instance, the
composition of housing loans with respect to the
period during which the interest rate is fixed has an
effect on their average interest rate. By the same
token,  the  structure  of  time  deposits  as  regards
their maturity affects their average interest rate.
Of  course,  the  composition  of  loans  and  of
deposits is to a great extent endogenous, since it
reflects the choices made by banks and their cus-
tomers on the basis of the factors described above
as well as the institutional and regulatory frame-
work governing the operation of the banking sys-
tem (including tax regulations). In addition, fac-
tors such as the level of awareness of the bank
clientèle  and  its  consumer  culture  also  affect
these choices. In any case, the effect of the differ-
ent composition of loans and deposits in Greece
compared with the euro area on the interest rate
spread is quite significant, as it has been calcu-
lated41 that, if the composition per product that
holds  for  the  euro  area  were  to  be  applied  in
Greece, the interest rate spread differential would
be reduced to approximately half.
Another  determinant  that  must  be  taken  into
account when assessing bank interest rate differ-
entials  is  that  lending  rates  do  not  necessarily
incorporate  the  total  cost  arising  for  borrowers
from their borrowing relationship, since they are
often also charged with non-interest-rate fees and
expenses, such as loan agreement file expenses.
In the same vein, deposit rates do not reflect the
total benefits depositors enjoy, since they are also
offered  a  series  of  follow-on  services,  such  as
safekeeping, accounting, payment facilitation, etc.
Thus, banks may in certain cases charge lower
lending rates while imposing in parallel non-inter-
est-rate  charges,  and  also  offer  lower  deposit
rates  while  compensating  depositors  with  the
additional services they offer.
The  empirical  literature  confirms  the  impor-
tance of this factor. Ho and Saunders (1981),
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) and Maudos
and Ferna ’ndez de Guevara (2004) find a posi-
tive, statistically significant effect of banks’ net
non-interest “payments”42 on the interest rate
spread.43 As Chart 11 shows, banks’ non-inter-
est “payments” in Greece are the highest among
euro area countries.44
Another  factor  associated  with  the  aforemen-
tioned one are the cross sales at which banks aim
by offering more favourable interest-rate terms in
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38 The  importance  of  this  factor  is  emphasised  in  European
Central Bank (2006a).
39 In Greece at the end of 2006 the outstanding balance of loans
through credit cards corresponded to 33% of total consumer loans.
40 Savings deposits in Greece at the end of 2006 corresponded
to 43% of total deposits.
41 See Bank of Greece (2007).
42 Net non-interest “payments” (defined as the ratio of non-inter-
est expenses less non-interest income to total assets) are used as
a proxy for measuring the services banks offer to their customers
without charging any explicit fee.
43 However, Angbazo (1997) finds no significant effect of net
non-interest-rate “payments” on the interest rate spread.
44 Although  this  proxy  is  extensively  used  in  the  literature  as
already mentioned, it must be interpreted with caution as it may
also reflect the efficiency of the banking system.specific  cases.  For  instance,  a  usual  practice  in
some countries is to offer housing loans with a
lower  interest  rate  provided  that  the  borrower
also brings his/her savings or insurance business
to the specific banking group. Moreover, in some
countries there are specialised housing banks45 in
operation, which grant loans for house purchase
at favourable interest rates to prospective borrow-
ers who have made regular deposits to an account
over a specific time period.
Finally, government policies aimed at facilitating e.g.
the access of small and medium-size enterprises to
bank financing or the purchase of a house by house-
holds affect the respective bank rates. Thus, in some
euro area countries a government guarantee is pro-
vided on bank loans to small and medium enter-
prises46 as  well  as  to  households  for  house  pur-
chase.47 This guarantee limits the credit risk under-
taken by credit institutions, enabling them to apply
more favourable interest rates on the specific loans.
4. Interest rate differentials among euro area
countries
Although  a  single  monetary  policy  is  pursued
across the euro area and the money market has
essentially been integrated, differences in bank
rates persist among member countries. Although
such  differences  tend  to  gradually  subside,
interest  rate  dispersion  remains  considerable,
especially  as  regards  deposit  rates.48 Among
these  interest  rates,  the  highest  dispersion  is
observed  in  enterprises’  and  households’
overnight deposits. As regards lending rates, the
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45 E.g. the “Bausparkassen” that operate in Germany and Austria.
46 E.g. in Greece this guarantee is provided through the Fund for
the Provision of Guarantees to Small and Very Small Enterprises
(TEMPME).
47 E.g.  in  the  Netherlands  the  government-run  “National
Hypotheek Garantie” (NHG) fund provides guarantees on loans
for house purchase or restoration.
48 These observations regarding interest rate dispersion in the
euro area draw on European Central Bank (2006a).highest dispersion is observed in loans without
a  defined  maturity  to  enterprises  and  in  con-
sumer  loans.  By  contrast,  in  loans  for  house
purchase interest rate dispersion is very limited.
The euro area monetary authorities, at both the
European Central Bank and the National Central
Banks level, in view of the observed differences
in interest rates among the euro area countries,
have proceeded to publishing a series of docu-
ments that attempt to identify the factors that
can explain such differences (see e.g. European
Central  Bank,  2006a;  McNeill,  2003;  Baugnet
and Hradisky, 2004; De Nederlandsche Bank,
2004;  Deutsche  Bundesbank  2004;  Maza  and
SanchÈ ’s, 2004; Banca d’ Italia, 2005). Recently
however,  national  differences  in  bank  rates
among the euro area countries have also been
the subject of systematic empirical analysis.
In  more  detail,  Affinito  and  Farabullini  (2006)
focus their attention on 5 categories of loans to
households, 5 categories of deposits by house-
holds  and  4  categories  of  loans  to  enterprises,
using  the  new,  harmonised  series  of  Monetary
Financial Institutions’ interest rates compiled by
the European System of Central Banks since 2003.
Initially, they econometrically establish the exis-
tence of considerable heterogeneity among inter-
est rates in the euro area countries. Then, they
examine the extent to which this heterogeneity
can still be detected when the factors considered
as  its  probable  causes  are  taken  into  account.
These factors are broken down into three general
categories:  (i)  factors  related  to  demand  (real
GDP growth rate, disposable income, existence of
alternative forms of savings, existence of alterna-
tive sources of financing, exposure to credit risk
and average enterprise size); (ii) factors related to
bank characteristics (operating costs, non-interest
income, liquidity and capital adequacy, asset and
liability structure); and (iii) factors related to the
structure of the credit system (presence of inter-
national  banks,  banking  market  concentration
level, average bank size, and bank mergers and
acquisitions).
The estimates by Affinito and Farabullini (2006)
lead to the conclusion that if national differences
with respect to the above factors are taken into
account, interest rate heterogeneity among euro
area  countries  is  reduced  considerably.  More
specifically, for 10 of the 12 member countries of
the  monetary  union,  approximately  50%  (or
more) of the interest rate differences become sta-
tistically insignificant when these factors are taken
into  account  (with  the  exceptions  of  Spain  and
Portugal,  where  the  respective  percentages  are
lower). In addition, when such factors are taken
into account, interest rate spread heterogeneity is
also considerably lower.
With respect to Greece, out of the 104 possible
differences  between  interest  rate  pairs  that
Affinito and Farabullini (2006) examine, when dis-
regarding the above factors only 7 differences are
statistically insignificant (i.e. from a statistical per-
spective the interest rates are not different). On
the other hand, when these factors are taken into
account,  this  number  rises  to  53  (51%  of  all
cases). Therefore, the differences between Greece
and the euro area in the variables that Affinito and
Farabullini  (2006)  include  in  their  estimates
explain a large part of the Greek bank rate differ-
ential over the respective interest rates in other
euro area countries.
In a recent study, Kok So /rensen and Lichtenberger
(2007) apply the methodology followed by Affinito
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housing loans in the euro area countries. In inter-
preting  the  observed  interest  rate  differentials,
aside from the general determinants that have an
effect on all banking products, they also use some
special factors related specifically to this market.49
Their estimates show that, when these special fac-
tors  are  taken  into  account,  the  percentage  of
interest rates that, from a statistical perspective,
have no differences increases considerably in the
categories of housing loans with a fixed rate for a
period of more than one and up to five years and
with a fixed rate for a period of more than ten
years. According to these authors, the largest part
of the heterogeneity observed among housing loan
interest rates is due to supply factors.
As regards Greece in particular, in the category of
housing loans with a floating rate or a fixed rate
for a period of up to one year —which is currently
the main housing loan category— if the above fac-
tors are taken into account, 36% of the interest
rate differences between Greece and other euro
area  countries  become  statistically  insignificant.
This percentage rises to 82% for housing loans
with a fixed rate for a period of one to five years,
which is the second most important housing loan
category.
5. Concluding remarks
The international theoretical and empirical liter-
ature has brought to light a multitude of deter-
minants thought to have an effect on both the
level of lending and deposit rates and the dif-
ference  between  them,  i.e.  the  interest  rate
spread. In the case of Greece, the examination
of these determinants in comparison with the
other  euro  area  countries  presented  in  this
study suggests that these factors can explain a
considerable part of the observed differences in
bank rates. This assessment is in line with the
conclusions  drawn  in  recent  empirical  studies
(Affinito  and  Farabullini,  2006;  Kok  So /rensen
and Lichtenberger, 2007) that examine interest
rate heterogeneity in euro area countries.
Some of the factors that play a role in shaping
bank rates in Greece at levels higher than the euro
area averages are related to inherent characteris-
tics of the domestic banking system and associ-
ated e.g. with its relatively more recent deregula-
tion, or with the conditions that marked its devel-
opment over time. Nevertheless, some of these
determinants can be affected by appropriate pol-
icy  measures  that  will  support  further  conver-
gence of the Greek interest rates with the respec-
tive ones in the euro area. For instance, strength-
ening creditors’ rights and improving the effec-
tiveness  of  the  judicial  system  in  safeguarding
these rights would help limit the credit risk banks
in  Greece  face.  Securing  fuller  information  on 
the financial behaviour of prospective borrowers 
—e.g. in the framework of the activities of Tiresias
SA— would constitute another step in the same
direction. Furthermore, raising the awareness of
bank customers so that they can make informed
choices  among  the  banking  products  with  the
most favourable terms for them would lead to a
more  rational  product  composition  of  total
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49 Indicatively, the determinants Kok SÔ /rensen and Lichtenberger
(2007)  consider  include,  among  other  things,  the  rate  of
increase in real estate prices, the degree to which banks engage
in the securitisation of loans, the degree to which they raise
funds in the money and capital markets, as well as the difference
between the total annual percentage rate of charge (SEPE) and
the interest rate, as an approximation of the non-interest cost of
borrowing.deposits and loans, with positive implications for
the Greek interest rate differentials over the euro
area  averages.  At  the  same  time,  Greek  banks’
continued efforts to improve their efficiency and
curtail their operating costs are also expected to
contribute  to  a  reduction  of  the  interest  rate
spread,  to  the  extent  that  at  least  part  of  the
resulting benefit will be passed through to interest
rates. Finally, it is obvious that in any event the
most  competitive  conditions  possible  must  be
ensured in the banking market, so as not to facil-
itate the exercise of monopoly power by banks.
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In  recent  years,  bank  loans  to  households  have
grown at a high rate (almost 30%) and bank pene-
tration into this sector of the economy has increased
significantly.1 These developments raise concerns as
to whether households are borrowing excessively
and  that  the  credit  risk  taken  by  banks  is  high,
although the outstanding balance of bank loans to
households as a percentage of GDP remains lower
in Greece than the euro area average.2
Aggregate  data,  however,  are  not  sufficient  to
assess  how  borrowing  is  distributed  among
household groups. Therefore, in order to assess
the financial condition of households and to exam-
ine their degree of indebtedness and the distribu-
tion  of  financial  pressure  on  them,  the  Bank  of
Greece repeated in 2005 the sample survey con-
ducted in 2002.3 The results of this survey were
published on the Bank of Greece website in March
2006 and in the Annual Report 20054 and were
also presented at the third conference of the Irving
Fisher Committee.5 The aim of this study is to pro-
vide a detailed analysis of the results of the survey
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* The views expressed in the article are those of the writers and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Greece. We
would like to thank Heather Gibson and also our colleagues who
attended a seminar concerning the above issue for their useful
comments.  Any  errors  contained  herein  are  exclusively  the
responsibility of the authors.
1 It is indicative that, in the three years 2003-2005, the number
of bank housing loan accounts rose at an annual average rate of
16%,  the  number  of  credit  cards  by  8%  and  the  number  of
accounts of other bank loans to households by 27%.
2 At the end of 2005, the outstanding balance of bank loans to
households  excluding  securitised  amounts  corresponded  to
36.3% of GDP in Greece (or to 38% including securitised loans),
compared with 52.6% on average in the euro area.
3 See: Mitrakos, Simigiannis and Tzamourani (2005).
4 See Bank of Greece, Annual Report 2005, Appendix to Chapter
VI, Athens 2006.
5 See Simigiannis and Tzamourani (2006).in terms of the significance of households’ socio-
economic characteristics in determining their loan
obligations.
In the next section, a summarised description of
the sample survey is given, while in the third sec-
tion,  the  distribution  of  households  within  the
main categories of loans is provided. In the fourth
section,  the  importance  of  households’  socio-
economic characteristics in determining the like-
lihood  of  a  household  having  taken  a  loan  is
examined  with  the  aid  of  a  logistic  regression
model. Sections 5 and 6 examine the correlation
of the level of indebtedness both with the income
and wealth of households and with the age of the
household head, while Section 7 shows the dis-
tribution of financial pressure on households in
relation to their income and to whether or not
they  are  home  owners.  Section  8  contains  an
analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of
households which declared that they do not ser-
vice their loan obligations properly. The final sec-
tion concludes.
2. Description of the survey
The survey was carried out in the last quarter of
2005 and covered 6,000 households in urban and
semi-urban areas of Greece. A random sampling
technique,  stratified  by  geographical  areas,  was
used to ensure that the sample was representative
of the surveyed population.
Through the survey, full responses6 —i.e. from all
adult members of the household— were received
from 3,120 households, thus bringing the aver-
age response rate to 52%, much higher than in
2002 (38%).
The  survey  conducted  by  the  Bank  of  Greece  in
2002  covered  only  household  members  aged  25
and over (25+). The new survey covered all house-
hold members aged 18 and over (18+). For reasons
of comparability, however, the results of this study
concern household mambers aged 25+.7
As the response rate varied across geographical
areas, the data were weighted in order to reflect
the population structure by area. Moreover, the
distribution of the sample households’ size was
adjusted in order to correspond to the distribution
of the population according to the 2001 census.
These weights restore the representativeness of
the  sample  to  the  extent  that  the  borrowing
behaviour of the originally selected households
that did not respond is the same as that of the
responding households. However, this cannot be
verified on the basis of the available data and,
therefore, the survey results must be treated with
some caution.
Table 1 shows that 47.7% of households reported
some outstanding loan.8 This percentage is a lit-
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6 The questionnaire covered all categories of household borrow-
ing. For each type of loan, the duration, initial amount and out-
standing balance were recorded, together with the size of the last
instalment paid. Thereafter, information was requested concern-
ing the income and the wealth of the household. In 2005, the
questionnaire was enriched with questions about the difficulties
encountered, in the correspondents’opinion, in servicing properly
their loan obligations, in conjunction with the payment of other
regular fixed expenses, as well as with questions about whether
the respondents had ease of access to bank borrowing.
7 In the Annual Report 2005 and in Simigiannis and Tzamourani
(2006)  certain  data  are  given  concerning  the  distribution  of
indebted households per category of loan and the average balance
of loans in the sample which includes all the members of house-
holds aged 18+. In neither of the two samples (18+ or 25+) do
the percentages or the average balance per loan category differ
substantially.
8 For households where all members aged 18+ were included,
this percentage stands at 46.9%.tle lower than in 2002 (48.4%). This small differ-
ence is not statistically significant, but the fact
that this percentage remained stable cannot be
considered  compatible  with  the  high  rate  at
which,  as  previously  noted,  bank  lending  to
households  increased  in  the  three  years  2003-
2005. It appears, therefore, that a proportion of
the households surveyed declined to declare that
they have taken loans.
More specifically, the amount of housing loans, as
recorded in the 2005 survey, leads to the estimate
that the total outstanding balance of this category
of loans came to € 26.2 billion, corresponding to
about 70% of the outstanding balance of housing
loans, as reported by banks.9 On the other hand,
the total outstanding balance of other bank loans
to households, estimated on the basis of the sur-
vey data, amounts to € 9 billion and corresponds
to 40% of the outstanding balance of these loans,
as recorded by banks. The available information
does not help to examine to what extent the sig-
nificant deviation between the survey-estimated
and bank-recorded outstanding balance of loans
is due to the fact that the percentage of house-
holds reporting a loan is relatively small or to the
likelihood that these specific households underes-
timated the balance outstanding on their loans, or
even  to  the  possibility  that  borrowing  is  more
concentrated among households that refused to
take part in the survey.10 However, when the sur-
vey  data  are  compared  with  data  submitted  by
banks to the Bank of Greece, the following points
come to light: the average outstanding balance of
housing loans per household, as recorded by the
2002 and 2005 surveys, increased at an average
annual  rate  of  12.1%,  while  the  corresponding
balance per account, as calculated from the rele-
vant bank data, increased at an average annual
rate of 11.3% in the same period.11 In addition,
households’  average  outstanding  balance  on
credit card loans, as shown by the sample sur-
veys, rose at an average annual rate of 21.3% dur-
ing 2003-2005, while the corresponding balance,
as  recorded  by  banks,  increased  at  an  average
annual rate of 19.4%12 over the same period. Con-
sequently,  the  average  annual  growth  rates  of
these two categories of loans, as calculated from
bank and survey data, do not differ substantially.
This  corroborates  the  view  that  the  borrowing
behaviour of non-responding households is gen-
Borrowing and socio-economic characteristics of households
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 33
9 Usually, housing loans are repaid in biannual instalments. In the
period  March-August  2005,  i.e.  during  the  crucial  six  months
before the survey, the average outstanding balance of housing
loans,  as  recorded  by  banks  (including  securitised  loans),
amounted to € 38.1 billion.
10 The deviation between the survey-estimated amount of loans
and the amount recorded in the macroeconomic figures is a com-
mon phenomenon. A similar deviation can be observed between
housing loans and other forms of bank borrowing. For instance, in
a relevant survey conducted in 2004 in the UK by the Bank of Eng-
land, the estimated outstanding balance on the basis of survey
data corresponded to 80% of the effectively recorded balance for
housing loans and 32% for unsecured bank loans (mainly con-
sumer loans). See May, Tudela and Young (2004).
11 The  outstanding  balance  of  housing  loans  per  account
(according to bank data) stood at € 34.9 thousand at end-2005
(including securitised loans), from € 25.3 thousand at end-2002.
Correspondingly, the outstanding balance of housing loans per
household  (according  to  the  2002  and  2005  surveys)  rose  to
€ 41.7 thousand in 2005, from € 29.6 thousand in 2002 (see Table
1).  Therefore,  the  outstanding  balance  of  housing  loans  per
account is lower than the average outstanding balance per house-
hold, indicating, as also shown by the surveys, that a number of
households have more than one housing loan. However, the rela-
tion between the two aggregates remained virtually unchanged,
since the outstanding balance per account corresponds approxi-
mately to 85% of the outstanding balance per household, indicat-
ing that the number of accounts per household did not change
substantially over this period.
12 Specifically, the outstanding balance of credit card loans, as
recorded  by  banks,  stood  at  € 8,445.4  million  at  end-2005  —
including securitised loans— compared with € 4,957.2 million at
end-2002.  Correspondingly,  the  outstanding  balance  of  credit
card loans per household, as recorded by the sample surveys,
stood  at  € 3,039  in  2005,  compared  with  € 1,701  in  2002.  It
should be noted that, if account is taken of the outstanding bal-
ance per household, the data are adjusted for the fact that the
number of households is different in the two surveys, thus mak-
ing the evolution of credit card loans comparable between banks
and  the  surveys,  given  that  the  number  of  Greek  households
remained almost unchanged during 2003-2005.erally  similar  to  that  of  responding  households
and, therefore, enhances the reliability of the sur-
vey results.
3. Loan categories
In order to present the results of the survey, loans
have been divided into two basic categories: loans
associated with the purchase of a dwelling —also
referred  to  in  this  survey  as  “housing  loans”—
which  include  loans  to  purchase  or  refurbish  a
home or to purchase land, and “other” or “mis-
cellaneous” loans, which include all other cate-
gories,  i.e.  non-housing  bank  loans,  credit  card
borrowing and loans from private individuals.
Table  1  shows  the  percentages  of  households
with loans falling into a specific category as part of
the total of indebted households, as well as the
average balance outstanding per loan category.
It appears that the distribution of indebted house-
holds throughout the different loan categories did
not change significantly in the period between the
two surveys. The most common category is credit
card  loans,  as  54.1%  of  households  with  out-
standing  loans  in  2005  had  such  debts.  The
increased use of credit cards for payments13 and
the easy access to this type of loan, within the lim-
its of each card, explain why they are widespread,
despite the fact that bank interest rates for these
loans are the highest among all loan categories.
The  second  most  common  category  is  housing
loans (38%), followed by unsecured bank loans
(28.9%,  being  mainly  personal  loans  and  loans
against supporting documents).14 Moreover, the
percentage share of households with outstanding
housing  loans  in  the  total  number  of  indebted
households is higher than in 2002. This is in line
with  the  rapid  increase  in  housing  loans,  since
new housing loans are contracted, as a rule, by
new borrowers. By contrast, the percentage share
of  households  which  declared  that  they  (also)
owe money on a different (non-housing) loan in
the total of indebted households declined in 2005
in  comparison  with  2002  (2005:  81.2%,  2002:
85.3%).  This  decline  relates  to  all  categories  of
loan and is particularly marked in the case of retail
store credit.
The  average  outstanding  balance  of  household
loans  increased  for  all  loan  categories  with  the
exception of retail store credit, which remained
stable.15
4. The relationship between borrowing and
the socio-economic characteristics of
households: logistic regression analysis
In order to examine the relationship between bor-
rowing  and  the  demographic  characteristics  of
households, logistic regression was used. A logis-
tic regression model correlates a binary variable
(i.e.  a  variable  with  two  values:  0  and  1)  with
other continuous or discrete/categorical variables.
More precisely, in this model, the dependent vari-
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13 Note  that,  at  end-2005,  two  credit  cards  corresponded  to
every three persons aged 20 and over. Moreover, the data sub-
mitted by banks to the Bank of Greece show that in 2003-2004
the number of credit card transactions increased at an average
annual rate of 15% and the value of transactions by 37%, reaching
€ 5.4 billion in 2004, from € 2.9 billion in 2002.
14 There is no significant difference between the percentages of
households per category of loan in the 18+ sample and the 25+
sample, see Bank of Greece, Annual Report 2006.
15 For a more detailed analysis of these developments, see Bank
of Greece, Annual Report 2006, and Simigiannis and Tzamourani
(2006).able is the logarithm of the ratio of the probability
that the dependent variable will take the value 1
to the probability that it will take the value 0 (i.e.
the logarithm of the relevant odds). In the analy-
sis that follows, models were assessed for three
independent  variables,  each  of  which  indicates
whether or not a household had (a) a loan of any
type, (b) a housing loan and (c) other, non-hous-
ing loans. The following were examined as inde-
pendent  variables,  i.e.  as  variables  which  are
likely to affect the probability of a household hav-
ing some type of loan: the degree of urbanisation
of the locality in which the household is situated,
the  family  status,  the  income  group  and  net
wealth group of the household, the age and edu-
cational level of the head of the household, the
number of household members in employment
and  whether  the  head  of  the  household  is
employed in the public or the private sector.
From alternative combinations of the above inde-
pendent variables, in order to explain each of the
three dependent variables, the two “best” models
were selected and are presented in Table 2. For
each dependent variable two models were chosen
such that the one included income and the other
included net wealth16 as one of the independent
variables, as these two variables both have a major
effect on the probability of a household having a
loan and are closely correlated. The models pre-
sented were selected on the basis of the following
criteria as regards the other independent variables:
(a) all the independent variables were statistically
significant at the level of at least 10% and (b) the
classification ratio, i.e. the percentage of cases in
which  the  model  correctly  showed  whether  a
household had a specific loan or not was compar-
atively higher. In Table 2, the independent variable
coefficients are presented. These coefficients, for
each category of independent variable, express the
ratio of the odds of a household (in the specific
category) having a loan to the odds of a household
in the reference category having a loan, with the
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Table 1
Indebted households by loan category
Without debt obligations  51.6 52.3
With debt obligations 48.4 100.0 47.7 100.0 15,532 19,637
House-related loans ("housing loans") 37.2 38.0 29,557 41,701
Other loans 85.3 81.2 4,246 6,275
– Credit cards 53.1 54.1 1,701 3,039
– Car purchase 20.9 20.1 5,815 7,159
– Other bank loans (personal, 
consumer etc.) 29.4 28.9 2,979 6,570
From retail stores 16.3 8.9 1,294 1,254
From other households 2.8 1.3 12,447 5,496
2005
Average debt (in euro)
2002 2005 2002
Percentage of households 
Loan category
Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% as some households have received more than one type of loan.
16 Net wealth is defined as the total assets of a household minus




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































oprerequisite that all the other variables included in
the model remain stable. Thus, in model 1, the
coefficient 1.41 of “Athens and Thessaloniki” indi-
cates that the ratio of the odds a household which
is resident in Athens or Thessaloniki having some
type of loan is 1.41 times greater than the corre-
sponding  odds  of  households  resident  in  other
urban areas (i.e. in the reference group used for
the specific regression).
The  results  of  this  analysis  have  been  compared
with those of 2002,17 in order to pinpoint any pos-
sible differences in household borrowing behaviour
in the period intervening between the two surveys.
As noted above, households in Athens and Thes-
saloniki are significantly more likely to have a loan
than  households  in  other  urban  areas.  This
increased likelihood reflects the correspondingly
high probability of households in Athens and Thes-
saloniki having a non-housing loan. By contrast,
for housing loans, the degree of urbanisation of a
household’s location of residence does not appear
to influence the probability of a household having
such a loan. The 2002 survey data provided simi-
lar results, though there is a difference in that the
latest survey also shows differentiation between
other urban and semi-urban areas. Households in
semi-urban  areas  are  significantly  less  likely  to
have some type of loan in comparison with house-
holds in other urban areas. This analysis appears
to indicate that, in the period intervening between
the two surveys, the degree of bank penetration
into semi-urban areas increased to almost match
that in other urban areas.
The probability of a household having a loan is
affected by the composition of the household. If
all the loans are examined, it can be observed
that couples with two or more children (refer-
ence group for the regression) are more likely to
have  a  loan  of  some  type  in  comparison  with
one-member households, couples, couples with
one child or other households, while the proba-
bility of households which comprise a couple and
other members excluding children having taken a
loan does not differ to any level of statistical sig-
nificance from that of the reference group. Simi-
lar results are obtained if the analysis is restricted
solely to housing loans or solely to other types of
loan. Thus, it appears that the composition of the
household is a significant factor in whether or not
the household takes out a loan, as the composi-
tion  to  a  large  degree  determines  its  financial
needs.
The age of the head of the household also appears
to have a significant impact on the probability of a
household having a loan, although no statistically
significant differences can be observed among age
groups  below  66  years  old.  More  specifically,
where the head of the household is over 66, the
probability of the household having some type of
loan in comparison with households in which the
head is in a different age group is lower. This result
is perhaps to be expected, as households where
the head of household is in this age group do not
usually still owe money on any housing loan they
may  once  have  had.  Moreover,  the  majority  of
these heads of household are pensioners. Thus, in
accordance with the life cycle theory of consump-
tion,  their  expenditure  for  consumption  must
depend, apart from their savings, i.e. their wealth,
chiefly on their current income. These households
do not generally expect this income to change to
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17 See Mitrakos, Simigiannis and Tzamourani (2005).any significant degree, which would allow them to
change  their  standard  of  living  correspondingly
and to fund any possible shortfalls via borrowing.
In  2002  a  difference  was  noted  for  households
where  the  head  was  aged  up  to  35  years  old.
These households too were less likely to have a
loan  in  comparison  with  households  where  the
head was aged between 35 and 65. It appears that
in the intervening years between the two surveys,
borrowing also expanded among households with
a younger head.
Household income and wealth affect the proba-
bility of a household having a loan. More specifi-
cally, the results of the regression show that there
is a positive correlation between income and the
likelihood of a specific household having a loan,
given that, the greater the income, the greater the
likelihood of borrowing. This positive correlation
can be observed both when borrowing as a whole
is examined and when housing and other loans
are examined separately, although the phenome-
non is considerably more evident in the case of
other loans.
The positive correlation between the probability
of  having  taken  a  loan  and  wealth  is  even
stronger. This result is to a large degree due to
housing loans, as taking a housing loan entails the
acquisition of wealth. There is also a positive cor-
relation between wealth and the probability of a
non-housing loan being taken, although this cor-
relation is less strong.
The educational level of the head of the household
did not appear to have any statistically significant
effect  on  the  probability  of  households  having
taken a loan, neither in the model containing all
loans nor in the two individual sub-models. This is
possibly due to the fact that the educational level
determines to some degree the income level of the
household. Indeed, if income is not included in the
logistic  regression  model,  the  educational  level
becomes statistically significant and thus appears
to play a role in determining the probability of a
household having some type of loan.
The  number  of  household  members  who  are  in
employment also affects the probability of a house-
hold having a loan, as households with more than
one  member  in  employment  are  more  likely  to
have a loan, particularly a non-housing loan. In the
model containing all loans, when there is control
for income, the number of members in employ-
ment is not statistically significant. This shows that
income is a more powerful determinant. In the case
of  non-housing  loans,  however,  the  existence  of
more than one working member in a household
increases  the  probability  of  such  a  loan  being
taken, irrespective of the household income. This
may reflect the fact that more members of the fam-
ily usually have other loans, particularly consumer
loans, than housing loans, for which just one mem-
ber of the household is usually liable.
Finally, whether the head of the household works
in the public sector or in the private sector has an
influence on the probability of a household having
taken out a housing loan. More specifically, the
probability is greater among those in the public
sector. This was also observed in 2002.
5. Debt-to-income and debt-to-wealth ratios
As seen in the previous section, the income and
wealth  of  households  affect  the  probability  of
their having some type of loan. In this section, the
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 38distribution of the level of borrowing and the loan
burden in relation to income and wealth is exam-
ined.18 As shown in Table 3, there is a positive
correlation between the level of household bor-
rowing and household income group,19 and aver-
age  indebtedness  per  income  group  rises  as
income increases. Indeed, the proportion of total
borrowing in the sample accounted for by those
in the lowest income groups is smaller than their
contribution to the sample, while the contribution
of the two highest groups, which together repre-
sent  31.9%  of  the  households  in  the  sample,
amounts to 47.2%. Similar results were observed
in 2002.20 These figures show that the access of
low-income  households  to  the  banking  system
remains limited, while it seems that, in the frame-
work of a more effective credit risk management,
competition between banks to attract customers
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18 In this section, a summary is provided of the results of the
analysis presented in Bank of Greece, Annual Report 2006, and
Simigiannis and Tzamourani (2006).
19 Households were requested to declare the net income of each
household member.
20 In addition, a positive correlation between income and bor-
rowing levels was observed by Cox, Whitely and Brierly (2002).
Table 3
Distribution of indebted households by income group
a. Total loans
Up to 7,500  8.3 5.4 3.5 3.4 5,684 12,637 25.7 61.2
7,501-15,000 27.8 28.2 19.0 22.5 10,238 15,655 29.2 37.7
15,001-25,000  33.5 34.5 32.8 26.9 14,783 15,325 22.8 29.4
25,001-35,000  16.3 19.0 19.6 27.1 18,182 27,976 15.4 34.2
35,001+  14.1 12.9 25.1 20.1 25,898 30,597 11.0 28.1
Total*  1,063 1,215 15,532 19,637 22.8 33.5
Median of
outstanding debt















Up to 7,500  5.9 4.8 3.0 3.4 14,846 29,418 252.7 262.0
7,501-15,000  23.5 24.1 17.0 22.9 21,407 39,754 103.6 272.7
15,001-25,000  32.7 31.1 32.7 24.3 29,565 32,739 86.1 123.1
25,001-35,000  17.1 23.1 20.8 29.0 35,906 52,834 74.1 106.2
35,001+  20.8 16.9 26.6 20.4 37,666 50,671 38.3 61.2
Total*  409 422 29,557 41,701 79.6 127.8
c. Other loans (non-housing)
Up to 7,500 8.9 5.3 5.1 3.5 2,412 4,154 25.2 41.3
7,501-15,000  28.4 28.8 25.5 21.3 3,805 4,620 20.2 21.8
15,001-25,000  33.4 35.6 33.2 34.2 4,221 6,006 10.2 15.3
25,001-35,000 15.7 17.6 16.0 21.6 4,327 7,653 8.5 12.4
35,001+  13.6 12.7 20.3 19.5 6,342 9,584 5.1 10.3
Total*  889 998 4,246 6,275 11.2 17.0
2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 2002
* Refers to all indebted households and concerns, respectively, the number of households, their average outstanding debt and the median of outstanding debt to
income.is more focused now than in the past on house-
holds in the highest income groups.
In any event, the vast acceleration of credit expan-
sion to households in 2003-2005 resulted in a sig-
nificant increase in their overall loan burden, as
measured  by  their  loan  to  income  ratio.  The
median21 of the loan burden for all households
rose  to  33.5%  in  2005,  from  22.8%  in  2002,
mainly reflecting the evolution of the housing loan
burden. It should be noted, however, that the loan
burden of households in the first income group
increased  substantially  compared  with  2002
(2005: 61.2%, 2002: 25.7%) and is much higher
than the average burden of all households.
Similar results can be observed when housing and
other  (non-housing)  loans  are  examined  sepa-
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Table 4
Distribution of indebted households by wealth group
a. Total loans
Up to 10,000 16.8 17.4 5.2 4.7 4,127 4,696 30.3 75.8
10,001-50,000 11.6 18.6 5.2 8.5 5,977 8,060 9.4 16.5
50,001-100,000 22.4 23.5 18.7 21.4 11,070 15,923 6.1 8.0
100,001-200,000 26.8 25.3 35.3 30.5 17,479 21,163 4.2 7.4
200,001+  22.0 15.3 35.6 34.8 21,078 39,899 1.4 5.0
Total* 978 1131 15,532 19,637 5.1 10.7
Median of
outstanding debt















U p   t o   1 0 , 0 0 0 ---- -- --
10,001-50,000 6.2 12.1 2.7 4.2 12,579 13,198 29.9 23.7
50,001-100,000 26.4 27.5 18.1 21.5 19,484 29,752 22.5 33.6
100,001-200,000 35.2 33.1 40.8 33.4 32,877 38,700 19.0 19.9
200,001+  31.5 26.7 38.2 40.8 34,418 58,442 5.7 11.4
Total*  328 363 29,557 41,701 13.2 19.9
c. Other loans (non-housing)
Up to 10,000 19.8 20.6 18.1 15.5 4,049 4,669 23.8 74.4
10,001-50,000 12.8 19.7 11.5 18.8 3,971 5,909 7.4 12.1
50,001-100,000 21.7 22.1 20.3 21.3 4,147 5,975 3.7 4.7
100,001-200,000 24.8 23.7 21.3 23.8 3,824 6,231 1.7 2.2
200,001+ 20.8 13.9 28.9 20.7 6,159 9,251 0.5 1.2
Total* 823 953 4,246 6,275 2.4 4.7
2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 2002
* Refers to all indebted households and concerns, respectively, the number of households, their average outstanding debt and the median of outstanding debt to
wealth.
** The number of households in this group is too small to be statistically assessed.
21 The median was chosen instead of the average on the basis of
the observation that the distribution of the loan burden is charac-
terised by a significant positive asymmetry, since there are few
but important outliers that affect the average disproportionately.rately (see Tables 3b and 3c). Average outstanding
loan  balances  in  both  these  categories  of  loan
have increased for all income groups. In addition,
the  associated  loan  burden  of  households  has
increased as the median of the outstanding bal-
ance  on  loans  has  risen  as  a  percentage  of
income. Particularly sharp increases in this ratio
can be observed in the case of the second income
group as far as housing loans are concerned, and
also as far as other types of loan are concerned in
the  case  of  lower  income  groups.  It  should  be
noted,  however,  that  households  in  the  lowest
wealth group represent a small percentage of the
sample (and, by extension, of the population) and
the  contribution  of  their  borrowing  to  total
indebtedness within the sample is small.
A  positive  relationship  can  also  be  observed
between the level of loans and the scale of house-
holds’  wealth.  On  average,  the  size  of  house-
holds’ loans increases in line with their wealth,
and households in the higher income groups have
correspondingly  higher  loan  balances  outstand-
ing. This positive correlation between the level of
borrowing and wealth reflects to a large degree
the distribution of housing loans, since taking a
housing  loan  means  that  a  property  of  similar
value is acquired (see Table 4). This correlation
was more pronounced in 2005 than in 2002, a
fact which must be directly related to the very
large increase in housing loans during the period
between the two surveys. By contrast, the contri-
bution of households in each wealth group in the
total of non-housing loans is relatively uniform,
indicating that households do not need to own
property to have access to other loans. For 50% of
households,  the  ratio  of  their  outstanding  loan
balance  to  their  wealth,  i.e.  the  median  of  this
ratio, despite increasing in 2005, does not exceed
the very low level of 10.7%, compared with 5.1%
in  2002.  The  median  is  relatively  high  (75.8%)
only in the case of households in the first wealth
group and there is a number of households whose
outstanding  non-housing  loan  balance  exceeds
their wealth.
6. The debt burden and the age of the house-
hold head
Table 5 shows the distribution of indebted house-
holds  in  relation  to  the  age  of  the  household
head. In comparison with the 2002 survey, this
distribution shows that the percentage of house-
holds with a household head aged up to 55 years
old was greater in the 2005 survey, while there
was a corresponding drop in the percentage of
households with a household head aged over 55
years.  The  contribution  of  those  in  lower  age
groups to the total survey loan balance was, in
general, greater in 2005, with the exception of
the second age group (35-45 years old), whose
contribution declined. For age groups up to 65
years old, an increase was observed in the aver-
age loan balance outstanding, while for all the
age groups an increase was noted in the median
of the loan balance as a percentage of income.
These results imply that, irrespective of the age of
the  household  head,  during  the  period  under
examination  borrowing  obligations  increased
more rapidly in general than income and the bulk
of new borrowing is concentrated among those
in lower age groups.
When examining the same variables for housing
loans, we can observe, as with loans as a whole,
that there has been an increase, in comparison
with 2002, in the percentage of borrowers repre-
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The share of those in the 25-35 year-old and the
46-55 year-old groups (particularly that of the for-
mer group) in the total balance outstanding on
these loans has also increased.
For all households whose head is up to 65 years
old, the average balance outstanding on housing
loans  has  grown,  with  a  particularly  sharp
increase in the case of households in the lowest
age group (head of household up to 35 years old),
i.e. the youngest households. This result is to be
expected, as such households have, in general,
taken out a housing loan more recently and are,
therefore,  at  the  beginning  of  the  repayment
period.  Not  only  do  such  households  have  the
greatest loan burden, i.e. the highest outstanding
loan  balance  to  income  ratio,  but,  in  addition,
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Table 5
Distribution of indebted households by age group
a. Total loans
Up to 35 15.8 16.8 14.2 21.1 13,338 24,732 22.8 36.4
36-45 26.8 29.4 34.8 32.4 19,300 21,634 27.3 36.1
46-55 22.2 25.4 22.8 26.6 15,235 20,536 24.2 43.7
56-65 17.1 16.6 14.4 14.9 12,433 17,525 19.3 35.4
66-75 11.9 9.1 8.7 3.9 10,881 8,295 15.0 15.1
76+  6.2 2.6 5.2 1.2 12,403 8,918 12.2 14.7
Total* 1063 1215 14,850 19,637 22.8 33.5
Median of
outstanding debt















Up to 35 11.0 14.7 13.9 23.1 37,050 65,440 170.0 329.7
36-45 26.9 31.3 37.2 33.7 41,049 44,965 128.5 166.7
46-55 24.2 29.6 22.7 27.2 27,788 38,337 82.6 100.0
56-65 19.8 16.1 13.9 12.6 20,805 32,591 30.5 87.4
66-75 11.7 6.4 6.9 2.3 17,366 14,734 34.0 25.9
76+ 6.6 1.9 5.4 1.2 24,457 25,235 25.7 133.3
Total* 409 422 29,557 41,701 79.6 127.8
c. Other loans (non-housing)
Up to 35 17.7 17.2 15.1 15.5 3,622 5,669 12.0 20.0
36-45 27.9 29.8 27.0 28.7 4,111 6,042 12.6 17.5
46-55 21.8 24.1 23.0 25.0 4,464 6,492 10.8 18.1
56-65 15.3 16.9 16.0 21.2 4,428 7,871 12.1 17.1
66-75 11.6 9.5 14.5 8.3 5,316 5,483 7.3 10.0
76+ 5.6 2.5 4.4 1.3 3,320 3,332 8.5 11.9
Total* 889 998 4,246 6,275 11.2 17.0
2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 2002
* Refers to all indebted households and concerns, respectively, the number of households, their average outstanding debt and the median of outstanding debt to
income.their burden increased during the period 2002-
2005  at  a  much  faster  rate  than  that  of  other
households (see Table 5).
A slight difference can be seen in the distribution
of households as far as “other” (i.e. non-housing)
loans are concerned. An increase is observed in
the percentage of indebted households headed by
people in the medium age groups (35-65 years
old) and the share of these age groups in the total
balance outstanding on loans within the sample
shows  a  corresponding  increase.  For  all  age
groups, however, the average balance outstand-
ing  on  these  loans  has  increased,  as  has  the
median of the loan balance to income ratio. The
greatest increase in this median relates to younger
households, i.e. those with a head 25-35 years
old, which have the highest median.
7. Debt-service costs and income
The ratio of loan balance to income shows the rel-
ative loan burden on households. However, this
ratio  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  all  house-
holds with a high debt burden are facing difficulty
in servicing their loans properly, as the loan repay-
ment period may be sufficiently long. One indica-
tor which measures financial pressure on house-
holds resulting from loan servicing is the ratio of
instalments paid to monthly income. According to
international literature, ratio values of up to 30% or
40% are considered satisfactory, in other words it
is accepted that households with a debt service
ratio of up to 40% can service their loans relatively
comfortably  (see  DeVaney,  1994,  Garman  and
Forgue,  1991,  and  Lytton,  Garman  and  Porter,
1991). As noted in Bank of Greece (2006), the dis-
tribution of debt service costs improved in 2005 in
comparison with 2002, in the sense that in 2005,
fewer households had a high debt service ratio.
More  specifically,  the  percentage  of  households
which had a debt service cost greater than 40% of
their  income  fell  to  12%  in  2005,  from  17%  in
2002. Of course, the significance of this ratio and
the limits within which it is desired to fluctuate in
order to allow households to service their loans
without difficulty are both associated with house-
holds’ disposable income and with the size of their
other  financial  obligations,  e.g.  rent  payment
obligations in cases where the household is not an
owner-occupier of a dwelling.
Table 6 presents the percentiles of the debt ser-
vice  to  income  distribution  for  three  income
groups for all households with some type of loan.
It also gives an analysis for households with or
without an owner-occupied dwelling. In addition,
Chart 1 illustrates the distribution of this ratio for
three  income  groups  and  for  households  as  a
whole in 2005 and 2002. As was to be expected,
the debt service ratio for households in the lowest
income group, i.e. with a net annual income of up
to  € 15,000,  is  higher  than  the  average  for  all
households.  Of  these  households,  35%  have  a
debt service ratio higher than 30% and 21% have
a ratio in excess of 40%. The distribution of the
debt service ratio improves markedly for the next
two income groups. In the medium income group
(€ 15,000 to € 30,000), 15% of households have a
debt  service  ratio  of  more  than  30%  of  their
income and just 8% have a ratio higher than 40%.
In the case of the highest income group, the per-
centage  of  households  with  debt-service  costs
higher than 30% drops to 11%.
Obviously,  it  is  easier  to  service  loans  when
there  are  no  other  obligations,  e.g.  rent.  As
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Table 6
Debt service to income ratio by income group and for owner-occupiers and tenants
(Percentages)
* Percentage of households with a debt service to income ratio less than or equal to the corresponding value shown in the table, e.g. for 20% of households the debt
service to income ratio did not exceed 8.3% of their income in 2005.
10 8.2 6.0 3.3 5.7 5.1 3.7 5.6
20 12.0 8.7 5.3 8.6 7.2 6.7 8.3
30 15.2 11.0 7.1 11.4 10.3 10.4 11.0
40 18.7 13.0 9.4 14.0 11.5 13.4 13.6
50 22.6 15.6 11.6 17.1 13.8 17.3 16.2
60 28.0 18.6 13.8 20.7 16.4 22.1 19.7
70 34.3 22.1 17.1 26.1 21.0 27.3 24.0
75 38.7 24.0 18.1 29.3 22.3 32.0 27.6
80 42.5 27.8 20.6 33.3 24.1 36.3 31.3
85 48.0 30.4 25.3 39.1 28.1 42.1 37.6
90 65.2 37.9 34.7 47.3 36.0 52.4 44.3
95 93.3 53.5 45.0 67.4 54.0 79.3 64.9
99 171.1 84.7 87.2 126.0 101.4 189.1 122.8
30,001+ 15,001–30,000 Up to 15,000
Household
percentiles* Owner-occupier
Income group (in euro) Dwelling: Total households
Tenant 2002 2005already mentioned, however,22 the bulk of the
loan balance outstanding for households with a
high debt service ratio relates to housing loans.
Specifically, 80% of the loan balance of house-
holds with a debt service ratio of more than 40%
of  income  relates  to  housing  loans.  However,
although the debt service ratio is high, account
must be taken of the fact that the majority of
these households, though not all of them, are
not burdened with rent payments. It is, there-
fore, particularly important to examine how high
the debt service ratio is for households which do
not own a home and are, as a result, further bur-
dened by rent payments. In Chart 2, a compari-
son is provided of the distribution of the debt
service to income ratio for owner-occupiers and
tenants.  Households  which  do  not  own  their
home face a lower debt-service ratio than those
which do. Of the households which do not own
their home 86% have a debt service cost of less
than 30% of income.
8. Loan servicing by households
The 2005 questionnaire also asked if the borrower
“pays, in general, the instalments on the loan reg-
ularly.”23 Of  the  responding  households,  11.5%
declared that they do not pay their loan servicing
instalments  regularly.  Below,  certain  socio-eco-
nomic characteristics and financial indicators are
examined  which  relate  to  households  that
declared they are late in making repayments com-
pared with those which stated that they service
their loans properly.
For  both  these  groups  of  households,  Table  7
indicates  the  average  and  the  median  for  the
income, the loan balance outstanding, the ratio of
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22 See Bank of Greece, Annual Report 2006.
23 This question referred to all bank loans (excluding credit card
debt) and to loans from retail stores.the loan balance to income and the ratio of instal-
ments to income.
Households which declared that they do not ser-
vice their loans properly have lower income levels
and  a  higher  loan  burden  indicator.  It  can  be
observed  that  both  categories  of  households
have, on average, approximately the same loan
balance outstanding. However, the median of the
loan balance is significantly higher for households
which  declared  they  are  late  in  servicing  their
loans. In other words, households which do not
service their loans properly have generally higher
loan balances outstanding than households which
service their loans regularly. In addition, as shown
in Table 7, households which do not service their
loans properly generally have higher balances out-
standing  than  other  households,  not  only  in
absolute  terms  but  also  in  relation  to  their
income, as is to be expected. Roughly the same
conclusion can be drawn when the ratio of instal-
ments to income is examined. The median of this
ratio does not differ substantially between the two
groups of households. More specifically, for 50%
of  households  in  either  group  the  instalments
they pay do not exceed approximately 16.5% of
their income. However, the average of this ratio is
considerably greater, in comparison with that of
other  households,  in  the  case  of  households
which  declared  they  are  late  in  repaying  their
loans. There are, therefore, some households in
the  specific  group  for  which  the  values  of  this
ratio are very high.
Table 8 presents the percentages of households
which do not service their loans regularly broken
down by income group, educational level, type of
job (seasonal or otherwise) and size of household.
Except  for  the  first  income  group,  which,  in
comparison with the others, shows a consider-
ably  higher  percentage  of  households  which
declared that they do not service their loans reg-
ularly,  such  percentages  do  not  differ  signifi-
cantly among the other income groups, nor is
any trend evident towards a reduction in the per-
centages when there is an increase in income. It
would be normal to expect these percentages to
approach  or  reach  zero  in  the  higher  income
groups (see Table 8.a).
A more powerful determinant, however, appears
to be job stability, i.e. whether the head of the
household  has  steady  employment  or  is
employed  on  a  seasonal  basis.  As  can  be  seen
from Table 8.b, 31% of households headed by a
person  who  is  employed  on  a  seasonal  basis
declared that they do not repay their loans regu-
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Table 7
Debt servicing and households’ economic characteristics
Proper 23,261 9,300 22,889 20,000 118.9 43.9 21.3 16.0
With a delay 23,370 11,336 21,315 17,420 177.0 64.1 28.9 16.5












Average Average Median Median Average Debt servicinglarly, while this percentage stands at 9.9% in the
case of households where the head is employed
on a permanent basis. The irregularity of income
in such households appears to affect the proper
settlement of their loan obligations.
The size of the household as well appears to be
correlated with the failure of some households
to  repay  their  loans  properly.  As  can  be  seen
from  Table  8.c,  households  with  one  or  two
members display a significantly lower percent-
age  of  improper  debt  servicing  in  comparison
with households with three or more members.
This may, perhaps, be explained by the increased
and,  perhaps,  to  a  large  degree  unpredictable
needs faced by larger households.
In  addition,  there  appears  to  be  a  correlation
between  the  educational  level  and  the  delay  in
loan repayment. As can be seen from Table 8.d,
the  percentage  of  households  which  declared
they  are  late  in  paying  instalments  on  loans
becomes  steadily  smaller  in  households  where
the head has a higher level of education. Thus, the
percentage of households which do not service
their loans regularly, which stands at 18.2% for
households where the head was educated up to
primary  school  level,  falls  to  12.2%  when  the
household head has completed lower secondary
school education and drops further to 8% when
the  household  head  has  graduated  from  upper
secondary school. It declines a little further for
graduates of higher education colleges and uni-
versities and for those with postgraduate qualifi-
cations.  Of  course,  as  stressed  in  the  previous
section, there is a significant positive correlation
between income and the level of education and
the above finding partly reflects this correlation.
However, in the logistic regression model where
improper loan servicing was the dependent vari-
able, the educational level proved statistically to
be  a  more  significant  determinant  than  the
income of the household. Thus, it appears that the
correlation of the educational level with loan ser-
vicing  is  a  more  complex  issue.  However,  the
small number of households which declared that
they do not service their loans properly makes it
impossible  to  apply  more  complex  models  of
logistic regression in order to examine the inter-
action of socio-economic household characteris-
tics relating to this phenomenon.
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Table 8 
Households which declared that they do not
service their loans properly 
(Percentages)
a. By income group (in euro)







d. By educational level
Up to primary school 18.2
Lower secondary 12.2
Upper secondary 8.0
Higher education +  7.7
Total households   11.5








Over  4 members 14.0
Total households 11.59. Conclusions
This study examined borrowing by households,
the  degree  of  their  loan  burden,  the  cost  to
households  of  servicing  their  debts  as  well  as
whether or not they service their debts properly,
in conjunction with their demographic and eco-
nomic  characteristics.  The  data  used  for  this
analysis  were  derived  from  sample  surveys  of
households carried out by the Bank of Greece in
2002 and 2005.
To study how households’ demographic and eco-
nomic characteristics affect the probability of their
having  taken  out  some  type  of  loan,  logistic
regression  models  were  estimated.  The  results
showed  that  the  degree  of  urbanisation  of  the
household  location,  the  composition  of  the
household, the age of the household head, the
number of household members in employment,
and the income and wealth of the household are
all associated with the probability the household
having taken a loan. More specifically, this proba-
bility is greater for households resident in Athens
and Thessaloniki than for those in other urban and
semi-urban areas of Greece, for families with sev-
eral members (couples with two or more children
or other household members resident), for house-
holds whose head is less than 66 years old and
works in the public sector (in the case of housing
loans), and for households where more than one
member  works  (for  non-housing  loans).  The
probability  of  a  loan  being  taken  also  rises  as
household income or wealth increases.
As for the level of borrowing, it is positively cor-
related with households’ income and net wealth,
as  the  average  balance  outstanding  generally
increases with their income and wealth. In addi-
tion, the share of the higher income and wealth
groups in the sample’s total outstanding debt bal-
ance is greater than their share in the sample of
households.
There is a correlation between the level of borrow-
ing and the age of the household head. Households
whose head is up to 55 years old have larger aver-
age  balances  outstanding  and  their  share  in  the
total  balance  outstanding  within  the  sample  is
greater than their participation in the sample exam-
ined. It should be noted that, in comparison with
2002, a particularly sharp rise was observed in the
loan burden among younger households, i.e. those
whose head is up to 35 years old.
There  was  general  improvement  in  comparison
with  2002  concerning  the  financial  pressure
which loans create for households, as measured
by the ratio of interest and amortisation payment
instalments  to  household  income.  The  most
recent survey recorded a smaller percentage of
households  for  which  this  ratio  takes  values
which are considered high (above 30% or 40%).
However, among households in the lower income
groups (annual income up to € 15,000), the per-
centage of households with a ratio above 30% and
40% is higher than the percentage of households
as a whole they represent. A differentiation of the
distribution of this ratio is also observed between
households  which  own  their  home  and  those
which  do  not.  Servicing  loans  generally  places
greater  financial  pressure  on  owner-occupiers,
although this pressure is at least partly offset by
the absence of the requirement to pay rent.
The study also looked at the financial and demo-
graphic characteristics of the households which
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 48declared  that  they  do  not  service  their  loans
properly.  These  households  generally  have
greater  outstanding  loan  balances,  a  lower
income  and  a  higher  average  debt  service  to
income ratio, i.e. they are under greater financial
pressure. However, the sharpest differentiation
between  those  households  who  service  their
debts properly and those which do not can be
seen when data are controlled for the size of the
household, the educational level and the type of
employment  (permanent  or  seasonal)  of  the
household head. Households with one or two
members were less likely to report difficulty in
servicing  loans  properly  than  households  with
three  or  more  members.  In  addition,  the  per-
centage  of  households  whose  head  has  com-
pleted  primary  school  education  and  which
declared delays in servicing their loans was more
than twice that of households whose head has
studied at a higher education college or univer-
sity or at postgraduate level. This result, how-
ever, probably reflects the positive relationship
between educational level and income. The per-
centage of households declaring delay in repay-
ing their loans was three times greater for house-
holds whose head is seasonally employed. This
must  be  associated  with  the  fact  that  their
income flow is not stable.
Borrowing and socio-economic characteristics of households
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Macroeconomic  theory  lays  emphasis  on  the
importance of human capital and its contribution
to the theory of economic growth. Initially, econ-
omists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo
attempted to study economic growth and deter-
mine its causes. Much later, mostly in the 1950s
and 1960s, the first theories on economic growth
were  formulated.  In  these  initial  attempts  to
interpret economic growth, changes in technol-
ogy — and, therefore, the increase in productiv-
ity— were regarded as exogenous factors with no
effect on the long-term growth rate. In the early
1980s, a new approach to economic growth the-
ory underlined the role of human capital as an
important factor of economic growth. The rein-
statement of the concept of human capital shows
its  particular  significance  for  economic  growth
and social welfare.
Faster economic growth is associated with a rise
in the quality of the labour input through accu-
mulating  human  capital,  which  requires  educa-
tion. This new aspect of education is very signifi-
cant, as it affects economic growth, both directly,
making employed persons more productive, and
indirectly, leading to the creation of knowledge,
ideas and technological innovation.1
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beroglou,  Daphne  Nicolitsas,  Vaggelis  Pantelidis  and  Pavlos
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sibility of the author.
1 For an extensive review of literature on the effects of education
on  economic  growth  and  empirical  evidence  in  developed
economies see, inter alia, Aghion and Howitt (1988) and Temple
(2001).Recent empirical studies at an international level
show the importance of investing in human capi-
tal for productivity and economic growth (OECD,
2004). The improvement in human capital seems
to  be  the  key  factor  contributing  to  economic
growth and an increase in productivity, particu-
larly in Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain. In these
countries, more than half of every additional per-
centage  point  of  increase  in  output  during  the
1990s,  compared  with  the  previous  decade,  is
attributed to the improvement in human capital.
Apart from contributing to the economic growth
of a country, another aspect of the significance of
education is the one associated with the produc-
tive characteristics of a person and is identified by
Becker  and  Mincer’s  human  capital  theory.
According to the human capital theory, education
increases a person’s skills, while at the same time
it  helps  develop  and  cultivate  already  existing
ones, thus making an employee more productive
and efficient, as well as better paid. Theory, as
well as most empirical studies, supports the view
that higher education levels are associated with
higher remuneration and better opportunities for
career advancement.
However,  both  theoretically  and  empirically,  it
seems  that  remuneration  is  different  between
employees with the same productive characteris-
tics. In particular, studies probing the existence of
wage differentials between men and women indi-
cate that men are better paid than women. More-
over, studies go on to establish whether these dif-
ferentials are explained by the productive charac-
teristics  of  employees  (education  among  other
things) or they constitute the unexplained part of
the  differences  in  remuneration.  Other  recent
empirical studies examine whether the wage dif-
ferential between male and female workers varies
across the spectrum of the wage distribution, i.e.
between  lower-  and  higher-paid  employees,  as
well as the extent to which the factors accounting
for wage differentials which are associated with
the  productive  characteristics  of  employees
change  across  the  wage  distribution  spectrum
(Albrecht,  Bjorklund  and  Vroman,  2003,  Papa-
petrou,  2004,  de  la  Rica,  Dolado  and  Llorens,
2005, and Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2007).
However, although human capital plays an impor-
tant role in the economic growth of a country and
has a decisive effect on remuneration, there are
few  studies  examining  these  associations  in
Greece.2 The  Greek  labour  market  has  similar
characteristics  to  the  labour  markets  of  some
European  Union  countries,  such  as  Spain  and
Italy, but is quite different to the labour markets in
other EU countries. There are major differences
and  similarities  concerning  genders,  which
depend  on  the  education  level  of  employees.
Among other things, what differentiates the Greek
labour market from that of other European coun-
tries is the women’s participation rate.3 This rate
is considerably lower in the Greek labour market
than in the EU, but grows with the rise in the edu-
cation level of women. There are relative remu-
neration  differences  between  male  and  female
employees in Greece, compared with other Euro-
pean  countries.  According  to  Eurostat  data
(2006),4 the ratio of the earnings of women to
those  of  men  in  Greece  is  higher  than  the  EU
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2 Regarding the role of education in the Greek labour market, see
also Tsakloglou and Cholezas (2005), Kanellopoulos, Mavromaras
and Mitrakos (2003) and Psacharopoulos (1999).
3 The labour force participation rate is defined as the labour force
aged 15-64 as a percentage of the population aged 15-64.
4 Data refer to employees aged 15-64 working longer than 15
hours per week in the whole economy for the year 2004.average. Particularly in 2004, the ratio of average
gross hourly earnings of women to those of men
in the economy as a whole was 90% in Greece,
i.e. higher than the corresponding figure in the
EU-25, which was 85%. A possible explanation is
that in countries like Greece, where the labour
force  participation  rate  for  women  is  relatively
low,  women  participating  in  the  labour  market
display a high education level, which allows for
limited wage differentials between them and men.
In contrast, in countries where the participation
rate of women with a lower education and skill
level is higher, wage differentials between men
and  women  are  probably  larger  (Papapetrou,
2003, 2004, and OECD, 2002).
The existence of wage differentials between men
and women in Greece and the extent to which
they can be accounted for by differences in the
productive  characteristics  of  employees  is  dis-
cussed in a recent survey (Papapetrou, 2004).5
According to this survey, even after controlling
for different male and female productive charac-
teristics, there still exists an unexplained part of
the wage differential between men and women.
However, the above survey does not explicitly
probe  the  role  played  by  education  and  the
extent to which the observed wage differentials
are explained by the productive characteristics of
employees, depending on their education level.
The present study aims to expand the examina-
tion  of  wage  differentials  between  men  and
women and probe the effect of education levels
on those differentials. For this purpose, men and
women employees are distinguished according
to  their  education  into  low  education  level
employees  (primary  and  secondary  education)
and high education level employees (post-sec-
ondary non-tertiary education, tertiary education
and post-graduate studies). Then, the existence
of wage differentials between men and women
depending on the education level is analysed, at
the mean and across the entire wage distribu-
tion, employing the quantile regression analysis
technique. Finally, the study makes use of a vari-
ation of the Oaxaca and Blinder decomposition
technique  in  order  to  explain  components  of
gender wage differentials by education level, on
average and in various deciles of the wage distri-
bution. Thus, it is possible to analyse the degree
to which this differential is due to differences in
the  productive  characteristics  of  employees  or
cannot be explained on the basis of them. The
analysis uses statistical data for Greece from the
2004 NSSG survey on Income and Living Condi-
tions  (EU-SILC,  European  Union  Statistics  on
Income and Living Conditions), which refer to
income in 2003. This study is the first method-
ological approach for Greece which takes advan-
tage  of  this  particular  database  in  order  to
analyse gender wage differentials.
The rest of the study is structured as follows: The
second  section  briefly  describes  the  relation
between  certain  measures  of  the  Greek  labour
market and the educational characteristics of the
population. The third section presents the theo-
retical approaches used in the analysis of wage
differentials  between  men  and  women,  taking
into consideration the role of education, while the
fourth section is a presentation of the statistical
data used in the analysis. The fifth section pre-
sents the methodology of the empirical analysis
and reports the empirical results. The last section
summarises the conclusions.
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5 Papapetrou (2004) examines studies on wage differentials in
Greece.2. Education  and  the  Greek  labour  market:
some key features
2.1 Education and skill level of the population
The education level of the Greek population is an
indication  for  the  development  capacity  of  the
country. In Greece, almost 11% of the population
over 15 years of age is university graduates, while
30% of the population of the same age has only,
completed primary education.
In detail, as regards the 25-34 age group, 17% are
university  graduates,  while  this  rate  decreases
towards older ages (OECD, 2004). Younger per-
sons record higher education levels (tertiary edu-
cation) compared with those already participating
in the labour market. This change in education
characteristics  over  time  possibly  reflects  the
change in the education preferences of the popu-
lation, which is attributed to stronger demand for
a highly skilled workforce, the rise in unemploy-
ment,  which  affects  the  rate  of  young  people
wishing to get tertiary education, as well as the
general increase in demand for education.
According to Eurostat data (2006) for 2005, the
percentage of women aged 20-24 that has com-
pleted  at  least  secondary  education  in  Greece
(88.7%) exceeds the Community average (80% for
EU-25). As regards men of the same age group,
the corresponding percentage is 79.4%, i.e. lower
than that of women but higher than the Commu-
nity average for men (74.6% for EU-25).
Particularly interesting is the progress of younger
employees towards obtaining tertiary education.
Greece is one of the three countries (with Portu-
gal and Mexico) that have managed to improve
the  level  of  obtaining  tertiary  education  among
generations, although in Greece the percentage of
younger  persons  that  have  completed  tertiary
education is smaller than the average for OECD
countries  (24%  in  Greece,  28%  in  the  OECD
countries in 2002).
In 2005, the percentage of highly skilled persons
(high education level) in Greece stood at 18% of
the working age population (15-64 years), while
almost 41% of this group was low-skilled (lower
education  level)  and  42%  was  medium-skilled
(medium education level – see Table 1). The per-
centage of the highly skilled working age popula-
tion is lower than the corresponding percentage
for the EU as a whole (around 20%). The same
goes for both men and women who are highly
skilled employees (European Commission, 2006).
Highly  skilled  men  and  women  constitute  18%
and 17%, respectively, of the working age popula-
tion in Greece.
2.2 Education and labour force participation
Labour force participation increases with the edu-
cation level (see Table 2). According to Table 2,
which presents the participation rates of the pop-
ulation aged 15-64 in the labour force by educa-
tion level in Greece and in the EU, it seems that
persons  with  a  high  education  level  are  more
likely to participate in the labour market. In 2003,
the labour force participation rate of the popula-
tion aged 15-64 was around 86% for highly edu-
cated persons and smaller for the others: almost
66% for medium education level employees and
around 54% for lower education level employees.
Moreover, in Greece the participation rate of the
tertiary education graduates in the labour force is
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the labour force participation rate of the popula-
tion with medium education level (almost 66%) is
smaller than the corresponding Community aver-
age (EU-15: 76%). Obviously, there is a positive
correlation between education levels and partici-
pation rates in the labour force.6
2.3 Education and employment rate7
There  are  significant  differences  between  the
employment rate in the Greek market and the cor-
responding rate in other European countries and
the Greek rate varies according to education levels
(see Table 3).
The employment rate in Greece (around 60% of
total  population  in  2004)  is  lower  than  the  EU
average (almost 65% in 2004 for EU-15 and 63%
for EU-25), while it also falls short of the target-
rate (70%) set for 2010 on the basis of the “Lisbon
Education, labour market and wage differentials in Greece
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Table 1 
Working population structure1 by education level in Greece and the European Union, 2005 
(Classification by education level – skills and gender, percentages) 
1 15-64 years of age. 
Note: Skills correspond to the UNESCO International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels (1997) as follows: 
Low skills: ISCED levels 0-2 (pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education).
Medium skills: ISCED levels 3-4 (upper secondary, post-secondary non-tertiary education) 
High skills: ISCED levels 5-6 (first stage of tertiary education, second stage of tertiary education). 
Source: European Commission, DG – Employment and Social Affairs, Employment in Europe 2006, Recent Trends and Prospects, on the basis of the Eurostat Labour
Force Survey, Spring Results.
Greece 40.8 41.6 17.6 40.5 41.4 18.1 41.1 41.8 17.1
EU-25  32.8 47.3 19.9 32.1 48.0 19.9 33.5 46.6 19.9
Men education  Women education  Total education 
Low Medium High  Low Medium High Low Medium High
Table 2 
Labour force participation by education level in Greece and the European Union, 20031
(Percentages) 
1 15-64 years of age. 
Note: Low education: ISCED levels 0-2 (pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education).
Medium education: ISCED levels 3-4 (upper secondary, post-secondary non-tertiary education). 
High education: ISCED levels 5-6 (First stage of tertiary education, second stage of tertiary education).
Source: European Commission, DG – Employment and Social Affairs, Employment in Europe 2004, Recent Trends and Prospects.
63.8 69.9 69.2 54.3 55.7 53.0 66.0 76.1 75.5 86.3 86.8 86.8
Medium education  High education Low education Total education
Greece EU-15 EU-25 Greece EU-15  EU-25  Greece EU-15 EU-25 Greece EU-15 EU-25
6 The Greek educational system consists of three levels: pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary education level. Primary education
is  divided  into  pre-school  education,  i.e.  kindergartens,  and
compulsory primary education, i.e. primary schools. Secondary
education  includes  two  cycles,  compulsory  lower  secondary
education,  i.e.  gymnasium,  and  post-compulsory  upper  sec-
ondary education, offered by Unified Senior High Schools and
Technical Vocational Educational Institutions (TEE). Tertiary edu-
cation is divided into university education and non-university
education. Post-graduate courses are also available at tertiary
education level.
7 The employment rate is defined as the ratio of the employed
aged 15-64 to the total number of persons aged 15-64.Strategy” (see Table 3). However, in the last few
years the employment rate in Greece rose gradu-
ally (56.6% in 2000, 57.7% in 2002, 58.9% in 2003
and  59.6%  in  2004),  while  the  corresponding
employment  rate  for  the  EU-15  increased  only
marginally (from 62.2% in 2000 to 63.0% in 2004).
The  employment  rate  for  men  in  Greece  rose
(from around 72% in 2000 to 74% in 2004), while
the corresponding rate in the EU-15 is stable. The
employment rate for women in Greece is signifi-
cantly lower than that for men (74% for men and
45.5% for women). Female employment rate in
Greece rose in the last few years (from around
42% in 2000 to 45.5% in 2004), though it falls
considerably  short  of  the  corresponding  EU-15
rate (almost 57% in 2004). According to a recent
study  (Nikolitsas,  2006),  certain  institutional,
social and economic factors caused the increase
in female participation in the Greek labour market
during the post-1980 period.
Employment  rates  differ  significantly  depending
on education levels and it seems that the employ-
ment rate increases with the rise in the education
level. The employment rate for people with a high
education level was almost 81% in 2004 (close to
the EU average in this category, which is about
83%), while the corresponding rates for medium
and low education level employees were around
61% and 50%, respectively.
The employment rate for men with a high educa-
tion level (almost 88%) is close to the EU average
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Table 3 
Employment indicators in Greece and the European Union (2004)1
(By education level and gender) 
1 15-64 years of age. As regards education levels, see note in Table 2. 
2 Employed persons aged 15-64 as a percentage of the population aged 15-64. 
3 As a percentage of total employment. 
4 Unemployed persons aged 15 and over as a percentage of the labour force. 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, second quarter, author’s calculations.  
Total 
Employment rate2 59.6 64.5 63.0 49.5 49.2 46.2 60.7 70.1 68.3 81.2 82.5 82.5
Part-time employment rate3 4.5 19.0 17.2 5.4 18.5 18.3 4.2 20.9 17.9 3.5 15.8 14.5
Unemployment rate4 10.4 8.4 9.4 9.6 11.8 12.8 12.4 8.1 9.6 7.9 5.1 5.1
Men
Employment rate2 74.0 72.4 70.6 74.0 60.8 57.0 74.3 76.3 74.6 88.0 86.0 86.0
Part-time employment rate3 2.0 6.6 6.3 2.2 6.4 6.8 2.1 6.7 6.2 1.6 6.4 6.1
Unemployment rate4 6.5 7.7 8.7 6.3 10.4 11.5 7.6 7.6 9.0 4.6 4.6 3.7
Women 
Employment rate2 45.5 56.6 55.4 32.3 38.0 36.0 47.4 63.8 61.8 75.2 78.9 78.9
Part-time employment rate3 8.4 34.8 31.0 11.9 37.1 35.7 7.5 38.4 32.6 6.0 26.4 23.9
Unemployment rate4 16.0 9.2 10.2 15.5 13.7 14.6 18.9 8.8 10.4 11.8 5.7 5.8
Medium education High education Low education Total education
Greece EU-15 EU-25 Greece EU-15  EU-25  Greece EU-15 EU-25 Greece EU-15 EU-25(approximately  86%).  As  regards  women,  the
employment  rate  in  Greece  (45.5%  in  2004)  is
lower than the EU-15 employment rate as a whole
(about 57%), while it also falls short of the target-
rate (60%) set for 2010 on the basis of the “Lisbon
Strategy”. The employment rate for women with a
high education level (75%) is relatively close to
the EU average (almost 79%) and more than dou-
ble the employment rate for women with lower
education (around 32%). The employment rates
for women with low and medium education lev-
els are significantly lower than those for men and
lower than the corresponding employment rates
for women in the EU. Women with a lower edu-
cation  level  in  Greece  are  in  the  most  adverse
position relative both to men of the same educa-
tion level and to women in the EU as a whole. It
also  seems  that  there  is  a  positive  association
between education level and employment, as high
education levels increase a person’s productivity,
thus also enhancing the possibility both to enter
the labour market and to find a job.
Part-time  employment,  i.e.  the  number  of  those
employed  part-time  as  a  percentage  of  the  total
number  of  employed  people  in  Greece  (4.5%)  is
considerably lower than the EU-15 average (approx-
imately  19%).  The  part-time  employment  rate  in
Greece is more than four times higher for women
(8.4%) than for men (2.0%) but lower than the aver-
age  part-time  employment  rate  for  EU-25  as  a
whole (31%). Part-time employment offers employ-
ees, particularly women, the opportunity to recon-
cile work with attending to the needs of their fam-
ily,  especially  when  the  available  child-care  solu-
tions are insufficient or in cases when the family
cannot afford the cost. On the other hand, part-time
jobs are typically associated with limited opportuni-
ties for career advancement and with lower remu-
neration (OECD, 1999). This is also indirectly sup-
ported by data in Table 3, which show that the part-
time employment rate falls towards high education
levels. Note that women of a lower education level
show a higher part-time employment rate (11.9%),
which is more than five times higher than the cor-
responding rate for male employees of a lower edu-
cation level and almost double that of women with
a high education level (6.0%).
2.4 Education and unemployment
There is an interesting relation between education
and unemployment, as the unemployment rate is
an indicator for the capacity of the economy to
offer suitable employment to any person wishing
to  work.  The  unemployment  rate  in  Greece
(10.4% of the total labour force in 2004) is higher
than  the  EU  average  (EU-15:  8.4%  and  EU-25:
9.4%).8 However, there is a differentiation of the
rate of unemployment according to the education
level  of  employees.  High  education  levels
increase  skills,  productivity  and  employment
opportunities  of  a  person  participating  in  the
labour force, while at the same time they dimin-
ish a person’s possibility to remain unemployed.
As seen in Table 3, the unemployment rate of the
labour force with a high education level (7.9%) is
significantly smaller than that of the labour force
with a medium (12.4%) and a lower (9.6%) edu-
cation level, although it exceeds the EU-15 aver-
age (5.1%). Women record higher unemployment
rates, compared with men of the same education
level. It is interesting to note that, while the unem-
ployment rate of men with a high education level
(4.6%) is close to the average EU rate (4.6%), the
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8 It decreased to 9.9% in 2005 and fell below 9% in 2006.unemployment  rate  for  women  with  a  high
(11.6%)  or  medium  education  level  (18.9%)  is
almost double the corresponding rate for the EU
as a whole (high education level: 5.7%, medium
education level: 8.8%). These figures demonstrate
that there is a poor match between education in
Greece and the needs of the Greek labour market.
Another  aspect  of  unemployment  concerns  the
number of the “new unemployed” (new partici-
pants in the labour market).9 In 2005 the “new
unemployed”  rose  to  approximately  38.4%10 of
total  unemployed  persons,  while  “new”  unem-
ployed  women  accounted  for  43.7%  of  total
unemployed women. This percentage is drastically
higher than the participation rate of “new” unem-
ployed  men  in  total  unemployed  men  (28%).
Secondary education graduates record the largest
participation rate in the “new unemployed” (41%).
University education graduates amount to approx-
imately 15% of total “new unemployed” (26,000
“new unemployed” university graduates in a total
of 178,000 new participants in the labour market
in 2005), while the number of “new unemployed”
female university graduates is double that of “new
unemployed”  men  of  the  same  education  level
(18,804 women, against 7,264 men).
The above analysis demonstrates that there is a
significant relation between the education levels
of  men  and  women  and  certain  labour  market
characteristics in Greece.
3. Empirical data and theoretical approaches
to gender wage differentials
This  section  summarises  recent  empirical  evi-
dence and theoretical approaches explaining gen-
der wage differentials in various European coun-
tries, taking also into consideration the role of
education.
Empirical  studies  tend  to  confirm  that  male
employees receive higher wages than their female
counterparts, a fact not solely attributable to dif-
ferent  productive  characteristics  of  employees.
However, in most studies wage differentials do
not concern the entire spectrum of the wage dis-
tribution,  but  focus  on  average  remuneration.
Recent  studies  examine  the  wage  differentials
between men and women across the entire spec-
trum of wage distribution, in order to establish
whether  there  are  wage  differentials  against
higher-paid women, compared with wage differ-
entials against lower-paid women. These studies
observe whether wage differentials between men
and women increase towards the upper end of
the  wage  distribution  (Albrecht,  Bjorklund  and
Vroman, 2003, de la Rica, Dolado and Llorens,
2005, and Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2007).
At theoretical level, many economists support the
view that women’s interrupted careers affect and
at the same time explain a significant portion of the
gender wage gap, for two reasons. First, the fact
that women have interrupted careers and remain
in the labour market for a limited period of time
could mean that they may not accumulate enough
human capital during their working life. Second,
while women do not participate in the labour mar-
ket, this may result to a loss of human capital.
Albrecht, Bjorklund and Vroman (2003), using
1998 data for Sweden, estimate that wage dif-
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9 “New unemployed” are those in search of a job for the first time.
10 Data refer to the second quarter of 2005.ferentials increase along the wage distribution,
with a sharp acceleration in the upper end of the
wage distribution.
Using relevant statistical methodology, de la Rica,
Dolado  and  Llorens  (2005)  study  the  case  of
Spain for 1999. The results for employees with
high  education  show  that  wage  differentials
increase towards the upper levels of the wage dis-
tribution. In contrast, as regards lower-education
employees,  wage  differentials  decline  towards
higher levels of the wage distribution. The authors
maintain that the career path of lower education
level female employees is often interrupted due to
discrimination against women on account of fam-
ily responsibilities and duties. Employers may use
statistics on the average performance of women
(statistical discrimination), which results in lower
remuneration  for  female  employees  compared
with  male  employees,  particularly  towards  the
lower end of the wage distribution, which nor-
mally  represents  early  employment  years  of
employees.11 Highly educated employees are usu-
ally  employed  in  more  permanent  positions,
under better working conditions and with better
opportunities  for  career  advancement.  Thus,  in
the first few working years, the gaps between the
wages of men and women tend to be limited or
insignificant. However, towards the upper levels
of  wage  distribution,  female  remuneration  falls
short of male remuneration, as women advance
less than men, mostly being employed in posi-
tions  with  little  opportunity  for  advancement
(Lazaer and Rosen, 1990).
Arulampalam,  Booth  and  Bryan  (2007),  using
data for 11 countries (Austria, Belgium, United
Kingdom,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain), show that
the wage gap between men and women employ-
ees increases significantly towards the upper end
of the wage distribution. The authors present var-
ious possible explanations for gender wage dif-
ferentials in the EU. According to this analysis,
male-female wage differentials are due to institu-
tional,  economic  and  structural  factors.  For
instance, certain institutional factors, such as leg-
islation against gender discrimination, improve-
ment  in  childcare  infrastructure,  as  well  as
parental leave provisions, affect gender wage dif-
ferentials (Jaumotte, 2003).
Improved childcare infrastructure and parental leave
provisions may influence the behaviour of both men
and women in a different way, thus the effects on
wage differentials may vary (Blau and Kahn, 2003).
On the one hand, it is claimed that women who are
not subject to parental leave may choose to aban-
don the labour market and enter again at a future
point of time, accepting lower-paid positions and
less  working  hours.  In  contrast,  women  allowed
parental leave may receive higher remuneration, as
the implementation of such policies allows them to
maintain  their  position  and  contact  with  their
employer-companies, thus strengthening their moti-
vation to increase their human capital. On the other
hand, parental leave provisions might also have a
negative  effect  on  female  remuneration.  The
absence of women from the labour market might be
associated  with  a  deterioration  of  their  skills  and
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11 According to the theory of statistical discrimination, wage dif-
ferentials between men and women are possibly a result of the
fact that employers make different assessments concerning the
productivity of working men and women they wish to employ,
which are based on the average performance of the specific group
a candidate comes from. Thus, employers estimate that candi-
dates show the same advantages and disadvantages as the mem-
bers of the group they belong to. Therefore, some candidates may
benefit from the fact that they belong to a certain group, while
others may be damaged.could thus have a negative effect on their remuner-
ation and increase male-female wage differentials.
Moreover, the improvement in childcare infrastruc-
ture is expected to have a positive effect on female
remuneration, as it could strengthen the employees’
bonds with their employer-companies or offer the
opportunity for an early return to work. Therefore,
improved  childcare  infrastructure  could  help
increase female remuneration and narrow the gen-
der remuneration gap.
According to an OECD study (2001), it seems that
in  countries  implementing  work-family  policies,
gender wage differentials are smaller towards the
lower levels of the wage distribution and larger at
the higher levels of the wage distribution.12,13
Finally,  Arulampalam,  Booth  and  Bryan  (2007)
claim  that  the  institutional  framework  for  wage
formation may have a direct effect on the gender
wage gap. In countries with higher levels of union-
isation and more centralised or coordinated bar-
gaining that raise the minimum level of pay, the
wage distribution spectrum is more compressed,
and therefore the gender wage gap is smaller, par-
ticularly towards the lower end of the wage distri-
bution (Blau and Kahn, 1996, 2003).14,15
The “glass ceiling hypothesis” (see Albrecht et al.,
2003), according to which male and female wage
differentials increase towards the upper end of the
wage distribution spectrum, though exceptionally
interesting due to the particular characteristics of
the Greek labour market, has not been studied
yet. The objective of this study is to examine wage
differentials between men and women, according
to education level, both on the basis of average
wage and across the wage distribution, as well as
to  analyse  these  differentials  in  order  to  show
whether they reflect differences in the productive
characteristics  of  employees,  or  are  a  part  that
cannot be explained on the basis of employees’
productive abilities.16
4. Statistical analysis
The  empirical  analysis  uses  statistical  data  for
Greece,  derived  from  the  NSSG  survey  on
Income  and  Living  Conditions  (EU-SILC).  The
survey was carried out in 2003 and 2004 (cover-
ing  2002  and  2003  income  data,  respectively)
and the results for Greece were released by the
NSSG. The survey includes questions referring
both to a household as a whole and to each sep-
arate member, and derives information regard-
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12 Work-family policies may have a different effect on female
remuneration.  On  the  one  hand,  they  might  increase  female
remuneration, as they enhance the employees’ bonds with their
companies,  which  is  a  significant  motivation  for  employees  to
increase their human capital. On the other hand, these policies
might push women away from the labour market, causing their
remuneration to fall and increasing the gender wage gap.
13 Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2007) have an explanation
concerning different gender wage differentials at the two ends of
the wage distribution spectrum. Policies enhancing an improved
work-family  relation  strengthen  employees’  bonds  with  their
companies, thus female employees receive higher remuneration
(a positive policy effect). On the other hand, these policies may
keep female employees out of the labour market, thus causing
their remuneration to decrease (negative policy effect). It seems
that the positive policy effect is stronger than the negative policy
effect at the lower end of the wage distribution spectrum, while
the opposite occurs at the higher end of the wage distribution
spectrum. Thus, as regards the 11 European countries examined
by the authors, the analysis shows that gender wage differentials
are smaller at the lower end and larger at the higher end of the
wage distribution spectrum.
14 For further reference on the effect of the institutional frame-
work on male-female wage differentials see, inter alia, Grimshaw
and Rubery (2002).
15 Acemoglu and Pischke (2003) claim that, in countries with
labour market deficiencies that cause narrower wage distribution
spectra, companies may wish to increase the education and skill
level of their personnel through training seminars. Thus, the effect
of these policies on wage differentials between employees cannot
be accurately defined.
16 Papapetrou (2004) examines the gender wage differentials in
Greece irrespective of education level.ing  demographic  characteristics,  income,  eco-
nomic  conditions,  housing  conditions  etc.  The
questions on each separate household member
present information about age, the family status
of  each  member,  education,  income,  type  of
work, type of employment, health etc. The EU-
SILC survey replaced the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP) sampling survey, con-
ducted by Eurostat from 1994 to 2001 and cov-
ering all EU countries.
The following statistical analysis uses data from
the 2004 survey, referring to 2003 income data.
The total number of respondents for Greece in
2004 was 16,843. Out of this number, only wage
earners were taken into account, while students
were excluded. Thus, the sample narrowed down
to  3,189  (women:  1,255,  men:  1,964).  Finally,
respondents  not  answering  to  all  the  questions
used in the empirical examination were not taken
into account.
4.1 Wage differentials by education level
Using sample data from Chart 1, we present the
percentage wage differentials between men and
women in Greece across the entire range of the
wage distribution and on average. The horizontal
broken  line  represents  the  average  percentage
wage differential between men and women.17 This
measure suggests that men receive higher remu-
neration  (18.7%  on  average)  than  women  (in
other words, women receive almost 84% of the
remuneration of men).
As seen in Chart 1, this gender wage differential
across the wage distribution spectrum is consider-
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17 The wage differential between men and women is determined
by two methods: according to the first method, the differential is
defined as the difference between male and female remuneration
as a percentage of female remuneration (this differential is pre-
sented in Charts 1 and 2), while, according to the second method,
the wage differential is defined as the female remuneration as a
percentage of the male remuneration.ably different to the differential concerning average
remuneration of men and women. The wage differ-
ential between men and women is almost stable
(up until the 4th decile of the male-female wage
distribution). After the 4th decile, the differential
declines, stabilises around the 6th decile, and then
increases. In particular, at lower wages the differ-
ential falls slightly short of the average differential,
at medium wages it is much smaller than the aver-
age, and at the upper levels of wage distribution the
differential is much larger than the average.
Chart  2  presents  the  percentage  differential  of
male and female remuneration by education level
in  different  deciles  of  the  wage  distribution.
Employees are distinguished into two levels: high
education  level  employees  and  low  education
level employees. Low education level employees
also  include  secondary  education  graduates,
while high education level employees also include
post-secondary education level employees (post-
secondary non-tertiary education, tertiary educa-
tion, and post-graduate education).
Data analysis shows that, on average, across all
deciles  of  the  wage  distribution  spectrum,  the
remuneration of men and women with lower edu-
cation is smaller than that of high education level
employees.18 Moreover, as seen in Chart 2, male
and female wage differentials vary depending on
the  education  level  of  employees.  As  regards
employees with a high education level, the male-
female  wage  differential  increases  towards  the
upper end of the wage distribution. In particular,
male employees with a high education level in the
1st decile of the wage distribution spectrum earn
almost  14.8%  more  than  female  employees  (in
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18 Table 4 below shows the logarithm of the average male and
female remuneration by education level. The measures represent-
ing male and female remuneration by decile are not presented
here, but are available from the author.other words, female employees earn 87% of the
remuneration  of  male  employees),  while  male
employees in the 9th decile of the wage distribu-
tion  spectrum  earn  60%  more  than  female
employees (or female employees earn 67% of the
remuneration of male employees).
As regards low education levels, wage differentials
between the two genders present a different pic-
ture. Almost up to the 7th decile, wage differen-
tials  between  female  and  male  employees  are
larger than those for female employees with a high
education level. In particular, employees with low
education level at the 1st decile of the wage distri-
bution earn almost 20% more than female employ-
ees  (in  other  words,  female  employees  earn
almost 82% of the remuneration of male employ-
ees), while male employees at the 5th decile earn
31.2%  more  than  female  employees  (in  other
words, female employees earn 76% of the remu-
neration of male employees). Towards the upper
end of the wage distribution spectrum (9th decile)
male employees with a low education level earn
almost 20% more than female employees (in other
words, female employees earn 83% of the remu-
neration of male employees). However, over the
7th  decile,  wage  differentials  between  the  two
genders are drastically higher for female employ-
ees  with  high  education  level,  compared  with
female employees with low education level.19
The  above  analysis  shows  that  it  is  of  particular
interest to explain and examine gender wage differ-
entials on the basis of education levels across the
wage distribution spectrum, since there is a differ-
entiation between deciles. Therefore, a wage differ-
ential analysis based solely on summing up the two
individual  groups  of  employees  and  the  average
remuneration level leads to misleading conclusions.
4.2 Sample characteristics
Table 4 presents the average levels of the major
variables used in the empirical analysis, both by
education level and by gender. The wage is a log-
arithm  of  the  respondent’s  monthly  income
through  wages.20 The  difference  between  the
respondent’s current age and the age at which he
or she started working is used as an indicator of
the person’s experience.
Statistical data in Table 4 show that the average
income  of  high  education  level  employees  is
larger than that of low education level employees.
The  average  monthly  income  from  wages  is
higher for men, compared with women, irrespec-
tive of education level. Women with a high edu-
cation level earn, on average, 83% of the remu-
neration of male employees, while women with a
low education level earn 79% of the remuneration
of male employees. Earnings, family status, expe-
rience,  age,  type  of  employment  and  working
hours are variables that show a statistically signif-
icant difference.
Moreover, Table 4 shows that the average age of
male employees with a high education level is
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19 The analysis of wage differentials between men and women is
based on the sample as a whole and at this stage there is no dis-
tinction for specialty or profession of employees. In the following
empirical analysis, profession, responsibilities, experience as well
as other variables showing the employee’s skills are used as inde-
pendent  variables  to  estimate  the  balance  between  male  and
female remuneration.
20 The monthly income includes perks (e.g. a car), which might
be offered by the employer to the employee but are not included
in the monthly gross wage. Income does not include overtime
payments. Table 4 shows that the average monthly income of
women with a low education level is around € 862, while that of
men is € 1,085. Correspondingly, the average monthly income of
women with a high education level is around € 1,224, while that
of men is € 1,465.almost 3.5 years above that of female employees,
while the average age of male employees with a
low  education  level  is  almost  0.5  years  above
that of female employees. On the other hand,
male employees seem to have higher levels of
experience  than  female  employees  (around  3
extra years of experience, on average, irrespec-
tive of education level). Highly educated employ-
ees have less years of experience, as obtaining
higher education forces them to enter the labour
market at a later stage. Male and female employ-
ees  with  a  high  education  level  are  mostly
employed  in  permanent  positions,  compared
with  low  education  employees.  Low  education
employees  work  more  hours  per  week  than
highly  educated  employees.  In  particular,  low
education  female  employees  work  almost  4
hours more than highly educated female employ-
ees. Male employees with a low education level
work almost 2 hours more than male employees
with a high education level.
5. Methodology and empirical results
5.1 Methodology
The  previous  presentation  of  statistical  data
shows that there are wage differentials between
men and women at both education levels (low
and  high).  Therefore,  it  would  be  advisable  to
probe the degree to which existing wage differen-
tials are attributed to personal productive charac-
teristics  of  men  and  women  and  whether  they
account for the “unexplained part of the wage dif-
ferential”, i.e. they are attributable to discrimina-
tion in the labour market.
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Table 4 
Sample characteristics: average values by gender and education level 
1 Dummy variables with values of 1 and 0. E.g. the “permanent employment” variable has a value of 1 if the respondent has permanent employment and 0 in all
other cases. The measures are presented as percentages, provided that, when calculating regressions, they receive values of 1 and 0.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU-SILC 2004 data. 
Number of observations  657 1,323 568 641
Monthly wages (logarithm)  6.76 6.99 7.11 7.29
Age (years)  41.50 41.86 40.29 44.03
Experience (years)  15.17 17.91 13.20 16.24
Family status1 (single)  0.24 0.30 0.29 0.24
Employment hours per week   40.36 42.25 36.62 39.96
Permanent employment1 0.83 0.82 0.86 0.90
Primary education1 0.19 0.28
Lower secondary education 1 0.12 0.19
Higher secondary education1 0.68 0.53
Post-secondary non-tertiary education1 0.18 0.17
Tertiary education1 0.82 0.83
High  Low
Education level 
Men Women Variables  Men  WomenThe empirical approach and analysis method of
gender wage differentials applied in this study is
in accordance with the decomposition technique
developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973).
According to this method, two equations of wages
are estimated. Specifically, one wage equation is
estimated for working men
Wmen = ‚men Ãmen + Âmen (1)
and another for working women
Wwomen = ‚women Ãwomen + Âwomen (2)
where Wmen and Wwomen are the logarithms of
men’s  and  women’s  wages  respectively,  Xmen
and Xwomen are vectors of variables that describe
the  characteristics  of  employed  men  and
women (such as demographic, human capital,
or  labour  characteristics),  ‚men and  ‚women are
the coefficients of the variables vector Ãmen and
Xwomen 21 and Âmen and Âwomen are the error terms
for  employed  men  and  women  respectively.
Consequently,  the  estimated  ‚men and  ‚women
coefficients  show  the  returns  on  men’s  and
women’s characteristics. Equations (1) and (2)
were estimated at both low and high education
levels.
If there were no wage differences, ‚men should be
equal  to  ‚women,  and  men’s  earnings  should  be
equal  to  women’s  earnings,  since  men  and
women have the same personal productive char-
acteristics.  However,  the  estimated  coefficients
are  different,  and  it  is  of  particular  interest  to
empirically  estimate  women’s  wages  if  female
employees  received  the  same  remuneration  as
male employees (Xwomen ‚men).
Determining wage differentials between men and
women  according  to  the  Oaxaca  and  Blinder
method allows the decomposition of wage differ-
entials on the basis of two factors. In particular,
through this method it is possible to analyse the
degree to which existing wage differentials may
be attributed to personal productive characteris-
tics of male and female employees, or they con-
stitute an “unexplained part of the wage differen-
tials”, i.e. what many economists call “discrimina-
tion  factor”  or  “discriminations”.22 To  this  end,
the following equation is calculated:
_   _     _    _










∧ over parameters (‚
∧
) denotes estimated
values. The left side of equation (3) estimates the
difference  in  average  wages  between  male  and
female employees. The first term on the right side
of  equation  (3)  estimates  the  total  difference
between the two genders in the means of the inde-
pendent variables weighted by the returns of the
vector Xmen of the male wage equation. This term
represents the part of the logarithm of the earnings
differential  between  genders  attributable  to  the
observed differences in human capital or produc-
tive characteristics of the employed and is referred
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21 In the equations of men’s and women’s earnings, the coef-
ficients  of  the  variables  vector  X,  ‚men and  ‚women show  the
extent to which the earnings of male and female employees
increase with an increase in one human capital variable by one
unit when all other factors remain unchanged (e.g. the extent to
which men’s or women’s earnings increase with one additional
year of experience). The “education” variable is not included in
the  estimated  regression,  as  the  sample  is  divided  into  two
groups. The first sample includes employees with a high edu-
cation level and the second group includes employees with a
low education level.
22 The unexplained part of wage differentials can be seen as a
measure  of  the  extent  to  which  the  earnings  of  an  employed
woman are different from those justifiable by her qualifications.to as the “characteristics differential” or “justifiable
earnings”. The second term on the right side of
equation (3) measures the total difference between
the vector returns of independent variables on the
basis  of  female  characteristics.  This  term  repre-
sents  the  part  of  the  earnings  differential  that  is
attributable  to  labour  market  discrimination  and
would be equal to zero if male and female employ-
ees had the same returns. All estimates are on the
basis of the wage distribution mean.
Moreover,  the  empirical  analysis  employs  the
Oaxaca  and  Blinder  decomposition  technique
combined with the quantile regression analysis in
order to estimate wage differentials between men
and women in different deciles of the wage distri-
bution and to explain which part of the wage dif-
ferentials  is  attributed  to  different  productive
characteristics  of  employees  and  which  part
accounts for the unexplained part of wages across
the wage distribution.
5.2 Empirical results
Initially,  a  wage  equation  for  the  total  sample
(men  and  women)  was  estimated  in  order  to
determine  statistically  significant  socioeconomic
variables  that  affect  the  workers’  wages.23,24,25
Next, wage equations were calculated, first on the
basis of employees’ education level (low and high
education level) for the sample as a whole (both
men  and  women)  and  then  separately  for  men
and women. The results show that, irrespective of
gender, monthly wage earnings are influenced by
employees’ personal characteristics, human capi-
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23 As  independent  variables,  the  wage  estimation  model  uses
variables concerning the family status of the employee, experience,
education, the size of the employer-company, the type of work, the
type of employment, the job description and the place of work.
24 The standard deviations, and thus the t statistics calculated for
the estimated coefficients, have been corrected for heteroscedas-
ticity following White’s method.
25 The  results  of  the  wage  equations  estimation  carried  out
according to the ordinary least squares method are not presented
here, but are available from the author.tal (education), working hours, experience, type of
work, type of employment, responsibility, occupa-
tion and the size of the company. Moreover, quan-
tile regression estimations at various points of the
wage  distribution  were  performed  and  it  was
tested whether the estimated coefficients are sta-
tistically different. A Wald test showed that at 1%
significance  level,  the  null  hypothesis  can  be
rejected,  i.e.  the  hypothesis  that  the  estimated
coefficients are equal. Then, by applying the quan-
tile regression analysis, the wage equations were
estimated separately for men and women employ-
ees at each decile of the wage distribution. Chart
3 shows the size of each estimated coefficient for
the “education level” variable by gender and by
decile.  The  coefficient  up  to  the  6th  decile  is
higher  for  women  than  for  men.  This  indicates
that, up to the 6th decile, high education levels
contribute  more  to  the  final  wage  of  a  female
employee than a male employee. So, taking into
account all other particular characteristics of the
employee —such as family status, working hours,
size of the company, experience, type of work,
responsibility and type of employment– it seems
that  returns  on  education  levels  are  higher  for
women with earnings equal or less than the aver-
age earnings of the sample. Possibly, this reflects
the low participation rate of women in the labour
market.  Female  employees  participating  in  the
labour market are the most productive (with high
education levels) and when they enter the labour
market they enjoy higher returns, compared with
their male counterparts. By contrast, it seems that
returns on education are the same for highly paid
men and women.
Next, equation (3) was estimated, to determine
the percentage of the wage differential that can-
not be explained on the basis of different charac-
teristics between men and women with the same
education level. Results are presented in Tables 5
and 6. Table 5 shows wage differentials for highly
educated  employees.  For  the  whole  sample,
41.7%  of  the  wage  differential  cannot  be
explained  on  the  basis  of  different  productive
characteristics of the respondents. As presented
in  the  Table  and  analysed  in  Chart  2,  gender
wage differentials accelerate at the higher deciles
of  the  wage  distribution,  and  the  unexplained
wage differential seems to be larger at the higher
deciles of the wage distribution.26 Therefore, it
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Table 5 
Unexplained part of the wage differential between men and women with a high education level 
Note: Wage differentials are in logarithmic form. 
10% = 1st decile, 25% = 1st quartile, 50% = 2nd quartile, 75%  = 3rd quartile, 90%  = 9th decile. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU-SILC 2004 data. 
Wage differential   0.187 0.138 0.098 0.087 0.241 0.406
Unexplained wage differential as a percentage  
of the total wage differential     41.7 – 42.9 62.1 67.0 98.9
Total  10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
26 Note that in order to estimate the measures in Tables 5 and 6,
the empirical analysis takes into consideration the particular char-
acteristics of employees, since these characteristics are used as
independent variables to estimate the wage regression of men and
women.seems that, as regards employees with a high
education level, the unexplained part of the gen-
der  wage  differential  increases  towards  the
upper end of the wage distribution. Wage differ-
entials  between  men  and  women  with  a  high
education level are mainly attributed to differ-
ences  regarding  productive  characteristics
towards the lower end of wage distribution, as
well as differences concerning returns (non-pro-
ductive  characteristics-unexplained  part  of  the
remuneration differences) at higher levels of the
wage distribution. A possible explanation is that
highly  educated  female  employees,  who  accu-
mulated more human capital, are employed in
permanent  positions  with  better  opportunities
for career advancement, while they face less dis-
crimination  towards  the  lower  levels  of  wage
distribution. At higher levels of the wage distrib-
ution, female employees, possibly due to their
weak bargaining power, reduced mobility or dif-
ferent  assignments  compared  with  their  male
colleagues,  face  larger  wage  differentials  than
male employees.
By contrast, as presented in Table 6, the unex-
plained part of the wage differential of the sample
that includes low education level employees as a
whole is higher (77.4%), while it is also higher
than  that  of  employees  with  a  high  education
level. In this employee category, the wage differ-
ential increases in the low deciles of the distribu-
tion  and  decreases  towards  the  higher  deciles.
The same seems to hold for the percentage of the
unexplained differential, which is particularly high
in  the  lower  deciles,  while  it  falls  considerably
towards the upper deciles of the wage distribu-
tion. In contrast to findings about highly educated
employees,  the  wage  differential  between  men
and women at the lower levels of the distribution
is attributed to the unexplained part, while at the
higher levels it is attributed to differences in the
productive characteristics of employees. A possi-
ble  explanation  is  that  lower  educated  female
employees,  in  the  early  years  of  their  careers,
accept jobs that correspond to the characteristics
of the group they belong to, rather than to their
productive ability. Thus, remuneration received in
the early stages of their career reflects the average
characteristics of the group they belong to (low
participation  rates  in  the  labour  market,  strong
possibility to leave the labour market, etc.). Over
time (upper end of the wage distribution spec-
trum),  as  female  employees  remain  employed,
their  skills,  assignments  and  earnings  increase,
thus  limiting  wage  differentials  in  comparison
with male employees.
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Table 6 
Unexplained part of the wage differential between men and women with a low education level 
Note: Wage differentials are in logarithmic form. 
10% = 1st decile, 25% = 1st quartile, 50% = 2nd quartile, 75%  = 3rd quartile, 90%  = 9th decile. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU-SILC 2004 data. 
Wage differential  0.234 0.193 0.205 0.272 0.186 0.189
Unexplained wage differential as a percentage
of the total wage differential      77.4 87.6 91.2 93.0 34.2 18.1
Total  10% 25% 50% 75% 90%6. Conclusions
The aim of this study is to investigate the relation
between the education level of employees and cer-
tain characteristics of the labour market in Greece
(such  as  indices  on  labour  force  participation,
unemployment and employment), to study wage
differentials between men and women depending
on  the  education  level  of  employees  across  the
wage  distribution  spectrum  and  to  examine  the
extent to which these differentials represent differ-
ences concerning productive characteristics of the
employees, or whether they account for a part that
remains unexplained on the basis of the productive
characteristics of employees (unexplained part or
discrimination factor). The empirical analysis uses
statistical data for Greece. These data derive from
the NSSG survey on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC,  European  Union-Statistics  on  Income
and  Living  Conditions),  which  refer  to  income
earned in 2003.
To this end, employees were divided according
to  their  education  level  into  low  educated
employees  and  highly  educated  employees.
Then, the existence of wage differentials between
men and women based on their education level
was examined, both in relation to average wages
and across the wage distribution spectrum, using
the quantile regression analysis technique. Then,
the Oaxaca and Blinder decomposition technique
was used in order to explain the components of
wage differentials between men and women by
education level, on average and at various deciles
of the wage distribution of employees.
The brief presentation and analysis of the relation
between education level and certain labour mar-
ket measures in Greece shows that younger work-
ers in Greece have a higher education level than
people already in the labour market. Moreover,
the labour force participation rate of the popula-
tion with a high education level is almost equal to
the EU average, while the labour force participa-
tion rate of the population with a medium educa-
tion level falls short of the EU average. Labour
force  participation  and  the  employment  rate
increase  with  the  education  level.  Employment
rates of women with low and medium education
levels are considerably lower than those of men
and noticeably lower than the corresponding rates
for  female  employees  with  the  same  education
level in the EU. Greek female employees with a
low education level are in the worst position, both
compared with their male colleagues of the same
education  level  and  in  relation  to  the  average
European female employee.
The empirical analysis performed shows that wage
differentials between men and women depend on
the education level of employees, as well as that,
across all the deciles of the wage distribution, the
remuneration of men and women with a low edu-
cation level is lower than that of their colleagues
with a high education level. As regards highly edu-
cated employees, wage differentials between men
and women increase towards the upper part of the
wage distribution. Thus, it seems that, as female
employees  with  a  high  education  level  climb
towards the upper parts of the wage distribution,
the  wage  differential  with  their  male  colleagues
increases. Finally, wage differentials between male
and female employees are higher for employees
with a low education level up to the 7th decile of
the  wage  distribution.  However,  as  regards  the
upper  deciles  of  the  wage  distribution,  gender
wage  differentials  are  considerably  higher  for
Education, labour market and wage differentials in Greece
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with those for low educated female employees.
Women  employees  with  a  high  education  level
receive, on average, around 83% of the wages of
men, while women employees with a low educa-
tion level receive, on average, around 79% of their
men counterpart’s wages. Across the wage distri-
bution there is substantial differentiation in terms
of the relative remuneration of men and women.
In particular, highly educated women employees
at the lower parts of the wage distribution (1st
decile  of  the  wage  distribution)  receive  almost
87% of the men’s wages, while women employ-
ees at the upper parts of the wage distribution
(9th decile) receive 67% of the men’s wages.
In contrast, low educated female employees at the
1st decile of the wage distribution receive almost
82% of male remuneration, female employees at
the 5th decile receive 76% of male remuneration
and female employees at the upper parts of the
wage distribution (9th decile) receive around 83%
of male remuneration.
Finally, using the Oaxaca and Blinder decomposi-
tion  methodology,  we  examined  the  extent  to
which these differences in male and female remu-
neration reflect differences concerning productive
characteristics  of  employees  or  represent  an
unexplained part of the difference – the discrimi-
nation factor. As regards employees with low edu-
cation, the unexplained part of the gender wage
differential for the sample as a whole is consider-
ably high (77.4%). The unexplained percentage is
particularly high at the lower deciles of the wage
distribution and declines significantly towards the
upper  deciles  of  the  wage  distribution.  This
implies that the male-female wage differential at
the lower parts of the wage distribution (lower
wages)  is  attributable  to  the  unexplained  part,
while at the upper parts of the wage distribution
(higher  wages)  it  is  attributable  to  differences
regarding  the  productive  characteristics  of
employees. It is possible that female employees
with  low  education  in  the  early  years  of  their
career accept jobs corresponding to their group
characteristics rather than their productive abili-
ties, therefore wages reflect the average charac-
teristics of the group they belong to (low labour
market participation, strong possibility to exit the
labour market, etc.). However, as female employ-
ees remain into the labour market (upper parts of
the  wage  distribution),  their  skills,  assignments
and remuneration increase, thus narrowing wage
differentials in relation to male employees.
In contrast, as regards employees with high edu-
cation in the sample as a whole, the largest part of
the wage differential (58,3%) is explained by dif-
ferences  in  the  productive  characteristics  of
employees and a smaller part (41.7%) cannot be
attributed  to  particular  characteristics  of  the
respondents and constitutes the unexplained part
of the difference. At the lower levels of the wage
distribution, wage differentials between men and
women with high education level are attributed
mainly to differences in the productive character-
istics of employees, while at the upper parts of the
distribution the difference cannot be explained by
particular characteristics of the respondents and
constitutes the unexplained part of the wage dif-
ferential. A possible explanation is that highly edu-
cated female employees, who accumulated more
human capital, are employed in permanent posi-
tions with better opportunities for career advance-
ment, while they face less discrimination towards
the lower levels of wage distribution (e.g. at the
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 70early stages of their career). At the upper levels of
wage  distribution,  female  employees,  possibly
due to their weaker bargaining power, reduced
mobility or different assignments compared with
their male colleagues, face larger wage differen-
tials than male employees.
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of credit risk: 
phenomena, methods
and management*




and Manchester Business School
Introduction
In response to continuous developments in the
markets, regulation and characteristics of credit
risk,  the  Bank  of  Greece  organised  an  interna-
tional research conference in 2006, under the title
“The evolution of credit risk: phenomena, meth-
ods  and  management”.  The  conference,  which
took place in the headquarters of the Bank, served
as a forum of interaction between banking, regu-
latory and academic researchers and offered new
insights for the assessment, forecasting and man-
agement of credit risk. The emphasis of the con-
ference was placed on the evolution of credit risk
and the development of reliable models for esti-
mation,  early  warning,  management  as  well  as
methods of model validation.
The  conference  took  place  at  a  time  when  the
management of risks is being seen as vital at all
levels of economic activity, including corporations,
financial institutions, national economies as well
as monetary unions. The conference papers pre-
sented innovations in risk management methods
which contribute to systemic financial stability, the
calculation of capital adequacy in financial institu-
tions as well as the validation of credit rating meth-
ods in the context of Basel II. Six invited speakers
contributed original research papers, which were
subsequently  commented  on  by  discussants.  A
common feature of those innovative papers is the
development  of  risk  management  methods  that
can  adapt  in  the  presence  of  evolving  financial
phenomena and thus improve their performance
under extreme shocks.
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should in no part be attributed to the Bank of Greece.The distribution of loan portfolio value
In this paper, Oldrich Alfons Vasicek, Moody’s-
KMV (see Vasicek, 2002), uses the classical Mer-
ton (1974) framework to derive the distribution of
loan portfolio value. There are a number of impor-
tant reasons for doing so. First, in the context of
capital adequacy, consider the portfolio of loans
of a credit institution, each of which is subject to
default thus resulting in a loss for the lender. Fol-
lowing Merton, it is assumed that this portfolio is
partly  financed  by  equity  and  partly  by  debt.
Hence,  the  credit  quality  of  the  lender’s  notes
depends on the probability that the loss on the
portfolio exceeds the value of the equity capital,
which in turn depends on the probability of loan
default. The credit institution maintains a certain
credit rating for its own notes, e.g. Aa on a rating
agency scale, by keeping the probability of default
on the notes at the level corresponding to that rat-
ing, i.e. about 0.001 for the Aa class of quality.
Thus, the adequate equity capital must be equal
to the percentile of the distribution of the portfo-
lio  loss  that  corresponds  to  the  desired  rating
probability.
Furthermore, the probability distribution of loan
portfolio  value  has  a  number  of  other  applica-
tions, such as the pricing of credit derivatives, e.g.
CDOs, the calculation of Value-at-Risk as well as
in regulatory reporting. Following Merton (1974),
it is assumed that asset value follows a Brownian
motion with drift and that a loan defaults if, at its
maturity date, the value of the borrower’s assets
falls below the contractual value of its obligations
payable.  Then,  if  each  loan’s  standard  normal
innovation  process  is  composed  of  a  common
and an idiosyncratic factor, the (conditional on the
common  factor)  probability  of  loss  can  be
obtained in closed form, as a function of structural
parameters. Thus, for a portfolio of n loans, the
loss distribution can be obtained as the limit of
the binomial probability to observe k defaults out
of n loans, as the portfolio size approaches infin-
ity (see Vasicek, 1987; 1991; 2002). This is an
influential work upon which many Basel II calcu-
lations are based.
The  paper  was  discussed  by  Stephen  Satchell,
Trinity College, Cambridge, who emphasised the
role of default frequency dynamic properties over
time, the effects on non-normal shocks as well as
the role of correlation between risk factors and
diversification  in  determining  the  shape  of  the
loan loss distribution. Recent work in these direc-
tions  includes  Schonbucher  (2002),  Hanson,
Pesaran and Schuermann (2006) and Lamb and
Perraudin (2006).
A simple multi-factor “factor adjustment”
for the treatment of credit capital 
diversification
In this paper, Daniel Rosen, University of Toronto,
(see Cespedes et al., 2006), presented an exten-
sion  to  the  single-factor  credit  capital  model,
which provides an adjustment accounting for the
diversification obtained from a multi-factor setting.
For institutions with extensive diversification over
countries and industrial sectors, diversification is
one of the key tools for managing credit risk, thus
it is important the credit portfolio model used to
calculate and allocate capital effectively captures
portfolio diversification effects. Although this issue
can  also  be  addressed  using  simulation  tech-
niques,  the  authors  utilise  analytical  approxima-
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tory  purposes  and  credit  portfolio  management.
They  introduce  the  concept  of  a  ‘diversification
factor’ and show that it can be expressed as a func-
tion of two parameters that broadly capture the
size  concentration  and  the  average  cross-sector
correlation. Furthermore, the ‘marginal diversifica-
tion factors’ are also defined at the sub-portfolio or
obligor levels, which account for their diversifica-
tion contributions to the portfolio, thus allowing
for intuitive capital allocation. The diversification
factor is estimated for a family of factor models but
requires  substantial  numerical  work.  The  model
can  also  be  calibrated  to  a  Monte  Carlo-based
framework to adjust periodically for changing mar-
ket conditions and portfolio composition. In the
context  of  risk  management,  the  model  can  be
used to understand concentration risk, capital allo-
cation and sensitivities, stress testing, as well as to
compute “real-time” marginal risk.
The  paper  was  discussed  by  Lynda  Allen,  City
University  of  New  York,  who  emphasised  the
importance  of  the  properties  of  risk  concentra-
tions in the model as well as the empirical perfor-
mance of its parameterisation in the presence of
more general shocks.
Markovian credit risk transition probabilities
under non-negativity constraints for the 
US portfolio 1984-2004
In  this  paper,  George  Christodoulakis,  Bank  of
Greece  and  Manchester  Business  School  (see
Christodoulakis, 2006), presented a new estima-
tion method of credit risk transition probabilities
in the context of a multiple-state Markov process
for aggregate loan class data. The use of Markov
transition matrices is intuitively appealing, and in
a quantitative context estimates of these quanti-
ties would constitute an indispensable input in a
credit  institution’s  risk  assessment.  Although
robust  estimation  of  these  probabilities  can  be
trivially performed by calculating the proportion
of risky objects, e.g. loans, which migrate for one
risk category to another, it is often the case that
such individual transitions cannot be observed or
are unavailable to the analyst. A standard example
is a regulator who usually collects aggregate data
for  performing,  non-performing  and  written-off
loans  for  credit  institutions,  without  access  to
detailed  credit  portfolio  data.  In  this  case  one
could consider the evolution of credit risk with
respect  to  broad  rating  classes  using  Markov
Chains for proportions of aggregate data.
A recent application to aggregate credit risk data
is given by Jones (2005), who estimates the tran-
sition matrices for quarterly US aggregate data on
non-performing loans as well as interest coverage
data using the generalised least squares approach
proposed by MacRae (1977). Following Lee et al.
(1970), when proportions data are available the
Markov probability model can be expressed as a
linear  regression  model  under  parameter  con-
straints,  the  latter  constituting  the  conditional
transition probabilities. The least squares estima-
tion of the transition probabilities —the regres-
sion  coefficients—  under  linear  equality  con-
straints to ensure that probabilities sum to unity,
is a typical quadratic programming problem with
closed-form solution and known distribution for
the  estimator.  However,  when  linear  inequality
constraints are imposed to ensure non-negative
transition probabilities, it is not possible to obtain
a closed-form solution. Thus, Judge and Takayama
(1966) proposed a modified simplex algorithm for
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quadratic  programme.  In  univariate  regression,
the  transition  probability  estimator  has  a  trun-
cated normal distribution if the regression error is
normally  distributed.  However,  when  there  are
more than two independent variables, it can be
very difficult to obtain the desired sampling distri-
butions  using  standard  methods.  One  could  at
most assess the superiority or inferiority of the
solution  vs.  the  maximum  likelihood  estimator
using the results of Judge and Yancey (1986).
This  paper  focuses  on  the  development  of  an
alternative estimation method for the stationary
Markov model by adopting a Bayesian perspective
to formally impose the non-negativity probability
restrictions in the form of a prior probability den-
sity. To calculate the posterior density of model
parameters,  Monte  Carlo  Integration  (MCI)  as
proposed by Kloek and van Dijk (1978) and van
Dijk and Kloek (1980) is used and further studied
by Geweke (1986). In the paper, this methodol-
ogy is applied to estimate the transition probabil-
ities of a first order Markov process for quarterly
US aggregate data on non-performing loans from
1984 until 2004. The empirical results on the US
portfolio of non-performing loan proportions are
in  some  cases  close  to  the  estimates  of  Jones
(2005), but also exhibit some statistically signifi-
cant differences regarding the estimated transition
probabilities.  Furthermore,  in-sample  forecast
evaluation  statistics  indicate  that  the  estimator
tends to slightly overpredict (underpredict) non-
performing (performing) loan proportions but is
substantially more accurate in all cases.
This paper was discussed by Alexandros Benos,
National  Bank  of  Greece,  who  emphasised  the
properties of the method with respect to parame-
ter uncertainty as captured by their posterior dis-
tributions as well as its forecasting performance.
The informational efficiency of the equity
market as compared to the syndicated bank
loan market
In this paper, Lynda Allen (see Allen and Gottes-
man,  2006)  presents  empirical  evidence  on  the
comparative efficiency between equity and syndi-
cated bank loan markets. The loan market is com-
prised of financial institutions with access to both
public  and  private  information  about  borrowing
firms. The paper tests whether this is reflected in
efficient price formation in the loan market vis-à-
vis  the  equity  markets  by  forming  four  related
hypotheses.  Firstly,  because  the  loan  syndicates
have access to regularly-provided inside informa-
tion  about  the  borrowing  firm,  the  loan  prices
should  reflect  private  information  before  it  is
released publicly and only then incorporated into
the prices of publicly held equity securities. This is
denoted  as  the  private  information  hypothesis.
Secondly,  as  syndicated  bank  loan  markets  are
considerably less liquid than equity markets and
although  lenders  may  have  access  to  superior
information, noise in the price formation process
in the syndicated bank loan market may hamper
informational  efficiency,  a  situation  which  is
termed  “the  liquidity  hypothesis”.  Thirdly,  since
loans have limited upside gain potential, it is pos-
sible that the loan markets should be more sensi-
tive  to  negative  information,  whereas  positive
information is more relevant to equity securities
holders that share in potential upside gains. This
situation is termed “the asymmetric price reaction
hypothesis”.  Finally,  in  the  case  that  loan  and
equity securities markets are well integrated and
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kets as warranted upon the release of any infor-
mation should be observed. This is termed as the
integrated markets hypothesis.
Empirical evidence suggests rejection of the pri-
vate information hypothesis, the liquidity hypoth-
esis,  as  well  as  the  asymmetric  price  reaction
hypothesis.  Finally,  empirical  evidence  is  most
consistent with an integrated markets hypothesis,
thus suggesting that both the equity and syndi-
cated  bank  loan  markets  are  highly  integrated
such that information flows freely across markets.
This paper was discussed by Ulrich Bindseil, Euro-
pean Central Bank, who focused on the possible
instability of the estimated parameters and their
impact on potential asymmetries in the transmis-
sion of information between markets.
A framework for joint market and credit 
risk modelling: a central bank and 
practitioner’s view
In  this  paper,  Ulrich  Bindseil  and  Ken  Nyholm
(2006),  European  Central  Bank,  presented  a
framework  for  integration  of  credit  and  market
risk in portfolio management models. The paper
is motivated by the observation that, although the
insight that macroeconomic variables drive both
credit risk and yield curves is very old, existing
credit risk portfolio models in the market seem to
assume  that  the  interrelation  between  the  two
risks  can  be  ignored.  In  this  paper  the  authors
present  a  flexible  method  for  analysing  market
and credit risk separately and jointly within a port-
folio context. Conditional upon the future macro-
economic  state,  the  model  allows  for  dynamic
evolution of yield curves for several credit grades
simultaneously, as well as for time-varying credit
transition matrices.
To illustrate the usefulness of the derived frame-
work, they analyse marginal and joint loss distrib-
utions under three different macroeconomic sce-
narios  of  a  simulated  portfolio.  In  particular,
through  Monte  Carlo  experiments,  the  paper
shows that the marginal credit risk distribution is
skewed and has more losses than the normal dis-
tribution; the marginal distribution for market risk
is closer to a normal distribution, however, with a
somewhat fatter loss tail, and the joint loss distri-
bution resembles a normal distribution but with
significantly more mass in the loss tail.
This  paper  was  discussed  by  Oldrich  Vasicek,
who placed emphasis on the possible effects of
diversification in this context as well as the model
performance in the tails of the distribution.
Assessing the accuracy of credit R.O.C. 
estimates in the presence of 
macroeconomic shocks
In this paper, Stephen Satchell (see Christodoulakis
and Satchell, 2006) presented an assessment of the
properties  and  performance  of  statistical  metrics
used in credit rating validation studies. In particular,
the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
is often used by creditors to assess credit scoring
accuracy and as part of their Basel II model valida-
tion. The paper provides a mathematical procedure
to  assess  the  accuracy  of  ROC  curve  estimates 
for  credit  defaults  in  the  presence  of  macroeco-
nomic  shocks.  The  developed  approach  supple-
ments the non-parametric method recommended
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Whitney test which is used as a summary statistic
of R.O.C. curves. Assuming initially that both sick
and healthy loan credit rating scores are generated
by  normal  distributions,  the  paper  shows  how
R.O.C. estimates depend on the location and scale
parameters.  Then,  using  these  results  the  paper
constructs  R.O.C.  confidence  intervals  in  closed
form  and  examines  the  influence  of  exogenous
macroeconomic shocks. Furthermore, the method
is generalised by allowing credit rating scores to be
generated  by  skew-normal  distributions,  thus
allowing skewness to affect the moments of the
distribution. It is then shown how the presence of
skewness could further exacerbate the accuracy of
model validation.
This paper was discussed by Ken Nyholm, who
offered  comments  on  the  performance  of  the
method using different empirical data and partic-
ularly shocks that may not be captured by normal
and skew-normal density functions.
Conclusions
The  Bank  of  Greece  research  conference  ‘’The
evolution of credit risk: phenomena, methods and
management’’ collected papers from regulatory,
banking  and  academic  origins,  focusing  on  the
dynamic properties of credit risk and the robust-
ness of the developed models. The main research
directions concerned the understanding of credit
risk and loss in a portfolio context, its interaction
with other types of risk particularly through the
effects  of  common  factors,  the  endogenous
dynamic properties of risk factors, as well as the
model performance in the presence of extreme
events. Three speakers of the conference, Ordrich
Vasicek, Daniel Rosen and Ulrich Bindseil, con-
tributed papers with developments on the proper-
ties of loan portfolio losses, focusing on the gen-
erating  mechanism  of  their  probability  distribu-
tion in closed form, the effectiveness of loan port-
folio diversification through multiple risk factors,
as well as the interaction between credit and mar-
ket  risk,  respectively.  Their  results  shed  further
light into the nature of losses in loan portfolios
and  contribute  to  more  effective  internal  credit
risk management. Furthermore, knowledge of the
distribution  of  loan  losses  greatly  improves  the
banking supervisory practice as well as the moni-
toring  of  financial  stability  in  both  banking  and
systemic levels. The paper presented by George
Christodoulakis offered a new method for the esti-
mation  of  Markov  credit  transition  matrices,
which can be particularly useful from a supervi-
sory and financial stability perspective when only
aggregate loan class data can be observed in the
system. Lynda Allen offered empirical evidence on
the informational efficiency of syndicated loan vs.
equity markets in the US, concluding that these
markets appear to be highly integrated such that
information flows freely across markets. Finally,
Stephen Satchell presented analytical results on
the  properties  of  ordinal  dominance  graphs  as
popular tools for the validation of credit scoring
models.  Confidence  intervals  for  these  curves
were  provided  in  closed  form,  thus  quantifying
explicitly the range of values for which such vali-
dation  methods  are  reliable.  Application  of  the
new  method  could  improve  the  internal  model
validation process in credit institutions, as well as
assist the supervisory practice.
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1. The Consumer Price Index
The  Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI),  the  most  com-
monly used inflation measurement index, reflects
the variation over time in the price level of goods
and  services  purchased  by  Greek  households.  In
other words, it captures changes in the cost of a
“basket” of goods and services purchased by the
average consumer in a given period of time. This
“basket” represents households’ consumer habits;
it remains stable throughout the index period and is
revised at regular intervals (approximately every five
years). The purpose of this revision is to update the
composition of the basket so as to bring it closer in
line with actual consumption patterns recorded in
the latest Household Budget Survey. Furthermore,
the revision allows for the redefinition of the share
of each good or service in households’ total con-
sumer spending. At the same time, it offers a win-
dow  of  opportunity  to  review  and  improve  the
methodology  used  to  deal  with  special  issues,
thereby enhancing the reliability of the index.
In Greece, the Consumer Price Index was first com-
piled by the National Bank of Greece in 1924, under
the  title  “Cost-of-Living  Index”.  In  1931,  another
“Cost-of-Living Index” was initiated by the General
Statistical  Service  of  the  Ministry  of  Commerce
encompassing 44 cities in Greece. From 1938 to
1958, the Bank of Greece measured inflation using
the “Cost-of-Living in Athens Index”.
The  National  Statistical  Service  of  Greece
(NSSG) started compiling the CPI in 1959 and
up  to  2000  it  covered  urban  areas  only.  The
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* The views expressed in this article are solely the authors’ and
not necessarily those of the Bank of Greece.index was revised in 1969, 1973, 1974, 1982,
1988, 1994 and 1999. With the 1999 revision
the  geographical  coverage  of  the  index  was
expanded  to  cover  the  whole  country  and  its
methodology  was  significantly  improved.  The
latest CPI revision was performed in 2005 with
the addition of new goods and services related
to health food and new technologies, thus fur-
ther enhancing its reliability.
2. Household Budget Survey
The 2004-5 Household Budget Survey (HBS) pro-
vided the basis for the compilation of the current
CPI.  The  survey  was  conducted  by  the  General
Secretariat of the NSSG between February 2004
and January 2005 and covered all areas (urban –
suburban – rural). The sampling percentage was
0.2%, referring to a sample of 6,555 private house-
holds. In selecting the household sample, the area
sampling method was applied to the whole coun-
try.  The  information  derived  from  this  survey
formed the basis for decisions regarding popula-
tion coverage, the number of items to be included
in the index, as well as the number of retail outlets
from which prices are to be collected.
Household expenditure on individual goods and
services is presented as a monthly average of all
households,  irrespective  of  whether  all  house-
holds in a group reported spending on the respec-
tive  goods  and  services  or  not.  This  average
monthly expenditure is classified according to the
geographical coverage of households (urban, sub-
urban, rural), by household size (number of mem-
bers), by income bracket, as well as by various
characteristics  of  the  household  head,  such  as
age, profession, professional position.
The Household Budget Survey provides impor-
tant feedback on household consumption pat-
terns over the respective period. Expenditure of
the sample of households taking part in the sur-
vey on each item (good or service) consumed in
the period covered by the survey is recorded in
terms of both amount and share in the house-
hold’s  total  consumption  expenditure.  There-
fore, if household spending on a given item is
high in the survey period, this item will have a
relatively high weighting coefficient and, thus,
any  variation  in  its  price  will  have  a  stronger
impact —compared with the price variation of
other items— on the total cost of the basket. A
typical example is fuel (heating oil and petrol).
While  in  the  1999  HBS  the  share  of  average
household  fuel  expenditure  in  total  consump-
tion expenditure was 48.43ò, in the 2005 HBS
it came to 59.82ò. This significant increase was
due to the fact that in the period covered by the
2005 HBS world oil prices had risen consider-
ably,  causing  the  increase  in  household  fuel
expenditure.  Thus,  large  fuel  price  variations,
together  with  the  high  share  of  fuel  in  final
household expenditure, play an important role
in determining inflation.
3. Coverage and classification of CPI items
The current Consumer Price Index (CPI), as well
as  the  CPI  that  resulted  from  the  previous 
revision (base year: 1999), refers to the whole
country  (urban,  suburban  and  rural  areas) 
and covers private households only, i.e. it cov-
ers  neither  collective  households  (hospitals,
homes  for  the  elderly,  boarding  schools  etc.)
nor foreign visitors (tourists). CPI items (goods
and  services)  were  grouped  according  to  the
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EU  Member  States  on  the  basis  of  the  Har-
monised Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs).
For  the  collection  of  CPI  item  prices,  24  cities
were selected on the basis of the 2001 general
population census. The total number of goods and
services included in the new index is 784; these
items encompass a much larger number of vari-
eties. Approximately 55,000 prices are recorded
every month.
4. Weighting coefficients
The new weighting coefficients were derived from
the 2005 HBS on the basis of monthly average
household  consumption  expenditure  by  CPI
group, sub-group and item (goods and services).
In the last three revisions of the CPI, the devel-
opment of weighting coefficients over time (see
Table  1)  has  been  consistent  with  variation
trends in world consumption patterns. As the
income level rises, consumption patterns shift
from  expenditure  to  meet  basic  needs  (food,
clothing and footwear) to expenditure intended
to improve living conditions and leisure, such as
communications  (mobile  telephones,  internet)
and hotels-restaurants.
5. Comments on weighting coefficients and
the CPI in general
Weighting  coefficients  reflect  consumption  pat-
terns with respect to average household expendi-
ture. However, certain groups of households/con-
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1 Classification  Of  Individual  Consumption  by  Purpose  (as
defined by the United Nations).
Table 1
Comparison between CPI weights in the last three revisions
(Ô/ÔÔ)
Source: NSSG.
01 Food and non-alcoholic beverages 205.67 184.89 178.21
02 Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 34.98 38.87 41.60
03 Clothing – footwear 111.13 99.06 87.01
04 Housing 135.85 117.13 116.51
05 Durables – household articles and services 83.90 86.41 78.22
06 Health 57.40 69.07 74.55
07 Transport 135.87 129.81 132.21
08 Communications 18.10 37.55 47.02
09 Recreation – cultural activities 50.41 49.01 50.30
10 Education 27.28 27.43 26.63
11 Hotels – cafés – restaurants 82.88 96.60 100.18
12 Miscellaneous goods and services 56.53 64.17 67.56
Overall CPI 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00
COICOP/






weightsumers have different consumption habits to those
of  the  average  household.  For  example,  average
household  consumption  patterns  are  not  ade-
quately representative of an elderly couple, which
constitutes a household in its own right. The cou-
ple’s food expenditure (or any other type of expen-
diture for that matter) does not follow the average
pattern, while its healthcare expenditure is larger.
Obviously,  the  weighting  coefficients  for  this
household differ significantly from the CPI weight-
ing coefficients. In fact, the inflation these groups of
households/consumers  actually  experience  may
differ from that of the average household. Certain
population groups, like the elderly, might prefer the
general CPI to be replaced by a more representa-
tive inflation index. However, the compilation of a
different index for each population group would be
too costly, not to mention that such an endeavour
would not be of much use. Besides, the CPI is not
a cost-of-living index, i.e. it does not measure the
differential in the cost required to reach the same
living standards under different consumption pat-
terns in terms of time and place; it measures the
average price evolution on the basis of the variation
in expenditure to maintain households’ consump-
tion pattern, as well as on the basis of population
composition in the reference period. Furthermore,
what is important from a macroeconomic perspec-
tive  is  the  variation  in  the  general  price  level  of
goods and services which are available throughout
the economy in order to meet demand. It is impos-
sible to monitor inflation for each consumer on the
basis of their personal basket. Rather, with given
weighting coefficients for the basket of the average
household, it is possible to measure inflation for
the economy as a whole.
As  already  mentioned,  the  CPI  is  revised
approximately every five years. Weighting coef-
ficients  are  kept  unchanged  throughout  the
index period and until the CPI is revised on the
basis of a new HBS. However, since consump-
tion patterns and household habits change over
time, it has been internationally agreed to revise
the CPI no sooner than every five years and no
later than every seven years so that it is more
representative. Besides, it has been statistically
proven that fixed-base inflation indices tend, by
definition,  to  overestimate  inflation  as  they
move farther away from the base year, because
it is not possible to replace higher-priced items
with cheaper ones. Revision implies compiling
the  new  index  with  the  latest  information,
namely adding new items, crossing out items
no  longer  in  use  or  replaced,  and  generally
updating the index in accordance with current
consumption patterns, as these are reflected by
weighting coefficients.
6. Special CPI issues
Special  issues  of  particular  interest  for  the
improvement of CPI reliability, which have been
effectively resolved by the NSSG, are as follows:
(a)Calculation  of  rents.  The  sample  of  1,300
rented  houses  in  Athens  and  Thessalonici,
which  was  used  in  the  previous  revision
(1999) to determine the cost of rent in the CPI,
was  expanded  to  an  area  sample  of  4,500
rented houses throughout the country.
(b)The  seasonality  of  certain  CPI  items  which
change over the year, such as fresh fruit and
vegetables, clothing and footwear, heating oil,
cinema  and  theatre  tickets,  as  well  as  the
reduced prices (discounts – special offers).
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vegetables, the NSSG applies the method of
varying  weighting  coefficients.  According  to
this  method,  the  composition of  the  basket
with  respect  to  these  items  changes  from
month to month, in line with their seasonal
production; hence these items have individual
seasonal weighting coefficients.
As to the other items (winter or summer cloth-
ing/footwear,  heating  oil,  winter or  summer
cinema/theater  tickets)  which  vary  over  the
year, their last observed price is kept for the
months they are not available in the market.
Reduced  prices  on  account  of  special  offers
and/or discounts are not taken into account
when calculating the CPI – by contrast with
the general discounts enacted by the Ministry
of Development, which are distinguished into
winter and summer discounts, and are taken
into  account.  After  the  end  of  the  discount
period, prices return to their previous level;
thus, there is no impact on the index when the
comparison is made on a year-on-year basis.
(c)Variations  in  utility  service  prices  are  moni-
tored through invoices of public utility compa-
nies and weighted with average consumption,
as derived from all household expenditure in
the country.
(d)Fixed and mobile telephony prices are calcu-
lated on the basis of average weighted varia-
tions in the prices of these services by com-
pany  (provider).  The  weighting  coefficients
used are the company’s receipts from the pro-
vision of the said services to household users
in the base year.
(e)In some categories (taxis, hairdressing, served
items) prices are surcharged over Christmas
and  Easter  periods.  These  increased  prices,
due  to  the  granting  of  the  Christmas  and
Easter bonuses, are taken into account when
calculating the CPI for the specific period dur-
ing which the bonuses were granted.
7. The new revised CPI
As already mentioned, the final determination of
household  consumption  expenditure  and  new
weighting coefficients was based on the results of
the Household Budget Survey, together with the
latest data from National Accounts and expenditure
stock data from public organisations (see Table 1).
Furthermore,  new  items  were  added,  as  well  as
variations of previous items, the special seasonal
weighting coefficients for fresh fruit and vegetables
were changed, while the number of outlets and of
collected prices was expanded.
These changes make the new index more repre-
sentative than the previous one, since it contains
further and more recent information regarding the
consumption pattern of the household and takes
into account developments in the product market
through the addition of new goods and services.
8. The Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
(HICP)
The Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)2
is the most important inflation measurement index
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2 See  previous  study  by  N.  Karabalis  “Harmonisation  of  Con-
sumer Price Indices in EU countries”, Bank of Greece, Economic
Bulletin, No. 7, March 1996.used  by  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB).  Har-
monised  inflation  indices  of  EU  Member  States
were constructed in 1997,3 in order to address the
need  to  compile  indices  that  are  comparable
between  Member  States.  They  were  one  of  the
tools used to assess whether the inflation criterion,
one of the main convergence criteria stipulated in
the Maastricht Treaty for the entry of EU Member
States into the European Monetary Union (EMU), is
met. Since the start of Stage Three of EMU, euro
area HICP, which is the outcome of the HICPs of
euro area Member States, has been used by the
ECB for the purpose of assessing price stability in
the euro area (price stability is defined as an annual
rate of change in the HICP below, but close to, 2%).
HICPs  are  based  on  national  CPIs  and  are
designed to cover prices of goods and services
actually  paid  (by  consumers).  They  are  not
intended to replace national CPIs and are not nec-
essarily used within a country in the context of
inflationary adjustments or wage bargaining.
HICPs  use  a  single  classification  of  sub-indices
(COICOP/HICP4), while weighting coefficients dif-
fer between countries, according to the relative
importance  of  consumer  expenditure  on  every
good or service in each country, i.e. there is no
uniform  basket  (see  Tables  2  &  3).  Weighting
coefficients  are  readjusted  at  the  start  of  each
year, based on previous year’s inflation and on
any other recent information, so that they reflect
the specific consumption pattern. The basis for
the computation of HICP items’ weighting coeffi-
cients is provided by National Accounts and the
Household Budget Survey.
Important items on the agenda of HICP compilers
are  the  replacement,  with  quality  standards,  of
items for which prices are collected (quality adjust-
ment procedure) and the inclusion of owner-occu-
pied  housing  in  the  list  of  items  covered.  These
issues have been discussed over a number of years
between Eurostat and the national statistical insti-
tutes of Member States in the context of the ten-
year  efforts  to  harmonise  inflation  measurement
between EU Member States. On the one hand, the
quality adjustment procedure stems from the fact
that inflation indices should measure “pure” price
changes without being affected by changes in the
quality  of  purchased  items.  Therefore,  collected
prices should be adjusted to reflect quality changes
without  being  exclusively  determined  by  them,
which could give rise to biased inflation estimates.5
On the other hand, the inclusion of owner-occupied
housing costs remains one of the most important
issues to be resolved by Eurostat and the national
statistical institutes of Member States, since owner-
occupier expenditure, even though it forms a signif-
icant  part  of  household  spending,  is  still  left  out
from the basket used to measure inflation.
9. HICP features
Eurostat,  in  agreement  with  national  statistical
institutes of Member States, defined the main fea-
tures HICPs should cover in order to be reliable
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3 In fact, the implementation of harmonised inflation indices at
the EU level started in 1996; however, since that was an early
stage, that year’s indices were considered interim and temporary.
4 Classification  of  Individual  Consumption  by  Purpose/Har-
monised Indices of Consumer Prices.
5 Claims that inflation indices may be biased due to their inabil-
ity to take into consideration changes in quality were raised after
the 1996 Boskin Committee report in the USA (Boskin, M.J. et al.,
“Towards a more accurate measure of the cost of living”, Decem-
ber 1996). The Boskin report argued that the CPI in the US was
highly biased on account of effects from quality changes in goods
and services (especially in high technology sectors) and the efforts
made to remedy this bias were not considered successful.Inflation measurement in Greece







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6and comparable. These features formed part of the
Council  Regulation  (EC  2494/95)  which  set  out
rules, guidelines and good practice standards for
HICP compilation. So far, many other rules and
directives laying down specific measures for fur-
ther improvement of HICPs have been approved.
Some of the main HICP features are the following:
ñ Indices cover all goods and services included in
the final consumption expenditure related to
households’ direct needs in the territory of the
Member  State,  irrespective  of  nationality  or
permanent residence of households’ members,
and use the uniform classification of individual
consumption  by  purpose,  adapted  to  HICP
requirements (COICOP/HICP).
ñ Prices  used  for  HICP  calculation  are  prices
actually paid by households for the purchase
of goods and services in the context of money
transactions and not price estimates. In other
words, prices included in the HICP are retail
prices (or final demand prices) and not pro-
ducer prices. Namely, they include taxes and
discounts, while excluding product subsidies.
ñ Indices have the same base year.
ñ Harmonised indices are Laspeyres-type indices,
i.e. monthly price changes are measured as the
average of price indices weighted on the basis
of  expenditure  corresponding  to  the  popula-
tion  consumption  pattern  in  the  reference
period of weighting coefficients.
ñ The basket is updated every 5-7 years, while
expenditure (weighting coefficients) is adjusted
every year.
ñ Harmonised indices do not include expendi-
ture for interest payments, since the interest
rates applied are neither goods nor services,
but  means  of  striking  a  balance  between
money supply and demand.
ñ National HICPs include expenditure by foreign
visitors,  but  not  expenditure  by  residents
whilst in a foreign country, while expenditure
incurred  for  business  purposes  is  not  taken
into account.
10. CPI and HICP in Greece
A comparison of the two inflation indices used in
Greece,  namely  CPI  and  HICP,  for  the  period
1996-2006 is presented in Chart 1. Both the par-
allel  development  of  the  two  indices  and  any
minor  or  major  differences  are  quite  obvious.
Deviations are mainly due to the different share of
individual types of expenditure in the shaping of
general  indices.  More  specifically,  the  fact  that
tourist expenditure is included in the HICP, but
not  in  the  CPI,  differentiates  considerably  the
weighting coefficients of certain goods and ser-
vices in the basket, which results in a commensu-
rate (greater or smaller) impact on HICP of price
variations in these items. In other words, while
price variations in these goods and services are
identical  in  both  indices,  their  contribution  to
shaping the general index (HICP or CPI) is differ-
ent, and this causes the deviations observed in
inflation measurement.
As already mentioned, the CPI covers consump-
tion  expenditure  in  the  economic  territory  of
Greece  only  by  domestic  private  households,
while the HICP also covers expenditure by for-
Inflation measurement in Greece
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(collective  households).  In  addition,  different
sources are used for the calculation of weighting
coefficients of the two indices; the frequency of
renewal and updating of weighting coefficients is
different  (CPI  weights  are  renewed  when  the
index is revised, i.e. every five years, while HICP
weights are mandatorily adjusted every January
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Table 4
Comparison between CPI and HICP weights 
(Ô/ÔÔ)
Source: NSSG and calculations based on NSSG data.
01 Food and non-alcoholic beverages 176.17 178.21 -2.04
02 Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 51.02 41.60 9.42
03 Clothing – footwear 121.61 87.01 34.60
04 Housing 100.83 116.51 -15.68
05 Durables – household articles and services 68.64 78.22 -9.58
06 Health 56.36 74.55 -18.19
07 Transport 136.38 132.21 4.17
08 Communications 22.75 47.02 -24.27
09 Recreation – cultural activities 44.17 50.30 -6.13
10 Education 19.65 26.63 -6.98
11 Hotels – cafés – restaurants 147.45 100.18 47.27
12 Miscellaneous goods and services 54.97 67.56 -12.59
COICOP/






(HICP - CPI)on the basis of previous December prices) and
HICP (contrary to CPI) coverage of newly signif-
icant items which correspond to market devel-
opments is mandatory every year, provided that
these items represent more than 1ò of total con-
sumption  expenditure.  No  matter  how  impor-
tant they are, new items cannot be added in the
CPI during its effect, since the index refers to a
specific consumption pattern that resulted from
a specific HBS. New items can be incorporated
in the CPI at the time of its revision, provided
that the respective expenditure represents a sig-
nificant  share  of  household’s  consumption
spending, according to the relevant HBS.
On the other hand, the two indices (CPI and HICP)
have similarities regarding geographical coverage,
price collection cities, goods and services for which
prices are collected, outlets, use of the geometric
mean for the calculation of individual indices, treat-
ment of seasonal items, reduced prices and dis-
counts and, finally, use of COICOP.
Weight  deviations  between  HICP  and  CPI  (see
Table 4) are entirely reasonable if we take into
account the different population coverage of the
two indices. As already mentioned, the CPI cov-
ers only domestic private household expenditure,
while the HICP covers both private and collective
households,  as  well  as  foreign  visitors,  whose
expenditure mainly accounts for the large differ-
ence in weights. Expenditure by foreign tourists
contributes significantly to the shaping of infla-
tionary trends in the domestic market, particu-
larly  during  summer,  when  population  almost
doubles  and  increased  demand  for  goods  and
services  clearly  affects  the  prices  of  the  items
included  in  the  basket.  Besides,  HICP  weights
may well rely on the Household Budget Survey,
as CPI weights do, but they are adjusted every
Inflation measurement in Greece
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Table 5
Deviations between the HICP and the CPI 
(Percentage points)
* Differences between the overall index and the sum of the figures for each category are due to rounding.
Source: Calculations based on NSSG data.
Overall index* –0.3 0.3 0.3 –0.1 0.1 –0.1 0.1 0.1
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 0.08 0.15 0.08 –0.03 0.06 0.04 –0.06 0.04
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.05
Clothing – footwear 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07
Housing –0.11 0.08 –0.05 –0.10 –0.12 –0.16 –0.03 –0.07
Durables – household articles and services –0.06 0.00 –0.02 –0.04 –0.04 –0.03 –0.03 –0.03
Health –0.16 –0.08 –0.05 –0.06 –0.03 –0.03 –0.04 –0.07
Transport 0.00 0.06 –0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.02
Communications 0.00 –0.02 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02
Recreation – cultural activities –0.04 –0.02 –0.03 –0.04 –0.02 –0.03 –0.01 –0.03
Education –0.02 –0.02 –0.03 –0.05 –0.03 –0.04 –0.03 –0.03
Hotels – cafés – restaurants 0.05 0.11 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.16
Miscellaneous goods and services –0.06 –0.06 –0.06 –0.09 –0.09 –0.09 0.00 –0.06
Main CPI/HICP categories 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
2000-06
averageyear  on  the  basis  of  National  Accounts  data,
while CPI weights are adjusted every five years.
The  most  important  deviations  for  2006  are
recorded  in  “clothing-footwear”,  “communica-
tions” and “hotels-cafés-restaurants” (see Table
5).  More  specifically,  in  the  last  seven  years
(2000-2006)  “hotels-cafés-restaurants”  was  the
expenditure  category  which  recorded  the  most
diverging  pattern  and,  thus,  contributed  com-
mensurately  to  the  deviation  between  the  CPI
and the HICP. By contrast, the contribution of
“clothing-footwear”, “housing” and “health” was
lower, due to the smaller deviation between the
respective HICP and CPI weights.
11. Conclusions
Each revision of the Consumer Price Index con-
tributes  to  the  creation  of  an  improved  and
updated inflation index. This index incorporates
the latest information and, on account of the fact
that it is based on a more recent consumption
pattern, it is more reliable and representative than
the previous one. It is used for the official mea-
surement of inflation within the country and it is
taken into account in wage negotiations between
the social partners and in any adjustment of the
purchasing power of the currency.
In essence, the HICP is another inflation index
with clear and pre-determined rules, in the form
of EU directives or guidelines, in order to ensure
that it is reliable and suitable for use in the con-
text of the EU and, particularly, the euro area.
The HICP is the result of a long harmonisation
process  and  it  is  therefore  comparable  to  the
respective  harmonised  indices  of  EU  Member
States. The HICP, together with the respective
harmonised indices of euro area Member States,
is  the  main  measure  of  price  stability  in  the
Monetary Union.
It is true that the measurement of inflation in
Greece  with  two  different  indices  (CPI  and
HICP), despite the fact that their differences are
minor, can confuse users, even though the roles
of the two indices are quite distinct. However,
owing  to  their  minor  theoretical  and  practical
differences, which do not exceed statistical devi-
ation limits, as can be seen in their ten years of
co-existence, it would be possible, in the context
of best practice and European convergence, for
these  two  indices  to  become  a  unified,  single
index.  HICPs  are  undoubtedly  the  best  means
for measuring consumer price inflation at Euro-
pean level and their quality has reached a very
high degree of comparability and precision com-
pared with any other price variation index.
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 94References
Astin  J.  (1999),  “The  European  Union  Harmonized
Indices of Consumer Prices (HICP)”, in R. Gudnason
and Thora Gylfadottir Proceedings of the Ottawa Group
Fifth Meeting held at Statistics Iceland, Reykjavik, Ice-
land,  25-27  August  1999.  Text  available  at
http://www.statcan.ca/secure/english/ ottawa group and
published in Statistical Journal of the United Nations
ECE 16 (1999), pp. 123-35.
Berglund  A.  (1999),  “New  Inflation  Measure  Used 
as Main Indicator in the ECB/ESCB Monetary Policy 
for the Euro-Zone”, pp. 67-79 in Proceedings of the
Measurement  of  Inflation  Conference,  M.  Silver  and 
D. Fenwick, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University,
Cardiff CF10 3EU, Wales, Un. Kingdom.
Camba-Mendez G. (2003), “The definition of price sta-
bility: choosing a price measure”, Background Studies
for the ECB’s Evaluation for its Monetary Policy Strategy,
European Central Bank.
Diewert  E.  (2002),  “Harmonized  Indices  of  Consumer
Prices:  Their  Conceptual  Foundations”,  Working  Paper
Series, European Central Bank.
Hill  P.  (1996),  “Inflation  Accounting:  A  Manual  on
National Accounting Under Conditions of High Infla-
tion”, OECD, Paris.
ECB  (2005),  “The  harmonized  Index  of  Consumer
Prices: Concept, Properties and Experience To Date”,
Monthly Bulletin, July.
Eurostat (2001), “Compendium of HICP reference doc-
uments”, EUROSTAT, Unit B3, Harmonization of price
indices, March.
NSSG  (2001),  “Revised  Consumer  Price  Index
(1999=100.0)”, Athens.
Karabalis,  N.  (1996),  “Harmonisation  of  Consumer
Price Indices in EU countries”, Bank of Greece, Eco-
nomic Bulletin, No. 7, March.
Inflation measurement in Greece
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 95ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 96Working Papers
(June 2006 – January 2007)
This section contains the abstracts of Working Papers authored by Bank of Greece staff and/or collabora-
tors and published by the Bank of Greece. The unabridged version of these publications is available in
print or electronic format on the Bank’s website (www.bankofgreece.gr).
Contents
42. Regional currency arrangements: insights from Europe
Josef Christl
43. Monetary unions, external shocks and economic performance: a Latin American perspective
Sebastian Edwards
44. What about a world currency?
Richard N. Cooper, Michael Bordo and Harold James
45. A worldwide system of reference rates
John Williamson
46. Technical and allocative efficiency in European banking
Sophocles N. Brissimis, Matthaios D. Delis and Efthymios G. Tsionas
47. Determinants of bank profitability in the Southeastern European region
Panayiotis P. Athanasoglou, Matthaios D. Delis and Christos K. Staikouras
48. The effect of the euro on foreign direct investment
Pavlos Petroulas
49. Computational intelligence in exchange-rate forecasting
Andreas S. Andreou and George A. Zombanakis
50. An alternative definition of market efficiency and some comments on its empirical testing
Alexandros E. Milionis
51. Market conduct, price interdependence and exchange rate pass-through
Sophocles N. Brissimis and Theodora S. Kosma
52. How homogenous are currency crises? A panel study using multiple-response models
Tassos G. Anastasatos and Ian R. Davidson
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 97ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 98Working Papers
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 99
Regional currency arrangements: insights from Europe
Working Paper No. 42
Josef Christl 
The successful completion of EMU and the intro-
duction of the euro have substantially increased
the general interest in regional integration and
especially  in  regional  monetary  arrangements.
The basic theoretical foundation for this kind of
analysis is the optimum currency area (OCA) lit-
erature. In the late 1990s, OCA theory was com-
plemented by the finding that the criteria for suc-
cessful monetary integration need not necessar-
ily be fulfilled ex ante but that they can be ful-
filled ex post, owing to the workings of a mone-
tary union.
This paper focuses on the requirements and fea-
tures of a successful monetary union on the basis
of the optimum currency area theory. Analytically,
it  reviews  the  “logical  roadmap”  for  economic
integration as proposed by Balassa (1962), inves-
tigates the steps taken in Europe and draws some
conclusions for the evolution and creation of cur-
rency arrangements in other regions of the world.
The author reminds us that Europe went through
a Balassa sequencing (free trade zone —common
external tariff— customs union) that took half a
century before arriving at EMU.
The  experience  with  monetary  integration  in
Europe suggests that monetary union is contingent
on  a  high  degree  of  economic  integration  and
strong  political  commitment.  However,  political
union is not an ex ante requirement. Outside fac-
tors  such  as  systemic  shocks  and  globalisation
seem to speed up the pooling of sovereignty in the
economic domain. A firm commitment to stability-
oriented monetary and fiscal policies is a precondi-
tion for gaining credibility and trust within and out-
side a monetary union. Last, but not least, conver-
gence criteria, fiscal rules and strong institutions
are necessary to ensure and monitor compliance.
While  Balassa’s  roadmap  reflects,  to  a  certain
extent, the European experience, it is unlikely to be
possible to derive straightforward “laws” governing
regional  integration  for  global  political  economy.
An important insight for other regions is that they
may  be  more  heterogeneous  than  Europe  and
might lack a strong region-minded centre.ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 100
Monetary unions, external shocks and economic performance: a Latin American perspective
Working Paper ¡Ô. 43
Sebastian Edwards 
This paper analyses the desirability of a monetary
union from a Latin American perspective. Analysis is
introduced  through  historical  retrospective.  A
review of the existing literature indicates that Latin
American countries do not seem to satisfy most of
the  Optimum  Currency  Area  criteria,  such  as
whether  countries  face  similar  shocks,  exhibit
macroeconomic  convergence  or  business  cycle
synchronisation. It is underlined however that some
criteria are partially endogenous to the monetary
and  exchange  rate  regime.  Hence,  the  author
prefers to examine the evidence on economic per-
formance in countries in existing currency unions
and to interpret the results from the perspective of
Latin  American  nations.  Random  effects  probit
regressions  are  estimated  using  a  large  panel  of
pooled data to investigate whether participating in a
currency union reduces the probability of experi-
encing  a  “sudden  stop”  of  capital  inflows  and/or
current  account  reversals.  Both  phenomena  have
plagued Latin American countries, negatively affect-
ing  GDP  growth.  In  addition,  the  question  of
whether countries in a currency union are better
able  to  accommodate  various  external  shocks  is
investigated. More particularly, the impact of terms
of  trade  shocks,  “sudden  stops”  and  “current
account reversals” shocks on growth are examined.
The results suggest that membership of a cur-
rency union does not lower the probability of fac-
ing a sudden stop or a current account reversal.
Furthermore,  external  shocks  are  amplified  in
currency union countries compared to countries
with a flexible exchange rate system, since the
former  group  of  countries  cannot  resort  to
exchange rate adjustments as a way of absorbing
external shocks. Therefore, the benefits of partic-
ipation in a union, i.e. credibility, lower transac-
tion costs, increased trade and lower and more
stable inflation, come at a cost.Working Papers
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What about a world currency?
Working Paper ¡Ô. 44
Richard N. Cooper, Michael Bordo and Harold James
This  paper  consists  of  two  different  parts  that
debate the merits and disadvantages of a world
currency. The opinions concerning a world cur-
rency are diverse and contradictory and the gen-
eral debate is a part of the issue of whether coun-
tries should fix or float their exchange rates. The
differing views depend on whether one believes
that financial market imperfections and monetary
policy shocks are the primary sources of distur-
bances or whether idiosyncratic shocks to funda-
mentals are. In the latter view, flexible exchange
rates are preferred because, under nominal rigidi-
ties  and  asymmetric  shocks,  they  act  as  shock
absorbers.
Cooper R. N.: Proposal for a Common Currency
Among Rich Democracies
The first part suggests that the governments of
large  industrial  democracies  (USA,  EMU  and
Japan) should establish a common currency for
three reasons. First, international financial trans-
actions  will  come  to  dominate  exchange  rate
determination and hence, in an integrated world,
trade and investment profitability. Second, shocks
within the economic entities will be more impor-
tant  than  shocks  between  and,  third,  financial
markets will continue to be fickle in the future.
Thus, elimination of monetary and exchange rates
as sources of asymmetric shocks will contribute
to  more  stable  economic  activity  and  possibly
higher growth.
Bordo M. and James H.: One World Money, Then
and Now
The second part discusses past currency arrange-
ments, similar to those proposed today, that were
tried and failed. These arrangements relied on the
clear strategic superiority of that part of the world
whose money was used in the international finan-
cial system. The authors note that: “[i]t is striking
how the most widely touted proposals for world
money do not attempt to deal with the issue of
who is making policy and in whose interest.” They
conclude that, even if the economic gains might
seem attractive, they are probably not that large
nowadays  and  that,  at  present,  the  political
dynamics that are essential to successful currency
and monetary unions are not there.ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 102
A worldwide system of reference rates
Working Paper No. 45
John Williamson
As global imbalances grow, it is becoming evident
that the present exchange rate arrangements lack
a disciplining mechanism that could help prevent
the escalation of imbalances. This paper makes
the case for reorganising the international mone-
tary system on the basis of globally agreed upon
reference rate parities. The proposed system, the
reference rates system, is claimed to prevent large
misalignments if the reference rates are built on a
vision  of  a  globally  consistent  outcome.  In  the
context of this system, exchange rates are man-
aged according to a well-specified set of rules that
prohibit interventions and other policies intended
to move the exchange rate away from an interna-
tionally agreed reference rate. Conversely, inter-
ventions that aim at bringing the exchange rate
towards the internationally agreed reference rate
are allowed.
As to the implementation of the system, it is pro-
posed that each country, or at least each major
country, will have a reference rate. The IMF staff
that has experience and credibility with macro-
modelling would generate a suggested set of ref-
erence rates, which would be expressed as effec-
tive exchange rates rather bilateral dollar rates,
using  their  favoured  approach  or  a  variety  of
approaches.  The  suggested  reference  rates
would be presented to the IMF Executive Board
at  regular  intervals.  Countries  would  have  the
right to object to the proposed rate but an agree-
ment would have to be reached within a defined
time interval. The IMF would also be endowed
with a framework that would permit it to super-
vise the system and ensure that the countries are
not adopting inconsistent policies or intervene
inappropriately.
Marc Flandreau discusses the paper and agrees
with the general thrust of the proposal. He offers
a few suggestions for implementation and surveil-
lance. Specifically, he has some reservation about
the surveillance role of the IMF and proposes the
BIS as an adequate alternative.Working Papers
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Technical and allocative efficiency in European banking
Working Paper ¡Ô. 46
Sophocles N. Brissimis, Matthaios D. Delis and Efthymios G. Tsionas
Conventional  methods  of  efficiency  estimation
using stochastic frontiers do not decompose over-
all cost efficiency into its technical and allocative
components,  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the
implied production function cannot be derived. In
particular, Greene (1980) defined allocative ineffi-
ciency as the departure of the actual cost shares
from the optimum shares, failing, in such a context,
to derive the relationship between allocative ineffi-
ciency and cost increases from such inefficiency
(Greene  problem).  For  this  reason,  researchers
have been content to either ignore allocative ineffi-
ciency or impose ad hoc restrictions to integrate it
into an empirical model.
This paper specifies a stochastic frontier frame-
work for estimating both technical and allocative
efficiency,  which  is  applied  to  a  large  panel  of
European banks over the years 1996 to 2003. Our
methodology  allows  for  a  self-consistent  mea-
surement of technical and allocative inefficiency,
in an effort to address the Greene problem. Fol-
lowing  the  theoretical  model  of  Kumbhakar
(1997), we estimate a translog cost function that
incorporates allocative inefficiency and its associ-
ated cost share equations, using the method of
maximum likelihood. We present an approximate
solution that is relatively easy to implement, since
we  provide  a  log-likelihood  function  for  this
model in closed form. In this respect, we are able
to obtain technical and allocative inefficiency for
individual banks at each point in time and then
present averages on a country-specific basis and
for the European banking system as a whole.
The  results  suggest  that,  on  average,  European
banks exhibit constant returns to scale and that
technical  and  allocative  efficiency  are  close  to
80%  and  75%  respectively.  Most  importantly,
models  that  include  only  technical  inefficiency
significantly overestimate it. Finally, both techni-
cal  and  allocative  efficiency  have  shown  a  ten-
dency to improve in recent years, as banks apply
better managerial practices in order to enhance
their overall performance. The significant ineffi-
ciencies  observed  and  their  differentiation  in
terms of the efficiency scores among the coun-
tries examined suggest that there is much to be
done  regarding  the  optimisation  of  banking
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Determinants of bank profitability in the Southeastern European region
Working Paper ¡o. 47
Panayiotis P. Athanasoglou, Matthaios D. Delis and Christos K. Staikouras
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of
bank-specific,  industry-related  and  macroeco-
nomic  determinants  of  bank  profitability  in  the
Southeastern  European  countries.  We  utilise  a
panel of commercial banks of these countries that
covers the period 1998-2002. The group of bank-
specific  determinants  involves  operating  effi-
ciency and financial risk. Size is also included to
account for the effect of economies of scale. The
industry-structure  determinants  that  affect  bank
profits are industry concentration and ownership
status  of  banks.  The  structure-conduct-perfor-
mance  (SPC)  hypothesis  figures  prominently
among theories that relate market power to bank
profitability. We also test the validity of the effi-
ciency-financial-structure  (EFS)  hypothesis.  The
third group of determinants relates to the macro-
economic environment within which the banking
system operates. In this context, we include infla-
tion and per capita income among the explanatory
variables of our model.
Our study is novel in the sense that, first, it is
among the few that examines extensively behav-
iour of bank profitability in this region. Second,
it tests the validity of both SPC and EFS hypoth-
esis.  Third,  it  introduces  the  EBRD  index  of
banking  system  reform  in  these  countries  in
order to identify whether it has had any impact
on profitability.
The  empirical  results  show  that  profitability  is
affected by all the bank-specific determinants in
the anticipated way. The SCP hypothesis is veri-
fied, as the effect of industry concentration on
bank profitability was found significant. There is
also some evidence in favour of the EFS hypoth-
esis.  Foreign  banks  operating  in  the  region 
seem to perform better relative to the domestic
banks  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  are  more 
capitalised.  However,  a  positive  relationship
between banking reform and profitability was not
identified. It appears that reforms, at this rela-
tively low level of financial system sophistication,
cause banks to offer competitive interest rates.
Finally, the evidence indicates that profitability,
while affected by inflation, is not affected by per
capita income.Working Papers
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The effect of the euro on foreign direct investment
Working Paper ¡Ô. 48
Pavlos Petroulas
This paper addresses the issue of whether EMU
has had any effects on foreign direct investment
(FDI)  flows.  The  recent  economic  and  policy
debate, concerning the economic effects of EMU
on  its  Member  States,  has  been  based  on  an
increasing  body  of  empirical  evidence  and  this
paper  is  an  attempt  to  investigate  yet  another
aspect of EMU.
In spite of the intuitive appeal of the argument
that  lower  exchange  rate  volatility  will  increase
FDI-flows,  empirical  evidence  regarding  the
effects of EMU on FDI flows is currently absent. In
addition, this evidence could give an indication of
whether EMU creates better conditions for firms
making long-term investment decisions.
Using a new dataset on FDI flows, a panel of uni-
lateral FDI flows between 18 developed coun-
tries  for  the  years  1992  to  2001  is  gathered.
Since we are trying to uncover potential effects
of an institutional reform, a difference-in-differ-
ences  approach  suitable  for  identifying  such
structural changes is used to gauge the effects of
EMU on inward FDI. The estimations are carried
out  both  within  a  partial  as  well  as  a  general
equilibrium approach to FDI.
The  results  of  this  study  show  that  EMU
increases inward FDI flows within the euro area
by approximately 14% to 16% and inward FDI
from  member  countries  to  non-members  by
11%  to  13%;  a  weak  increase  in  inward  FDI
from non-member countries to member coun-
tries  of  around  8%  is  also  uncovered.  The
results are robust to changes in time and coun-
try sample. The central locations of Germany
and Belgium-Luxembourg are shown to play an
important role in euro area FDI where they act
as hub.
Finally, an investigation of the economic geog-
raphy of the euro is conducted by combining
the  inward  FDI  results  with  results  obtained
from export regressions. The findings indicate
that the increase in FDI is concentrated in large
economies,  while  the  increase  in  exports  is
larger for small economies. This is suggestive of
an increase in vertical specialisation or “third”
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Computational intelligence in exchange-rate forecasting
Working Paper ¡o. 49
Andreas S. Andreou and George A. Zombanakis
The diversity of opinions in the international litera-
ture  on  the  issue  of  exchange-rate  forecasting
sometimes raises doubts concerning the extent to
which empirical contributions are able to agree on
a method which can achieve a reliable prediction in
such  an  important  field  at  both  a  micro  and  a
macro policy level. Considering, therefore, that the
question of reliability in exchange-rate forecasting
is still open, we have decided to resort to the use
of artificial intelligence in an effort to improve the
forecasting performance of selected exchange rate
series. To do so, we use Artificial Neural Networks,
which, being a data-driven approach, are consid-
ered  preferable  to  traditional,  model-driven
approaches used for forecasting purposes.
We concentrate on attaining reliable forecasting
performance for the U.S. dollar and the Japanese
yen  rates  versus  the  euro.  Indeed,  following  a
study of the selected exchange-rate series using
traditional as well as specialised, non-parametric
methods together with Monte Carlo simulations,
we  employ  selected  Neural  Networks  (NNs)
trained to forecast rate fluctuations. More specifi-
cally, we use the Neuroshell 2 to show that Artifi-
cial Neural Networks can provide successful time
series  predictions  with  a  substantial  degree  of
accuracy. It is interesting to note that, although
the data are shown by Rescaled Range Statistic
(R/S) analysis to exhibit random behaviour, their
internal  dynamics  are  successfully  captured  by
certain NN topologies, thus yielding accurate pre-
dictions. Indeed, different Multi-layer-Perceptron
topologies  trained  with  the  Back  Propagation
algorithm are used to show that the NN employed
manages to learn the underlying dynamics of the
exchange-rate developments and yields success-
ful results of above 98% accuracy.Working Papers
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An alternative definition of market efficiency and some comments on its empirical testing
Working Paper ¡o. 50
Alexandros E. Milionis 
There is little doubt that the concept of market effi-
ciency is one of the most fundamental in modern
financial  theory.  Although  market  efficiency  is
defined differently by different authors it is the def-
inition of Fama that has become the established
one  and  its  empirical  implications  have  been
extensively tested. According to this definition, a
market is efficient if “prices ‘fully reflect’ all avail-
able information”. However, as is discussed in this
work, this definition is not based on well-defined
econometric notions and, to a certain extent, gen-
erates ambiguity with respect to the substance of
market  efficiency  as  well  as  the  econometric
methodology for its empirical testing.
One of the main aims of this work is to remove
this ambiguity by suggesting an alternative defi-
nition  for  market  efficiency,  based  on  well-
defined econometric notions. It is argued that
the proposed definition has some considerable
advantages over the existing one, as it is sim-
pler, clearer and can more easily be made oper-
ational. Moreover, it is shown that Fama’s defi-
nition can be derived as a consequence. Further
the notion of market efficiency is discussed in a
time-varying  risk  framework  and  some  weak
points  in  Fama’s  econometric  treatment  are
pointed out.
Finally,  the  conditions  under  which  the  results
from  the  application  of  some  commonly  used
methods for the empirical testing of market effi-
ciency are meaningful are examined, and guide-
lines for practitioners are suggested.ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 108
Market conduct, price interdependence and exchange rate pass-through
Working Paper No. 51
Sophocles N. Brissimis and Theodora S. Kosma
The  issue  of  the  unresponsiveness  of  traded
goods prices to exchange rate changes has been
extensively analysed in the literature. Most exist-
ing  studies  focus  on  the  analysis  of  the  micro-
foundations of foreign firms’ pricing and attribute
incomplete exchange rate pass-through to imper-
fectly  competitive  market  structures  and  to  the
existence of market power by foreign firms. In this
context, the existence of domestic competitors is
recognised but their interaction with foreign pro-
ducers is not fully integrated in the models. Thus,
the  possible  impact  of  the  exchange  rate  on
domestic  producers’  pricing  behaviour  and  its
implications for the exchange rate pass-through
have not been adequately analysed.
This paper attempts to fill this gap by developing
a model which examines the pricing behaviour of
foreign firms that produce a differentiated product
and  compete  with  domestic  producers  in  the
domestic  market.  Foreign  and  domestic  firms
simultaneously choose their pricing strategies and
are assumed to have non-zero conjectural varia-
tions. The two price relationships derived, which
correspond to exporting and domestic firms’ reac-
tion functions, indicate that the prices of these
producers are interdependent and this simultane-
ity establishes an indirect link between domestic
producer prices and the exchange rate. Thus, the
interaction  between  foreign  and  domestic  pro-
ducer prices and the exchange rate appears to be
a  key  element  in  the  determination  of  the
exchange rate pass-through elasticity, which can
be not only less than one but also equal to or
greater than one, depending on these producers’
conjectural variations. The paper therefore con-
tributes to the literature by providing a richer pat-
tern for exchange rate pass-through; models that
assume zero conjectural variations typically come
up with a pass-through elasticity which is lower
than one.
The empirical implications of the model are tested
with the Johansen multivariate cointegration tech-
nique using data for Japanese firms’ exports to the
US market. The results indicate that US producer
prices are indeed influenced by the prices of their
Japanese competitors and that, even after allow-
ing  for  this  influence,  the  pass-through  is  still
found to be incomplete.Working Papers
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How homogenous are currency crises? A panel study using multiple-response models
Working Paper No. 52
Tassos G. Anastasatos and Ian R. Davidson
The purpose of this article is to assess empirically
whether all currency crises are induced by a com-
mon set of generating factors or they differ from
each other with respect to magnitude, geographi-
cal  vicinity,  process  of  evolution,  timing,  the
degree of their success in forcing a devaluation
and  the  exchange  rate  regime  upon  which  an
attack is launched. This is explored using a range
of  advanced  Limited  Dependent  Variable  (LDV)
estimation  procedures.  Models  for  ordered  and
unordered  outcomes  along  with  their  het-
eroskedastic  and  random  effects  extensions  are
applied  to  a  large  panel  of  data  comprising  40
years of monthly observations on 23 developed
countries and in various divisions of the sample.
Results provide evidence that fundamentals such
as money supply growth, inflation and the real
exchange rate are linked with crises across the
board. However, several structural factors, most
consistently a lack of real growth but also unem-
ployment, associate in a different way with —and
are more important for— successful attacks com-
pared to failed attacks, larger scale episodes com-
pared to minor episodes, and crises that occur in
bands and pegs compared to crises that occur in
more flexible exchange rate regimes. Crises also
differ  over  time.  Formal  tests  establish  these
structural  dissimilarities.  This  implies  that  the
inherent  hypothesis  spanning  most  empirical
studies  that  all  crises  are  driven  by  the  same
imbalances and follow the same process is mis-
guided.  Heterogeneity  of  crises,  complemented
by  indications  of  self-fulfilling  expectations  and
noise, suggest that time and region specific pre-
dictive approaches and policy responses are more
useful than trying to base analysis and policy deci-
sions on more general patterns.ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 110Monetary policy and
financial system 
supervision measures
(July 2006 - February 2007)
Monetary policy measures of the
Eurosystem
6 July 2006
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations  and  the  interest  rates  on  the  mar-
ginal lending facility and the deposit facility will
remain unchanged at 2.75%, 3.75% and 1.75%
respectively.
3 August 2006
The Governing Council of the ECB decides, with
effect from 9 August 2006, to increase:
1. the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations by 25 basis points to 3.0%;
2. the interest rate on the marginal lending facil-
ity by 25 basis points, to 4.0%; and
3. the interest rate on the deposit facility by 25
basis points to 2.0%.
31 August 2006
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations  and  the  interest  rates  on  the  mar-
ginal lending facility and the deposit facility will
remain  unchanged  at  3.0%,  4.0%  and  2.0%
respectively.
5 October 2006
The Governing Council of the ECB decides, with
effect from 11 October 2006, to increase:
1. the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations by 25 basis points to 3.25%;
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ity by 25 basis points to 4.25%;
3. the interest rate on the deposit facility by 25
basis points to 2.25%.
2 November 2006
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations  and  the  interest  rates  on  the  mar-
ginal lending facility and the deposit facility will
remain unchanged at 3.25%, 4.25% and 2.25%
respectively.
7 December 2006
The Governing Council of the ECB decides, with
effect from 13 December 2006, to increase:
1. the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations by 25 basis points to 3.50%;
2. the interest rate on the marginal lending facil-
ity by 25 basis points to 4.50%;
3. the interest rate on the deposit facility by 25
basis points to 2.50%.
22 December 2006
The  Governing  Council  of  the  ECB  decides  to
increase  the  allotment  amount  for  each  of  the
longer-term  refinancing  operations  to  be  con-
ducted in the year 2007 from € 40 billion to € 50
billion. This increased amount takes the following
aspects into consideration: the liquidity needs of
the euro area banking system have grown strongly
in recent years and are expected to increase further
in  the  year  2007.  Therefore  the  Eurosystem  has
decided to increase slightly the share of the liquid-
ity needs satisfied by the longer-term refinancing
operations.  The  Eurosystem  will,  however,  con-
tinue to provide the bulk of liquidity through its
main  refinancing  operations.  The  Governing
Council may decide to adjust the allotment amount
again at the beginning of 2008.
11 January, 8 February 2007
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations  and  the  interest  rates  on  the  mar-
ginal lending facility and the deposit facility will
remain unchanged at 3.50%, 4.50% and 2.50%
respectively.
Bank of Greece decisions on the estab-
lishment and operation of credit institu-
tions and the supervision of the financial
system
10 July 2006
— IRF European Finance Investment Ltd. is autho-
rised to acquire a qualifying holding of 30% in the
share capital of Proton Investment Bank S.A.
— The ceiling on credit institutions’ investment
in equity and mutual fund units (25% of their
own  funds)  will  be  calculated  on  the  basis  of
their net positive position in equity, derivatives
on equity and equity-indexed derivatives of their
trading portfolios.
— JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. is authorised to
establish  and  operate  a  representative  office  in
Greece.
26 July 2006
— The Paris-based Crédit Agricole S.A. is autho-
rised to acquire up to 100% of the share capital of
the Commercial Bank of Greece.
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to acquire a qualifying holding of up to 57.12%
(85% by a later decision) in the share capital of the
Romania-based Mindbank S.A.
— Marfin Financial Group S.A. is authorised to
acquire a qualifying holding of up to 49% of vot-
ing rights in Egnatia Bank.
— Société Générale Consumer Finance Holding
Hellas SA is authorised to acquire 100% of the
share capital of “Cofidis Hellas Finance S.A.”.
— EFG Eurobank Ergasias is authorised to acquire
a qualifying holding of up to 70% in the share cap-
ital of the Turkey-based “Tekfenbank AS”.
6 September 2006
— The absorption of Omega Bank and of Proton
Stock  Brokers  by  Proton  Investment  Bank  is
approved.
— Dubai Financial LLC is authorised to acquire a
qualifying holding of up to 34% in the share capi-
tal of Marfin Financial Group SA.
— “EFG Factors S.A.” is authorised to operate a
branch in Bulgaria.
— EFG Eurobank Ergasias is authorised to acquire
a qualifying holding of up to 99.34% in the share
capital of the Ukraine-based Bank Universal.
— The Zurich-based I.B.I. Bank AG is authorised
to establish and operate a representative office in
Greece.
21 September 2006
The Agricultural Bank of Greece is authorised to
acquire a qualifying holding of up to 24.99% in the
share capital of the Serbia-based Agroindustrijka
Komercijalna Banka-AIK Banka AD.
29 September 2006
Marfin Bank S.A. is authorised to acquire a quali-
fying holding of up to 89.91% in the share capital
of the Investment Bank of Greece.
2 October 2006
A branch of the Austria-based BMW Austria Bank
GmbH commences its operation in Greece.
13 October 2006
— The National Bank of Greece is authorised to
convert its branch network in Serbia into a sub-
sidiary.
— The  operational  principles  and  the  evaluation
criteria for the structure of credit and financial insti-
tutions’ internal audit systems are specified, with a
view to preventing the use of the financial system
for money-laundering and terrorist financing.
— The  authorisation  for  the  establishment  and
operation of bureaux de change by “Dias Bureaux
de Change S.A.” is withdrawn.
— Novabank  SA  is  authorised  to  amend  its
Statute  and  its  registered  name.  The  latter
becomes “Millennium Bank S.A.”.
8 November 2006
The  National  Bank  of  Greece  is  authorised  to
acquire 100% of the share capital of the Serbia-
based “Vojvodjanska Banka AD Novi Sad”.
28 November 2006
— EFG Eurobank Ergasias is authorised to acquire
100% of the share capital of the Bulgaria-based
“DZI Bank AD”.
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fying holding of up to 27% in the share capital of
“Trieris Real Estate Ltd.”.
11 December 2006
— The Cyprus-based Marfin Popular Bank Public
Co. Ltd. is authorised to acquire a qualifying hold-
ing of up to 100% in the share capital of Egnatia
Bank S.A. and of Marfin Financial Group S.A., and,
through the latter, up to 100% in the share capital
of Marfin Bank ATE and 91% in the share capital
of Investment Bank of Greece S.A.
— The National Bank of Greece is authorised to
acquire  100%  of  the  share  capital  of  P&K
Investment Services S.A.
— Except  for  the  cases  where  the  manner  of
application of contractual terms is clearly deter-
mined,  whenever  the  contractual  terms  agreed
upon between customers and credit institutions
are unilaterally amended by the credit institution,
the  latter  is  obliged  to  inform  the  counterparty
individually. Besides, fees for the lack of transac-
tions will not be applied to savings deposits, to
the extent that such fees exceed interest amounts
and  reduce  the  outstanding  balance  of  the
deposited amount.
— “Intel  Express  Bureaux  de  Change  S.A.”  is
authorised to operate in Greece.
— The terms for keeping sight deposit accounts
and for the circulation of cheques through the
banking system are amended and codified so as
to meet market conditions and also to allow for
their better application by credit institutions and
customers.
1 January 2007
The  Greek  branch  of  the  Italy-based  bank
“Sanpaolo IMI S.p.A.” changes its registered name
to “Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.”.
9 January 2007
— The  amendment  of  the  Statute  of  “Geniki
Bank” is approved.
— The amendment of the Statute of “Cooperative
Bank of Pieria Ltd” is approved.
24 January 2007
— Piraeus Bank is authorised to increase its qual-
ifying holding in the share capital of the Belgrade-
based “Piraeus Bank AD, Beograd”.
— “Proton Bank S.A.” is authorised to increase its
qualifying  holding  in  the  share  capital  of  the
Cyprus-based “Interfund Investments Ltd”.
— The amendment of the Statute of “Proton Bank
S.A.” is approved.
1 February 2007
The branch of the Poland-based DaimlerChrysler
Bank  Polska  SA  commences  its  operation  in
Greece.
13 February 2007
The  Greek  branch  of  Société  Générale,  which  is
under liquidation, is authorised to prolong its admin-
istrative, accounting and tax-related operations.
20 February 2007
The framework for the processing and re-circula-
tion of euro banknotes by credit institutions and
professional cash handlers is determined.
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R e:  Supplementation  of  Bank  of  Greece
Governor’s Act 2577/2006 on the operational
principles and criteria for the evaluation of the
organisation and Internal Control Systems of
credit and financial institutions, and relevant
powers of their management bodies (Banking
and  Credit  Committee  Decision  231/4/13
October 2006)
The Banking and Credit Committee, having regard
to:
i) Article 55A of the Bank of Greece’s Statute, as
applicable;
ii) the provisions of Law 2076/1992 re “Taking up
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions
and other relevant provisions”, as applicable;
iii) the provisions of Law 2331/1995, as amended
by Law 3424/2005, on the prevention of the
use of the financial system for money launder-
ing  and  terrorist  financing,  and  the  relevant
Bank of Greece’s Circular 16/2 August 2004;
iv) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2577/9 March
2006, “Operational principles and criteria for
the evaluation of the organisation and Internal
Control Systems of credit and financial institu-
tions, and relevant powers of their manage-
ment bodies”;
v) the need to further specify the above mentioned
framework  with  respect  to  the  prevention  of
money laundering and terrorist financing,
has decided:
1. to supplement Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2577/9  March  2006  with  Annex  4,  attached
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tion criteria for the organisational structure of an
Internal Control System (ICS), with regard to the
prevention  of  money  laundering  and  terrorist
financing. The attached Annex 4 shall henceforth
constitute an integral part of the above mentioned
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act.
2. As from the entry of this decision into effect,
Bank of Greece’s Circular 16/2 August 2004 shall
be abolished.
All other provisions of Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act 2577/9 March 2006 shall remain unchanged.
Annex 4 to Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
No. 2577/9 March 2006
R e: Prevention of the use of the financial sys-
tem for the purpose of money laundering and
terrorist financing
INTRODUCTION
In the context of the prevention of the legalisation
of proceeds from criminal activities (hereinafter:
“money laundering”) and terrorist financing, the
Bank  of  Greece  is  the  Competent  Authority
(Article  1(f)  of  Law  2331/1995,  as  amended  by
Law  3424/2005)  for  the  implementation  of  the
applicable institutional framework by supervised
credit institutions (CIs) and financial institutions
(FIs)  (hereinafter:  “Supervised  Institutions”  -
“SIs”, Table I).
Consequently, the provisions hereof concerning
CIs:
ñ apply also to FIs; and
ñ constitute criteria for assessment of SIs by the
Bank of Greece.
The Department for the Supervision of Credit and
Financial Institutions may, by authority of Chapter
VII of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2577/2006,
adjust the scope of certain requirements on cer-




(a)require proof of the customer’s identity;
(b) examine with special attention any transaction
that, by its nature or in the light of data con-
cerning the customer or his capacity, may be
associated with money laundering or terrorist
financing;
(c) establish internal control and communication
procedures  in  order  to  prevent  transactions
associated with the above crimes;
(d) take into account the customer’s overall port-
folio at group level, pursuant to decisions of
the Minister of Economy and Finance issued
according to Article 4(10) of Law 2331/1995,
as  currently  in  force,  in  order  to  verify  the
compatibility  of  the  transaction  with  such
portfolio;
(e) ensure that these requirements also apply to
their  branches  and  subsidiaries  abroad,
according  to  the  terms  and  conditions  of
Article 4(9) of Law 2331/1995, as currently in
force, and the provisions on the adequacy of
internal control procedures at banking group
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Governor’s Act 2577/2006; and
(f) take any other proper measure, including not
carrying out the transaction or terminating the
business relationship with the customer, if the
identification  and  verification  requirements
according to the legislation on the prevention
of  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing
have  not  been  satisfied  or  the  customer’s
transaction  behaviour  is  not  in  line  with  the
policy and procedures applied by the bank for
addressing the relevant risks.
2.  To  ensure  effective  implementation  of  the
above  provisions,  SIs  shall  observe  the  general
and specific provisions of the said Act (Chapter II,
Sections 14.1-14.3) concerning:
ñ appropriate policies consistent with their busi-
ness objects;
ñ procedures for detecting suspicious transactions;
ñ preventive measures, similar to those applied
to other risks, notably classification of transac-
tions and/or customers into risk grades;
ñ staff’s awareness of risks, policies and proce-
dures;
ñ the  application  of  criteria  for  accepting  and
monitoring a business relationship with a cus-
tomer; and
ñ regular  assessment  of  methodologies  and
adaptation of training to changing conditions.
3. SIs shall be responsible for specialising policy
measures and procedures in order to comply with
the  requirements  emanating  from  these  provi-
sions.  With  a  view  to  ensuring  uniform  imple-
mentation, SIs shall observe the following proce-
dures  in  order  to  comply  with  the  relevant
requirements.
CHAPTER 1
CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION AND 
VERIFICATION PROCEDURES AND CUSTOMER
DUE DILIGENCE
All  anti-money  laundering  and  counter-terrorist
financing (AML/CFT) procedures are based on the
collection, possession and use of adequate infor-
mation on a customer to verify his identity and
evaluate his profile. This is also the most effective
protection against any adverse consequences on
SIs’ reliability and reputation.
In this context, SIs shall develop and apply a pol-
icy and procedures for accepting business rela-
tionships,  in  full  compliance  with  the  require-
ments of law and Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2577/2006,  conducting  customer  due  diligence
(CDD).  CDD  implies  taking  the  measures  pro-
vided for herein to get to know existing and new
customers and conducting ongoing monitoring of
their  transaction  behaviour.  For  high-risk  cus-
tomers  and  transactions  (Chapter  2),  enhanced
CDD policy and procedures shall be applied.
Specifically:
1.1 SIs may not open and keep secret, anony-
mous and numbered accounts, or accounts
in fictitious names, or accounts without the
owner’s full name according to the identifi-
cation documents.
Decisions of the Bank of Greece
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 1171.2 SIs shall conduct CDD and require identifica-
tion of any customer who wishes to:
— enter into any contract; and
—  carry  out  any  transaction  amounting  to
the equivalent of € 15,000 or more, whether
such  transaction  is  carried  out  in  a  single
operation or in several operations which are
effected on the same day or are legally con-
nected;  however,  SIs  should  be  able  to
detect whether a transaction has been car-
ried out in several operations.
1.3 SIs shall require the customer to provide identi-
fication documents that are difficult to be forged
or  obtained  illegally,  regardless  of  the  bank
account or services concerned. Without preju-
dice  to  the  specific  information  required  for
high-risk categories (Chapter 2), the minimum
particulars required and the documents verify-
ing them are, indicatively, as follows:
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IDENTIFICATION PARTICULARS
ñ Full name and father’s name
ñ ID number or passport number 
ñ Issuing authority
ñ Customer’s signature specimen
ñ Current address
ñ Occupation and current occupational address
ñ Taxpayer’s identification number
ñ Recent utility bill
ñ Lease agreement certified by an internal revenue office
ñ Tax clearance certificate issued by the internal
revenue service
ñ Valid stay permit
ñ Employer’s certificate
ñ Tax clearance certificate issued 
by the internal 
revenue service
ñ Copy of the last payroll slip
ñ Self-employment startup declaration
ñ Occupational identity card
ñ Certificate issued by a social security fund
ñ Tax clearance certificate issued by the internal
revenue service
ñ Identity card issued by a police authority
ñ Valid passport
ñ Identity card of persons serving in law enforcement 
agencies and the armed forces
IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTSConcerning  the  identification  of  legal  entities,
the  completeness  of  their  establishing  docu-
ments  and  the  documents  empowering  their
legal  representatives  may  be  certified  by  the
legal departments of the SIs. The minimum doc-
uments are as follows:
1.4 The provisions of Bank of Greece Governor’s
Acts 2536/2004 and 2541/2004 shall apply
to  the  verification  of  the  identity  of  cus-
tomers  of  fund  transfer  companies  and
exchange bureaux respectively.
1.5 SIs shall require customers acting on behalf
of  another  natural  person, in  addition  to
identifying themselves as aforesaid, to pro-
vide identification of the other natural person
on behalf of whom they act, either by fol-
lowing the procedure referred to in par. 1.3
or by presenting a power of attorney certified
by a public authority. If this is not possible,
the transaction shall not be carried out.
1.5.1 SIs shall take every reasonable measure
to obtain information as to the real identity of
the  persons  on  behalf  of  which  customers
act, even if they have not stated that they are
acting on behalf of another person, but there
is reasonable doubt as to whether they are
acting on their own behalf or it is certain that
they are acting on behalf of someone else.
1.6 In the case of joint accounts, before con-
ducting any transaction through the account
concerned,  the  SI  shall  identify  every  co-
owner  according  to  the  above  procedures.
Likewise,  if  someone  wishes  to  open  an
account for a third person, the third person
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Sociétés anonymes and limited liability companies: The Sociétés Anonymes & Limited Liability Companies Issue of the
Government Gazette where a summary of the charter of the société anonyme or limited liability company was published,
including: 
ñ the name, registered office, object, number of directors (for Sociétés anonymes) and names of administrators (for limited
liability companies); 
ñ the names and identity particulars of the company’s representatives and their powers; 
ñ the number and date of the decision of the authority that approved the formation of the société anonyme or the registra-
tion number referred to in Article 8(1) of Law 3190/1955 “Limited Liability Companies”; 
ñ Government Gazette issues in which any amendments to the charter in connection with the above particulars were pub-
lished; and
ñ the identity particulars of the legal representatives and all persons authorised to operate the company’s account.
Partnerships: 
ñ certified copy of the original partnership agreement that has been filed to the court of first instance, including any amend-
ments thereto; and
ñ the identity particulars of the legal representatives and all persons authorised to operate the company’s account.
Other legal entities: 
ñ their establishing documents, certified by a public authority; and
ñ the identity particulars of the legal representatives and all persons authorised to operate the company’s account.shall  be  identified  before  conducting  any
transaction through the account.
1.7 SIs shall treat with caution applications for
safekeeping of parcels and sealed envelops
and for renting of safe deposit boxes. When
such services are requested by persons that
do  not  keep  an  account  with  the  SI  con-
cerned, the identification procedures stated
hereinabove shall be followed.
1.8 Ongoing monitoring of accounts and trans-
actions
SIs shall ensure that their customers’ identity
particulars remain fully updated throughout
the existence of the business relationship.
In  this  connection,  SIs  shall  review  on  a
regular  basis,  or  when  there  are  doubts
about their veracity, the data in their pos-
session, especially those that concern high-
risk customers (Chapter 2). If any difficul-
ties arise during the updating process, SIs
shall  consider  terminating  the  business
relationship  and/or  reporting  the  case  to
the National Authority for the Combatting
of  Money  Laundering  (hereinafter:  the
“National Authority”).
Where a steady and lasting business relation-
ship has been established, transactions shall
be compared and assessed in order to iden-
tify any divergence from the customer’s pro-
file and his expected transactions. Any trans-
actions that cannot be explained by the exist-
ing information on the customer shall be fur-
ther scrutinised so as to determine whether
there are any suspicions of money launder-
ing or terrorist financing.
CHAPTER 2
RISK-BASED APPROACH TO MONEY
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
2.1 According to Chapter 14, paras. 14.1-14.3 of
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2577/2006,
SIs  must  have  in  place  a  risk-based  policy
and procedures for customers and/or trans-
actions. This policy includes classifying cus-
tomers into at least three risk grades:
— low risk;
— normal risk; and
— high risk
on the basis of reflecting the possible causes
of risk. The classification is accompanied by
the corresponding CDD measures, ongoing
monitoring and audits, which are diversified
by customer and/or transaction category, so
that the SI may decide whether or not to ter-
minate the business relationship.
2.2 An  assessment  and  classification  system
shall indicatively take into account the fol-
lowing  parameters:  the  ultimate  owner  or
beneficial owner; the kind of shares; the cus-
tomer  category;  the  reason  of  the  transac-
tion; the country of origin and destination of
the funds; divergences from the customer’s
transaction behaviour; the nature of business
transactions;  and  the  expected  source  of
funds.
2.3 By 31 May 2007, SIs shall adopt adequate IT
systems and  effective  procedures  for  the
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tions, in order to detect, monitor and assess
high-risk transactions and customers.
Further indicative measures for implement-
ing a risk management system:
ñ Assessment of the risk facing the SI con-
cerned  (transactions  structure,  review  of
basic  clientèle,  regions  of  activity,  proce-
dures,  products,  distribution  networks  and
organisation).
ñ Recording and identification of customer-,
product- and transaction-specific risks, using
the expertise and techniques applied in the
banking  sector.  The  expertise  required  is
obtained and updated on the basis, inter alia,
of  the  international  typology  of  suspicious
events  (including  the  relevant  typology
which  the  Bank  of  Greece  Department  for
the  Supervision  of  Credit  and  Financial
Institutions requires on a minimum basis and
periodically  communicates  to  SIs),  assess-
ment of Press articles, analysis of suspicious
events  that  the  SI  becomes  aware  of,  and
exchange  of  experience  with  the  AML/CFT
Compliance Officers.
ñ Development,  through  electronic  data
processing, of adequate parameters based on
the results of the SI’s risk analysis.
ñ Review and further development of pre-
ventive  measures,  taking  into  account  the
results of risk analysis.
Risk analysis shall be effected comprehensi-
bly  in  writing.  Procedures  shall  determine
the degree of CDD according to the respec-
tive risk grade.
2.4 What follows is a discussion of the funda-
mental  high-risk  categories  (by  customer,
transaction, country or geographical region)
for which SIs shall conduct enhanced CDD,
according to par. 2.1, reviewing customers
and transactions on an at least annual basis.
High-risk  accounts  shall  be  scrutinised
according  to  the  inherent  risk,  in  order  to
decide whether or not to maintain them. The
employee  in  charge  of  monitoring  the
account shall prepare a brief report stating
the results of the review and send it to the
AML/CFT Compliance Officer. Reports shall
be processed by the AML/CFT Compliance
Officer, who shall submit a report to the SI’s
management for approval (Chapter IV A3 of
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2577/2006).
2.4.1 Non-residents’ accounts
Customers  having  their  usual  residence
abroad shall be subject to the same informa-
tion  requirements  and  identity  verification
procedures as those who live permanently in
Greece.
Non-residents that come in direct and per-
sonal contact with the SI shall be requested
to  produce  their  passports  and  identity
cards (if any) issued by their country of ori-
gin. The relevant data shall be made avail-
able  to  the  Bank  of  Greece  auditors.  In
addition, when there is any doubt concern-
ing the identity of a person (in relation to
passport, identity card or address particu-
lars), the SI shall seek verification by the
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try in Greece, or by a professional subject
to reporting requirements under the applic-
able Community legislation, or by reliable
FIs in the customer’s country of origin, or
through the internet etc.
Information about the customer’s residence
and  citizenship  is  also  useful  for  verifying
whether the customer comes from a high-
risk  country  characterised  by  the  FATF  as
non-cooperative. In addition to serving the
ends of the AML/CFT policy, such informa-
tion is also inextricably linked with the pre-
vention  of  the  violation  of  economic  sanc-
tions imposed on countries or persons by the
United  Nations  or  the  European  Union.  In
this connection, the number, date and coun-
try  of  issuance  of  the  customer’s  passport
shall always be recorded.
2.4.2 Accounts of politically exposed
persons from third countries
The establishment of business relationships
with natural persons characterised as “politi-
cally exposed persons” may expose the SI to
risk. Enhanced CDD procedures shall apply
to  politically  exposed  persons  residing  in
third countries. Specifically, such risk arises
when the potential customer asking for an
account to be opened comes from a country
that  is  widely  known  as  a  high-corruption
country  having  AML/CFT  laws  and  regula-
tions that do not meet internationally accept-
able  standards.  To  address  any  possible
risks, SIs shall assess their customers’ coun-
tries of origin in order to identify those that
are more prone to corruption.
1. Politically exposed persons are natural per-
sons that are or have been entrusted with a
prominent  public  function,  as  well  as  their
immediate  family  members  or  the  persons
known to be their close associates and notably:
(a) heads  of  state,  heads  of  government,
ministers and assistant ministers;
(b) members of parliaments;
(c) members of supreme courts, of constitu-
tional courts or of other high-level judicial
bodies whose decisions are not subject to
further appeal, except in exceptional cir-
cumstances;
(d) members of courts of auditors or of the
boards of central banks;
(e) ambassadors, chargés d’ affaires and high-
ranking officers in the armed forces; and
(f) members of the administrative, manage-
ment  or  supervisory  bodies  of  state-
owned enterprises.
None of the categories set out in points (a) to
(f)  above  shall  be  understood  as  covering
middle-ranking or junior officials.
2. Immediate family members of the persons
referred to in para. 1 shall include the fol-
lowing:
(a) the spouse;
(b) any partner considered by national law as
equivalent to the spouse;
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ners; and
(d) the parents.
3. Persons known to be close associates of
the  persons  referred  to  in  para.  1  shall
include the following:
(a) any natural person who is known to have
joint beneficial ownership of legal entities
or legal arrangements, or any other close
business relations, with a person referred
to in para. 1; and
(b) any person who has sole beneficial own-
ership of a legal entity or legal arrange-
ment which is known to have been set for
the de facto benefit of a person referred
to in para.1.
4. Without prejudice to the application, on a
risk-sensitive basis, of enhanced CDD mea-
sures,  where  a  person  has  ceased  to  be
entrusted with a prominent public function
within the meaning of para. 1 of this article
for a period of at least one year, SIs shall not
be obliged to consider such a person as polit-
ically exposed.
2.4.3 Accounts of companies with bearer
shares
SIs  opening  accounts  for  companies  with
bearer  shares  that  do  not  meet  the  condi-
tions of para. 2.5 shall indicatively apply the
following procedures:
ñ Before opening the account, they shall ver-
ify the identity and financial condition of
the owners and the beneficial owners of
the company on the basis of reliable and
independent sources and/or by visiting the
company’s offices.
ñ They shall compare regularly the expected
with  the  actual  transactions  through  the
account. Any significant divergences shall
be  scrutinised  and  the  findings  shall  be
entered in the customer’s file.
ñ If there is a change in the actual beneficial
owners, the SI shall consider whether or
not to maintain the account.
2.4.4 Accounts of offshore etc. companies
Where the customer is a company that has
no commercial or productive activity in the
place  of  its  establishment  (such  as  an  off-
shore  company,  a  special  purpose  vehicle
etc.), the SI shall conduct enhanced CDD.
To  determine  the  countries  where  offshore
companies  operate,  decision  No.  1108437/
2565/DOS of the Deputy Minister of Finance
(Government  Gazette  B.1590/16.11.2005)
shall be taken into account.
If the customer who requests the opening of
an  account  is  a  company  the  beneficial
owner  of  which  is  another  company  in
Greece or abroad, SIs shall, before opening
the account, verify the identity of the natural
persons  who  are  the  beneficial  owners  of,
and/or control the, other company.
To  identify  the  beneficial  owner,  SIs  shall
require the legal representative of the com-
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copies  of  confirmations  of  the  beneficial
owners’ identities.
If the data collected are not enough to certify
and verify the identity of the natural persons
that control the company (paras. 2.4.3 and
2.4.4), no accounts shall be opened and no
transactions shall be carried out. However,
by way of derogation, SIs may allow the ver-
ification  of  their  identity  to  be  completed
during  the  establishment  of  the  business
relationship if this is necessary in order not
to interrupt the normal conduct of business
and where there is little risk of money laun-
dering  or  terrorist  financing  occurring.  In
such a situation, this procedure shall be com-
pleted as soon as practicable (in any case,
within thirty (30) days). If the verification of
the  customer’s  and  the  beneficial  owner’s
identity is not completed, the provisions of
para. 1(f) hereof shall apply.
The term “beneficial owner” referred to in
paras. 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 means:
ñ the natural person(s) who ultimately con-
trol(s)  a  legal  entity  through  direct  or
indirect ownership or control a sufficient
percentage of the shares or voting rights
in  that  legal  entity,  including  through
bearer share holdings, other than a com-
pany listed on a regulated market that is
subject to disclosure requirements con-
sistent  with  Community  legislation  or
subject  to  equivalent  international  stan-
dards;  a  percentage  of  25%  plus  one
share shall be deemed sufficient to meet
this criterion;
ñ the natural person(s) who otherwise exer-
cise(s) control over the management of a
legal entity.
2.4.5 Accounts of non-profit organisations
With respect to accounts of non-profit organi-
sations, SIs shall verify the legitimacy of their
objects, requiring the submission of a certified
copy of their establishing deed (charter etc.),
their certificate of incorporation, the certificate
of registration and the number of their regis-
tration  with  the  competent  public  authority.
When such corporation has appointed more
than one authorised signatories to operate its
account, the identities of all authorised signa-
tories shall be verified, according to the iden-
tity verification procedures for natural persons.
2.4.6 Portfolio management accounts of
important customers
SIs shall take the following measures in the case
of portfolio management accounts of important
customers (for example private banking):
ñ verify  the  identity  of  all  their  beneficial
owners;
ñ verify whether the owner of the account is
a  politically  exposed  person  within  the
meaning of para. 2.4.2 hereof;
ñ establish  the  source  of  funds  and  the
expected use of the account; and
ñ examine  whether  the  operation  of  the
account is consistent with its purpose and
report any suspicious activity.
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SIs that provide their customers the possibil-
ity to carry out non-face to face transactions,
notably at the opening of accounts (phone
banking, e-banking etc.) shall adopt proce-
dures that ensure their compliance with the
requirements of Law 2331/1995, as currently
in force, in relation to the identification pro-
cedures, where required.
The above requirements on natural persons
shall  also  apply  to  companies  or  organisa-
tions that request the opening of an account
by mail or through the internet. In order to
minimise the risks arising out of the estab-
lishment of such a business relationship, SIs
shall  indicatively  apply  the  following  addi-
tional identification measures:
ñ obtain confirmation by a CI or FI operating
in an EU Member State;
ñ demand that the first payment within the
context  of  the  business  relationship  be
made through an account in the name of
the customer kept with a CI operating in
an EU Member State; and
ñ take appropriate measures to avoid estab-
lishing business relations with companies
which  the  SI  has  reasonable  grounds  to
suspect of being involved in illegal activi-
ties according to the AML/CFT legislation
in force.
2.4.8 Cross-border correspondent banking
relationships with respondent 
institutions from third countries
With respect to cross-border correspondent
banking relationships with respondent insti-
tutions from third countries, SIs shall:
(a) gather  sufficient  information  about  the
respondent to fully understand the nature
of  the  respondent’s  business  and  to
determine  from  publicly  available  infor-
mation  the  reputation  of  the  institution
and the quality of supervision, including
information about its ownership, address
and regions of activity;
(b) assess the respondent institution’s AML/
CFT controls;
(c) obtain approval from senior management
before  establishing  new  correspondent
banking relationships;
(d) document the respective responsibilities
of  each  institution  in  relation  to  CDD
measures; and
(e) with respect to payable-through accounts,
be  satisfied  that  the  respondent  credit
institution  has  verified  the  identity  and
performed ongoing monitoring of the cus-
tomers having direct access to accounts of
the correspondent that is able to provide
relevant CDD data to the correspondent
institution, upon request.
In  particular,  SIs  may  open  correspondent
accounts and act as correspondents for SIs
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lowing condition:
The bank that requests the opening of a corre-
spondent account is physically present with a
fully staffed office in the country of incorpora-
tion, from which it provides real banking ser-
vices, i.e. the applying bank is not a shell bank.
The  existence  and  operation  of  the  applying
bank, as well as the regulatory framework to
which it is subject, may be verified as follows:
(i) on the basis of data from the central bank
or other competent supervisory authority
of the country of incorporation; or
(ii) by  a  correspondent  SI  operating  in  the
country of incorporation; or
(iii)by evidence of the applying bank’s autho-
risation to carry out financial and/or bank-
ing operations, submitted by the applying
bank itself.
2.4.9 Countries which do not apply 
adequately the FATF 
recommendations
SIs shall examine with special attention trans-
actions  and  conduct  ongoing  monitoring  of
business  relationships  and  transactions  with
natural persons or legal entities, including CIs
and FIs, from non-cooperative countries.
All transactions with natural persons or legal
entities from these countries shall be exam-
ined with special attention and, if such exam-
ination gives rise to doubts about the legiti-
mate origin of the funds, the procedure laid
down in Article 4(10) of Law 2331/1995, as
currently in force, shall apply.
Records  of  the  data  and  findings  of  the
examination shall be kept for five years from
the  date  of  the  transaction  concerned.
Transactions  with  no  apparent  financial  or
legal purpose shall be further investigated in
order to identify their economic, commercial
or investment motivation. If the SI does not
obtain adequate information or explanations
to be fully satisfied about the legitimacy of a
transaction,  it  shall  promptly  submit,
through the AML/CFT Compliance Officer, a
report to the National Authority.
In  any  case,  it  is  necessary  to  assess  the
AML/CFT risk of the customer’s country of
origin.  The  FATF,  European  Union  and
European Economic Area countries are con-
sidered of equivalent status to Greece.
To  assess  country  risk  for  AML/CFT  pur-
poses, SIs may use the following criteria:
ñ inclusion in non-cooperative countries or
tax havens;
ñ inclusion in the EU, UN and OFAC lists;
ñ FATF membership;
ñ implementation of EU directives;
ñ implementation of the Wolfsberg principles;
ñ ratification of the UN Convention Against
Illicit  Traffic  in  Narcotic  Drugs  and  Psy-
chotropic Substances of 1988;
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ment of State, in relation to the production
and trafficking of narcotics;
ñ quality of local laws and regulations;
ñ government support;
ñ scope of the banking industry; and
ñ quality  of  government  regulation  and
supervision.
2.5 SIs  shall  apply  simplified  CDD  when  the
company  requesting  the  opening  of  an
account or its parent company (if any) has
bearer shares, provided that one of the fol-
lowing conditions is met:
ñ the  customer  is  a  listed  company  whose
shares are traded into a regulated market; or
ñ the company operates as a collective invest-
ment undertaking established in a country
with  an  adequate  regulatory  and  supervi-
sory framework for such undertakings; or
ñ the customer is a CI situated in the EU or
a  third  country  which  imposes  require-
ments equivalent to those imposed in the
EU  and  supervised  for  compliance  with
these requirements; or
ñ the shares or the company itself are con-
trolled  by  the  government  or  a  govern-
ment organisation.
SIs  shall  not  apply  simplified  CDD  when
there are suspicions of money laundering or
terrorist financing.
Enhanced CDD (Chapter 2, para. 2.4.3) shall
apply to companies with bearer shares that
do not meet any of the above conditions.
2.6 List of exceptions: SIs may draw up a “List of
Exceptions”, registering their customers with
business activities that justify a large number
of  transactions.  Transactions  of  customers
entered  in  the  “List  of  Exceptions”  shall  be
monitored and any unusual and/or suspicious
transactions  shall  be  reported  within  one
month to the competent National Authority
referred  to  in  Article  7  of  Law  2331/1995,
except for cases that require additional time
for the collection of the necessary data. The
SI’s IT system shall allow access to the “List of
Exceptions” to every competent employee.
2.7 Customer acceptance policy: SIs shall develop
and  apply  a  customer  acceptance  policy  and
procedures, fully in line with the provisions of
Law  2331/1995  and  hereof.  SIs’  policies  and
procedures shall take into account such factors
as  the  customer’s  profile,  country  of  origin,
expected amount and nature of transactions, as
well as the expected source of funds. SIs shall
establish  concrete  criteria  for  customers  and
transactions of unacceptable risk. Such transac-
tions include, mainly, those where a business
relationship is either not established or termi-
nated, as well as all cases of inadequate data or
where  the  structure  of  the  undertaking  is  so
complex that identification is not possible etc.
CHAPTER 3
PERFORMANCE BY THIRD PARTIES
3.1 According to FATF Recommendation 9, SIs
may rely on intermediaries or other third par-
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and  verification  procedure,  applying  the
appropriate CDD, provided that the ultimate
responsibility for customer identification and
verification  remains  with  the  SI  relying  on
such third party.
The criteria that should be met are as follows:
ñ A SI relying on a third party shall be able to
obtain immediately all the necessary infor-
mation relating to the customer identifica-
tion and verification procedure. SIs shall
take adequate measures to satisfy them-
selves  that  copies  of  identification  data
and other relevant documentation relating
to CDD requirements will be made avail-
able by the third party upon request with-
out delay.
ñ The SI shall satisfy itself that the third party
is regulated and supervised for, and has
measures in place to comply with, CDD
and  record-keeping  requirements  in  line
with Recommendations 5 and 10.
3.2 SIs may rely on third parties for the identifi-
cation and the verification of the identity of
the customer or beneficial owner and for the
collection of data on the purpose and nature
of the business relationship.
“Third parties” shall mean SIs or equivalent
institutions  and  organisations  situated  in  a
third country that meet the following require-
ments:
ñ they are subject to mandatory professional
registration, recognised by law;
ñ they  apply  CDD  and  record-keeping
requirements  and  their  compliance  is
supervised.
Third  parties  shall,  upon  request,  immedi-
ately  make  available  to  the  SI  the  above
information, the relevant copies of identifi-
cation data and other relevant documenta-
tion relating to the identity of the customer
or beneficial owner.
3.3 When  they  use  third  parties,  SIs  may  not
waive  the  ultimate  responsibility  for  cus-
tomer  identification  and  verification  and
compliance with the “Know your customer”
principle. Specifically, in these cases SIs shall
observe the following procedures:
ñ The  AML/CFT  Compliance  Officer  shall
assess  the  customer  identification  and
CDD  procedures  applied  by  the  profes-
sional intermediary or third party/associ-
ate recommending the customer and shall
verify that they are in line with acceptable
international standards and at least equiv-
alent to those applied by the SI. The rele-
vant assessment report shall be prepared
and  entered  in  a  separate  file  kept  for
every  professional  intermediary  or  third
party/associate.
ñ The  professional  intermediary  or  third
party/associate shall be subject to regula-
tion  and  supervision  by  the  appropriate
Greek or foreign AML/CFT authority.
ñ All the data and documentation relating to
the customer’s identity shall be submitted
to the SI (in certified copies) by the pro-
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ciate together with the request for opening
of an account or provision of a service or
execution of a transaction.
ñ The SI shall enter into an agreement with
the  professional  intermediary  or  third
party/associate according to which the SI
may verify, whenever deemed advisable,
the CDD procedures applied by the latter
for AML/CFT purposes, and access by the
Bank  of  Greece  (Department  for  the
Supervision  of  Credit  and  Financial
Institutions) shall be ensured. Annex 1 to
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2577/2006




4.1 SIs shall keep records of the contracts and
transactions (including the establishing doc-
uments of legal entities and the documents
empowering  their  legal  representatives,
photocopies  of  identification  documents,
account files etc.) for a period of at least
five  years  after  the  business  relationship
with their customer has ended, in the case
of  contracts,  and  the  last  transaction  has
been executed, in the case of transactions,
unless  they  are  required  by  law  to  keep
such records for a longer time period.
4.2 SIs shall ensure that they can provide the fol-
lowing information:
ñ the identity of the owners of the account;
ñ the identity of the beneficial owners of the
account;
ñ the identity of the persons authorised to
operate the account;
ñ data  on  the  transactions  through  the
account;
ñ associated accounts;
ñ the source of funds;
ñ the currency and amount of each transac-
tion;
ñ the  manner  of  deposit  or  withdrawal  of
funds (cash, cheques, wire transfer etc.);
ñ the identity of the person who carried out
the transaction;
ñ the destination of funds;
ñ the nature of the instructions and authori-
sation given; and
ñ the  type  and  number  of  the  account
involved in the transaction.
4.3 Data and documentation relating to ongo-
ing  investigations  shall  be  kept  until  the
National Authority confirms that the inves-
tigation has been completed and the case
has  been  closed.  Such  data  may  also  be
kept in forms other than the originals (e.g.
in electronic form).
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DETECTION, HANDLING AND REPORTING OF
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTIONS
5.1 SIs  shall  examine  with  due  diligence any
transaction  that  is  particularly  likely,  by  its
nature, to be related to money laundering or
terrorist  financing.  Unusual  or  suspicious
transactions normally belong to this category.
Unusual transactions are those that have no
apparent economic or visible lawful purpose.
As a general principle, suspicious transac-
tions are usually incompatible with the cus-
tomer’s  profile  (lawful  business,  personal
activities,  usual  transactions  through  the
account in question).
Therefore, SIs must have adequate informa-
tion, be familiar with their customers’ activi-
ties and have in place a risk assessment sys-
tem, using their experience and information
from other sources, in order to be capable of
detecting in time any unusual or suspicious
transaction.
5.1.1 After the examination of these transac-
tions, if there are any doubts concerning the
legitimate  use  of  the  funds,  the  procedure
described in Article 4(10) of Law 2331/1995,
as currently in force, shall apply.1
5.1.2 Reports shall include at least the fol-
lowing data:
— full particulars of the reporting SI;
— all the available information on the cus-
tomer;
— the date of establishment of the business
relationship and a full account of transac-
tions;
— possible  justification  of  the  unusual  or
suspicious transaction; and
— in  international  transactions,  the  origin
and course of the incoming remittance.
5.1.3 Employees’ reports (as well as reports
issued by SIs’ IT systems) shall be kept in a
special file and shall be dated and signed by
the reporting employee. The reports may be
kept in electronic files provided that they sat-
isfy terms of controlled access, application of
user id and dating.
5.1.4 SIs shall communicate to the Bank of
Greece the identity of the persons designated
as AML/CFT Compliance Officers and shall
notify it of any relevant change according to
the provisions in force.
AML/CFT Compliance Officers shall have at
least the following duties, according to the
principles of Chapter Vc of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2577/2006:
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1 “The  senior  management  and  employees  shall  report  to  the
competent officer any suspicious transaction and any event that
comes to their attention in the performance of their duties and
may be an indication of criminal activity. In branches, such suspi-
cions shall be reported directly to the branch director, who shall
report them immediately to the competent officer, if he shares
them. If the branch director or his deputy is unavailable or rejects
or disregards or does not share the reporting employee’s suspi-
cions, then the employee shall report them to the competent offi-
cer. The latter shall inform, both on the phone and by a confiden-
tial document, the Competent (National) Authority, providing any
useful information or evidence, if his examination leads to the
conclusion  that  the  existing  information  and  evidence  suggest
criminal activity’’ (Article 4(10) of Law 2331/1995).ñ They shall receive from bank employees
any information that makes them have rea-
sonable grounds or suspicions of money
laundering or terrorist financing.
ñ They shall examine and assess the informa-
tion  in  correlation  with  other  available
sources and discuss the facts with the infor-
mation provider and, where necessary, the
principals of the information provider. The
AML/CFT Compliance Officer shall assess
such information on a special form, which
shall also be kept in a special file. If, after
the assessment, the AML/CFT Compliance
Officer decides to disclose the information
to the National Authority, he shall prepare a
report  and  submit  it  to  the  National
Authority as soon as possible. If, as a result
of  such  assessment,  he  decides  not  to
report  the  information  to  the  National
Authority, he shall fully justify this decision
in the relevant file.
ñ The AML/CFT Compliance Officers shall act
as first point of contact with the National
Authority both at the commencement and
throughout the investigation of a report in
writing, answering to all questions, provid-
ing all clarifications requested, furnishing all
information required and cooperating fully
with the National Authority.
ñ They shall develop all the knowledge and
skills required for improving the AML/CFT
procedures.
5.2  Submission  of  reports  to  the  National
Authority
Reports  shall  be  sent  to  the  National
Authority on a confidential basis.
After the submission of the report, the SI may
wish to terminate the business relationship
with the customer in order to avoid the risk
that may arise from the maintenance of the
account. In such case, SIs shall pay particular
attention not to reveal to the customer that a
report  has  been  submitted.  Therefore,  SIs
shall  cooperate  closely  with  the  National
Authority to prevent any obstacles or difficul-
ties in the investigation.
Following the submission of the report, SIs
shall  follow  any  instructions  given  by  the
National Authority, notably whether to com-
plete a transaction or maintain an account.
According  to  Article  6  of  Law  3424/2005,
where the money laundering investigation is
conducted  by  the  National  Authority,  its
Chairman  may,  in  case  of  an  emergency,
prohibit  the  operation  of  accounts  or  the
transfer or sale of any asset.
CHAPTER 6
INTERNAL  CONTROL  AND  COMMUNICATION
PROCEDURES
6.1 AML/CFT  internal  control  and  communica-
tion  procedures  shall  be  governed  by  the
provisions of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2577/2006.
SIs’ internal procedures shall mainly aim at
the detection of unusual transactions which
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order  to  verify  whether  the  procedure
described in Article 4(10) of Law 2331/1995
should be applied thereto.
In addition to obtaining the data mentioned
in the above Act, SIs shall instruct the com-
petent employees to apply “Know your cus-
tomer”  procedures  as  a  necessary  instru-
ment for performing their obligations.
6.2 In addition to applying the AML/CFT proce-
dures and measures referred to in Chapter
II, paras. 14.1-14.3 of the said Act, SIs shall
ensure that:
ñ all employees know the person to whom
they  must  report  their  information  on
transactions  they  believe  or  suspect  are
aimed  at  money  laundering  or  terrorist
financing;
ñ there is a clear and short channel of com-
munication  for  reporting  information  on
suspicious and/or unusual transactions to
the  AML/CFT  Compliance  Officer.  The
internal AML/CFT practice, procedures and
controls shall be recorded in a manual, to
be  distributed  to  all  the  employees  that
handle,  monitor  and  control  customers’
transactions in any manner; and
ñ there  shall  be  a  clear  assignment  of
duties and responsibilities within the SI
in order to ensure effective management
of  the  AML/CFT  policy  and  procedures
and compliance with this document and
any specific instructions of the Bank of
Greece.
6.3 Without prejudice to the specific provisions
to be enacted pursuant to Article 5(4) of Law
3424/2005 and Chapters III and Vc of Bank
of  Greece  Governor’s  Act  2577/2006,  SIs
shall  apply  AML/CFT  policies,  procedures
and controls at group level and shall inform
the Bank of Greece on any divergences of the
laws  of  the  host  country.  Special  attention
shall  be  paid  to  branches  established  in
countries  that  are  not  fully  compliant  with
the FATF Recommendations.
6.4 The external auditors’ report referred to in
Bank  of  Greece  Governor’s  Act  2577/2006
(Annex  3,  Chapter  IIe)  shall  include  an
assessment  of  the  adequacy  and  effective-
ness of the AML/CFT system.
CHAPTER 7
PERSONNEL EDUCATION AND TRAINING
7.1 Understanding  the  need  to  prevent  money
laundering and terrorist financing is the pre-
requisite of successful implementation of the
relevant  policy  and  procedures.  Integrated
and modern training programmes are essen-
tial for the development of an effective risk
management  system  for  money  laundering
and terrorist financing.
7.2 SIs shall develop employee training (includ-
ing web training) programmes. In the context
of these programmes:
ñ employees shall be informed on the legis-
lation and the legal obligations of the staff,
as well as the procedures adopted, includ-
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 132ing customer identification, record keep-
ing and internal reporting procedures;
ñ the duration and subject of training pro-
grammes shall be tailored to each staff cat-
egory  (newly-hired,  front  office,  compli-
ance, customer recruitment staff); and
ñ training  programmes  shall  be  repeated
regularly, in order to ensure that the staff
know their duties and obligations and are
kept abreast of developments.
CHAPTER 8
WIRE TRANSFERS
Without prejudice to the entry into force of the
Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the
Council  “on  payer  information  accompanying
transfers  of  funds”,  SIs  receiving  cross-border
wire transfer orders shall include in the relevant
information the name and address of the origina-
tor  and,  where  the  funds  to  be  transferred  are
drawn  from  a  deposit  account  held  with  the
ordering institution, the originator’s account num-
ber (according to art. 5, par. 2 of Law 3424/2005).
The requirement to report the originator’s data
shall not apply to transactions where both the
originator and the beneficiary are CIs or FIs act-
ing on their own behalf. It shall also not apply
to transfers in the context of transactions car-
ried out through credit or debit cards, provided
that the information contains the number of the
card involved. However, if a credit or debit card
is used for transfers not associated with com-
mercial  transactions,  the  above  requirements
shall apply.
CHAPTER 9
REPORTING TO THE BANK OF GREECE
SIs shall submit to the Bank of Greece Department
for  the  Supervision  of  Credit  and  Financial
Institutions in March every year an Annual Report
containing the following information:
1. The  name  and  post  of  the  AML/CFT
Compliance Officer and his deputy (and of
the  coordinator,  for  financial  groups)
appointed  under  Article  4(10)  of  Law
2331/1995, as well as the particulars of the
decision  appointing  them.  If  the  AML/CFT
Compliance  Officer  is  replaced  during  the
calendar year, the Bank of Greece shall be
informed in writing to this effect within ten
working days from such replacement.
2. A copy of the AML/CFT internal control and
communication  procedures  established  in
writing. The Bank of Greece shall be notified
of any change in these procedures within ten
days from their effective date.
3. Brief information on important measures taken
and/or procedures adopted during the year.
4. (a)  The  audits  carried  out  to  assess  the  ade-
quacy of CDD procedures in customer identifi-
cation, as well as the scope of such audits (pro-
cedures, transactions, employees’ training etc.).
(b)  Any  important  defects  and  weaknesses
detected (especially in the internal procedures
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actions, the quality of reports and their timely
processing), as well as the actions and/or rec-
ommendations for corrective measures.
This  information  shall  not  be  transmitted
separately if included in the Annual Report of
the Internal Audit Unit, according to the pro-
visions  of  Chapter  Va,  para.  2.13.2,  and
Chapter VI, para. 1.
5. (a) The number of suspicious and/or unusual
transactions reported by SI’s employees to
the AML/CFT Compliance Officer, as well as
the approximate time between the transac-
tion and the submission of the report to the
competent officer.
(b)  The  number  of  reports  of  suspicious
and/or unusual transactions submitted by the
AML/CFT Compliance Officer to the National
Authority, as well as the approximate time
between the submission of the report to him
and  its  transmission  to  the  Competent
Authority.
6. The  training  received  by  the  AML/CFT
Compliance Officer and its content.
7. The education/training provided to the staff
during  the  year,  including  the  number  of
seminars,  their  duration,  and  the  number
and posts of participating employees.
In order to reduce SIs’ administrative costs, the
data on procedures and regulations referred to in
(2) and (3) above shall not be reported anew to
the Bank of Greece unless changes are important
and modify all arrangements.
CHAPTER 10
SANCTIONS
According  to  Article  4(8)  of  Law  2331/1995,  as
currently in force, and without prejudice to any
specific provisions of the legislation in force, in the
event that a SI violates its obligations under the
law  or  the  regulatory  provisions  issued  by  the
Bank of Greece, sanctions shall be imposed by a
decision of the Competent Authority. Specifically,
the Bank of Greece may impose on SIs the admin-
istrative sanctions provided for by Article 55A of its
Statute and the legislation in force.
*  *  *
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TABLE I
List of supervised CIs and FIs for AML/CTF
purposes 






ñ fund transfer intermediaries;
ñ credit companies; and
ñ postal companies, only to the extent they act as fund transfer
intermediaries.
TABLE I I
















Italy United States of America
Japan
* European Commission (EC) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).R e: Sight deposit accounts kept with credit insti-
tutions and circulation of cheques through the
banking system (Banking and Credit Committee
Decision 234/23/11 December 2006)
The Banking and Credit Committee, having regard
to:
i) article 55A of the Bank of Greece’s Statute, as
applicable;
ii) Law 5960/1933 “on cheques”, as applicable,
especially article 29 thereof;
iii) article 11 of Law 1957/1991;
iv) the  provisions  of  Monetary  and  Credit
Committee Decision 502/3/23 June 1992, as
applicable;
v) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2523/12 June
2003;
vi) Bank  of  Greece  Governor’s  Act  2577/9
March 2006, especially the sub-section “Risk
Management” of Section II thereof;
vii) the advisability of amending and codifying
all  the  provisions  of  Monetary  and  Credit
Committee Decision 502/3/23 June 1992, as
applicable, in order to meet current market
conditions and to allow easier implementa-
tion  of these provisions by credit institu-
tions and transacting parties,
has decided as follows:
Monetary  and  Credit  Committee  Decision
502/3/23  June  1992,  as  applicable,  is  amended
and codified as follows:
A. SIGHT DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
1. Sight deposit accounts with credit institutions
may also be opened in the name of natural persons
(individual or joint accounts), under terms (interest
rate,  overdraft,  cheque-book,  cheque  guarantee
etc.) freely set by credit institutions.
Sight  deposit  accounts  shall  include  current
accounts.
2.  Overdrafts  on  sight  deposit  accounts  shall
not  be  deducted  from  the  balances  of  the
accounts but shall be recorded in the financial
statements that credit institutions submit to the
Bank  of  Greece  in  accordance  with  Bank  of
Greece Governor’s Act 2558/7 February 2005
and shall be subject to the surcharge provided
for in article 1, paragraph 3, of Law 128/1975,
as applicable.
B. CIRCULATION OF CHEQUES THROUGH THE
BANKING SYSTEM
I. Bank cheques
The account of the bearer of a bank cheque shall
be  credited  with  value  date  at  the  latest  one
working day after the date of the cheque pur-
chase.
II. Private cheques
1. Cheques presented for payment to the credit
institution  with  which  the  chequing  account  is
kept shall be subject to the following:
i) The chequing account shall be debited with
value date the cheque’s date of payment.
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the value of the cheque (provided that this
account  is  kept  with  the  payer  bank)  with
value date at the latest the next working day
after the day of the cheque purchase.
2. The following shall apply to cheques presented
for collection to a credit institution other than the
one with which the chequing account is kept:
i) The account shall be debited with value date
the day on which the particulars of the cheque
were electronically entered to the Interbank
Cheque Clearing System or the day when the
cheque went through the Clearing Office.
ii) The bearer’s account shall be credited with
the  value  of  the  cheque  (provided  that  the
account  is  kept  with  the  purchasing  bank)
with value date at the latest the third working
day after the date of the cheque’s purchase.
If,  however,  in  the  city  where  the  private
cheque is purchased there is no branch of the
paying bank nor a Clearing Office and one of
the  two  banks  (purchasing-paying)  is  not  a
member  of  the  Interbank  Cheque  Clearing
System or if, due to the applicable ceiling as
regards the value of cheques, it is not possi-
ble to perform a clearing through the above
System, then the value of the cheque shall be
credited to the account with value date at the
latest the fifth working day after the date of
the cheque’s purchase.
C. NOTIFYING OF BOUNCED CHEQUES -
SANCTIONS
1. i) Credit  institutions  with  which  chequing
accounts  are  kept  shall  notify  (through  the
branch where the account is kept) “Tiresias
Bank  Information  Systems  SA”  of  any
bounced cheques within the next working day
after the deadline for the presentation of the
cheque for payment, in accordance with arti-
cle 29 of Law 5960/1933 (provided that the
cheque has not been paid by the deadline).
ii) The  above  notification  of  “Tiresias  Bank
Information  Systems  SA”  shall  include  data
on the legal representatives (Board members,
Managing  Directors,  General  Managers,
administrators and partners) of the legal per-
sons who have issued bounced cheques in
their above capacity.
2.  If  the  owner  of  a  sight  deposit  account  has
issued,  within  a  period  of  twelve  (12)  months,
bounced  cheques  the  total  amount  of  which
exceeds by more than one thousand euro (€ 1,000)
the  outstanding  balance  of  the  account  or  the
agreed overdraft ceiling, all credit institutions with
which  the  above  person  keeps  sight  deposit
accounts shall take action so that the beneficiary
returns all the chequebooks in his possession.
A new chequebook shall not be issued earlier than
twelve (12) months after the issuance of the last
bounced cheque, provided that all relevant debts
have been settled.
If the credit institution decides that the beneficiary
should  be  deprived  of  the  chequebooks  for  a
longer period because of a significant excess in
the above limit, the Bank of Greece shall be duly
notified thereof.
For bounced cheques drawn on joint sight deposit
accounts,  the  consequences  mentioned  above
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tion to the particular joint account.
3. Credit institutions are allowed to grant, at their
discretion,  chequebooks  to  enterprises  that  are
under  revival  or  consolidation  (Law  3562/1956,
Law  1892/1990,  articles  44  and  45  of  Law
1892/1990, as applicable), even if the conditions
referred to in paragraph C.2 above exist.
D. OTHER PROVISIONS
As from the entry into force of this decision, the
provisions  of  Monetary  and  Credit  Committee
Decision  502/3/23  June  1992,  as  amended  by
Monetary  and  Credit  Committee  Decision
513/6/4  December  1992,  Monetary  and  Credit
Committee  Decision  519/4/5  February  1993,
Banking and Credit Committee Decision 121/1/
1  March  2002,  Banking  and  Credit  Committee
Decision  139/6/3  December  2002  and  Banking
and  Credit  Committee  Decision  149/1/30  April
2003, as well as any other provision contradictory
to the present decision shall be abolished.
References  to  the  Monetary  and  Credit
Committee Decision 502/3/23 June 1992 and to
the  amending  decisions  listed  above  shall  be
henceforth meant to be references to the present
decision.
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Table I . 1
Consumer price index
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Source: Calculations based on National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) data (CPI 1999=100).
2003  . . . . . . . 3.53.1 3.2 3.1 4.2 5 .0 10.7 3.9
2004  . . . . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.3 3.8 0.5–11.9 7.5
2005  . . . . . . . 3.53.2 3.1 3.4 3.7 0.6 –8.1 18.0
2006  . . . . . . . 3.2 2.52.7 3.4 3.0 3.7 3.3 10.9
2005 I   . . . . . . 3.3 3.53.3 3.1 3.6 –0.6 –11.5 15 .1
II  . . . . . . 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.8 –0.3 –12.4 18.1
III   . . . . . 3.9 3.1 3.0 4.0 3.6 1.4 –4.1 21.6
IV   . . . . . 3.7 3.0 3.0 3.6 3.7 2.1 –2.2 17.1
2006 I   . . . . . . 3.3 2.3 2.53.3 3.2 1.9 –5 .8 19.6
II  . . . . . . 3.2 2.3 2.53.6 2.7 3.4 1.3 14.8
III   . . . . . 3.4 2.4 2.7 3.9 2.8 5.1 10.8 11.8
IV   . . . . . 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.7 3.1 4.6 9.4 -1.2
2005 Jan.   . . . . 4.0 4.54.2 4.3 3.7 0.6 –8.9 10.3
Feb.  . . . . 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.8 3.6 –0.9 –12.1 16.4
March   . . 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.4 3.6 –1.3 –13.1 18.4
April   . . . 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.8 –0.1 –11.0 19.7
May  . . . . 3.2 3.3 3.2 2.7 4.0 –0.4 –12.3 14.9
June   . . . 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.7 –0.5–14.1 19.9
July   . . . . 3.9 3.53.3 4.1 3.7 0.7 –7.9 20.0
Aug.   . . . 3.7 3.0 2.9 3.8 3.6 1.4 –3.7 20.8
Sept.   . . . 3.9 2.9 2.8 4.2 3.6 2.0 –0.7 24.0
Oct.   . . . 3.8 3.1 3.0 3.8 3.9 2.7 2.1 17.1
Nov.   . . . 3.53.0 3.0 3.4 3.7 2.6 1.2 12.5
Dec.   . . . 3.6 2.9 2.9 3.7 3.51.0 –8.9 22.1
2006 Jan.   . . . . 3.2 2.0 2.3 3.3 3.2 1.6 –6.3 24.9
Feb.  . . . . 3.2 2.3 2.53.3 3.2 2.0 –4.5 19.2
March   . . 3.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.3 2.1 –6.7 15.1
April   . . . 3.3 2.3 2.6 3.6 2.9 3.8 3.514.0
May  . . . . 3.1 2.1 2.4 3.6 2.6 2.9 –0.7 16.6
June   . . . 3.2 2.3 2.6 3.6 2.7 3.50.9 13.8
July   . . . . 3.8 2.3 2.6 4.6 2.7 5.8 15.9 17.3
Aug.   . . . 3.52.4 2.7 3.9 2.9 4.7 7.5 14.4
Sept.   . . . 2.9 2.52.7 3.0 2.8 4.7 9.4 4.0
Oct.   . . . 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.7 3.0 5.1 10.1 –2.4
Nov.   . . . 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.8 3.2 4.58.6 –0.6
Dec.   . . . 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.7 3.2 4.3 9.5–0.6






















2003  . . . . . . . 2.3 2.3 1.6 2.7 1.0 2.8 1.8 –1.8 2.5–0.3 –0.6
2004  . . . . . . . 3.53.2 4.56.0 2.0 6.2 4.0 4.3 4.7 5 .0 1.8
2005  . . . . . . . 5.9 3.8 2.6 2.5 4.2 2.4 13.2 25.1 3.0 3.7 0.3
2006  . . . . . . . 6.9 7.52.3 5 .9 3.56.0 8.1 12.9 6.3 4.2 2.7
2005 I  . . . . . . 4.6 4.9 4.8 0.8 3.50.7 9.9 19.0 2.6 2.7 0.0
II . . . . . . 4.9 3.6 2.2 1.4 4.51.2 11.6 21.9 2.3 2.3 –0.6
III  . . . . . 6.3 3.3 1.1 2.2 4.9 2.1 15.8 29.8 2.6 4.5 0.4
IV  . . . . . 7.7 3.5 2.4 5.7 3.9 5.8 15.3 28.7 4.7 5.4 1.3
2006 I  . . . . . . 9.2 4.7 1.58.8 3.8 9.0 15 .4 30.6 6.8 7.0 2.7
II . . . . . . 8.6 7.6 1.7 7.4 3.4 7.6 12.0 21.6 7.2 5.9 2.9
III  . . . . . 6.8 9.2 3.1 6.2 3.6 6.3 6.1 8.1 7.2 3.2 2.7
IV  . . . . . 3.0 8.6 2.7 1.6 3.2 1.50.0 –3.6 4.3 0.8 2.3
2005 Jan. . . . . 3.9 5.3 5.8 0.7 3.3 0.6 7.1 12.5 2.7 2.0 0.1
Feb.  . . . 4.6 4.7 5.0 0.8 3.6 0.7 10.0 19.8 2.5 2.9 0.2
March . . 5.3 4.7 3.8 0.9 3.6 0.8 12.6 24.6 2.5 3.1 –0.3
April  . . . 5.1 3.8 2.7 1.0 4.3 0.9 12.8 24.9 2.2 2.4 –0.9
May  . . . 3.7 3.4 2.3 1.3 4.6 1.1 7.8 13.2 2.1 1.2 –0.6
June  . . . 5.7 3.5 1.7 1.8 4.7 1.7 14.3 28.0 2.4 3.3 –0.2
July . . . . 5 .6 3.50.51.8 4.7 1.7 13.9 26.9 2.4 3.9 0.2
Aug.  . . . 6.0 3.2 1.4 2.1 4.7 2.0 14.9 28.3 2.54.4 0.5
Sept. . . . 7.3 3.2 1.3 2.8 5.1 2.7 18.6 34.0 2.8 5.2 0.6
Oct.  . . . 7.0 2.9 2.1 4.9 4.4 4.9 14.524.3 4.0 4.4 0.8
Nov.  . . . 7.0 3.5 2.5 5.1 3.6 5.2 13.6 26.1 4.3 5.3 1.3
Dec.  . . . 9.1 4.1 2.57.1 3.6 7.2 17.9 36.9 5 .7 6.51.9
2006 Jan. . . . . 9.9 4.3 2.2 9.1 3.4 9.4 17.8 36.2 6.9 7.52.5
Feb.  . . . 9.55 .0 1.4 8.7 3.8 8.9 16.2 32.0 6.8 7.2 2.7
March . . 8.3 4.9 0.8 8.54.1 8.7 12.3 22.7 6.6 6.4 3.0
April  . . . 8.6 6.1 0.7 8.3 3.6 8.512.4 22.57.0 6.3 3.1
May  . . . 9.3 7.9 1.9 7.4 3.2 7.6 14.0 25.9 7.3 6.2 2.8
June  . . . 8.0 8.9 2.6 6.53.4 6.6 9.7 16.7 7.2 5 .2 2.7
July . . . . 8.3 9.0 3.2 6.6 3.4 6.8 10.6 18.2 7.3 4.3 2.4
Aug.  . . . 7.7 9.3 3.2 5.5 3.9 6.7 8.2 10.9 7.4 4.2 3.0
Sept. . . . 4.5 9.2 3.1 5.5 3.4 5.6 –0.3 –3.8 6.8 1.0 2.9
Oct.  . . . 3.0 9.7 2.8 2.6 3.4 2.5–2.1 –7.4 5 .3 0.6 2.8
Nov.  . . . 3.4 8.4 2.6 1.6 3.2 1.51.3 –1.2 4.3 0.8 2.5
Dec.  . . . 2.7 7.8 2.6 0.6 3.0 0.51.0 –1.9 3.4 0.9 1.7
Source: Calculations based on NSSG data.
Table π . 2
Industrial producer price index (PPI) for the domestic and the external market
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period
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* Data on the “energy” item for 2004 are not comparable with those for 2003 because of changes in the relevant index coverage: before 2004 it did not include the branch-
es “carbon and lignite mining”, “crude oil and gas pumping” and “electricity”.





2003  . . . . . . . 0.7 –1.1 0.8 0.9 –1.4 1.4 11.0 . . .   0.6
2004  . . . . . . . 3.1 4.4 –0.1 0.6 –1.1 1.0 40.7 . . .  0.8
2005  . . . . . . . 8.8 2.7 –0.3 1.4 –0.8 1.9 51.2 57.1 1.2
2006  . . . . . . . 4.4 5.7 0.6 2.0 0.4 2.3 10.5 10.8 2.8
2005 I  . . . . . . 8.2 4.2 –0.8 1.0 –1.1 1.5 52.6 59.1 1.4
II . . . . . . 8.4 2.5 –0.5 1.2 –1.2 1.8 52.1 58.6 1.1
III  . . . . . 9.8 2.0 –0.2 1.6 –0.7 2.1 55.4 61.7 1.1
IV  . . . . . 8.9 2.0 0.2 1.9 –0.1 2.3 45.6 50.1 1.4
2006 I  . . . . . . 7.7 2.50.7 2.3 0.5 2.7 33.1 35 .0 1.8
II . . . . . . 6.8 5.1 0.9 2.1 0.7 2.4 23.1 23.9 2.7
III  . . . . . 2.7 7.0 0.6 1.8 0.4 2.1 1.3 0.9 3.1
IV  . . . . . 0.7 8.2 0.3 1.7 0.0 2.1 –8.4 –8.8 3.4
2005 Jan. . . . . 6.6 4.7 –0.6 0.4 –1.3 0.8 40.0 44.51.4
Feb.  . . . 9.0 4.3 –1.0 1.4 –1.1 1.9 59.9 67.9 1.5
March . . 9.1 3.7 –0.6 1.2 –1.0 1.7 58.0 65.2 1.4
April  . . . 8.4 2.8 –0.6 1.0 –1.2 1.55 3.8 60.2 1.1
May  . . . 6.52.3 –0.6 1.1 –1.2 1.6 39.1 43.7 0.9
June  . . . 10.3 2.5–0.3 1.5 –1.1 2.1 63.9 72.51.2
July . . . . 10.3 2.2 –0.4 1.6 –1.0 2.2 60.8 68.4 1.1
Aug.  . . . 10.7 1.9 –0.3 1.7 –0.7 2.2 61.6 68.7 1.1
Sept. . . . 8.52.1 –0.1 1.6 –0.52.0 44.8 49.0 1.2
Oct.  . . . 7.9 1.9 –0.1 1.6 –0.7 2.0 39.4 43.0 1.1
Nov.  . . . 9.1 2.1 0.3 1.8 –0.2 2.3 46.6 51.9 1.4
Dec.  . . . 9.8 2.0 0.5 2.2 0.6 2.6 51.4 56.0 1.6
2006 Jan. . . . . 8.8 2.0 0.3 2.8 0.53.3 42.2 45 .1 1.7
Feb.  . . . 7.4 2.6 0.8 2.0 0.52.3 31.6 33.1 1.8
March . . 6.8 3.0 0.9 2.0 0.4 2.3 26.6 28.1 2.0
April  . . . 7.4 3.9 1.1 2.1 0.52.528.2 29.7 2.4
May  . . . 8.1 5.3 0.9 2.1 0.8 2.4 30.3 31.7 2.7
June  . . . 5.0 6.2 0.8 2.1 0.7 2.4 12.3 12.1 3.0
July . . . . 3.8 6.6 0.7 1.9 0.8 2.2 6.55 .6 3.0
Aug.  . . . 2.3 7.3 0.7 1.8 0.52.1 –1.1 –2.2 3.3
Sept. . . . 2.1 7.1 0.4 1.7 0.0 2.1 –1.2 –0.6 3.1
Oct.  . . . 1.2 7.9 0.2 1.8 0.0 2.2 –5.9 –5.7 3.3
Nov.  . . . 0.6 8.3 0.3 1.6 –0.1 2.0 –8.8 –9.3 3.4
Dec.  . . . 0.2 8.4 0.3 1.6 –0.1 2.0 –10.6 –11.3 3.4
Table π . 3
Import price index in industry
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Table I . 4
Industrial production index (2000=100)
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period




















2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2005 I . . . . . . . . . . . 
II. . . . . . . . . . . 
III . . . . . . . . . . 
IV . . . . . . . . . . 
2006 I . . . . . . . . . . . 
II. . . . . . . . . . . 
III . . . . . . . . . . 
IV . . . . . . . . . . 
2004 Jan.. . . . . . . . . 
Feb. . . . . . . . . 
March. . . . . . . 
April . . . . . . . . 
May . . . . . . . . 
June . . . . . . . . 
July. . . . . . . . . 
Aug. . . . . . . . . 
Sept.. . . . . . . . 
Oct. . . . . . . . . 
Nov. . . . . . . . . 
Dec. . . . . . . . . 
2005 Jan.. . . . . . . . . 
Feb. . . . . . . . . 
March. . . . . . . 
April . . . . . . . . 
May . . . . . . . . 
June . . . . . . . . 
July. . . . . . . . . 
Aug. . . . . . . . . 
Sept.. . . . . . . . 
Oct. . . . . . . . . 
Nov. . . . . . . . . 
Dec. . . . . . . . . 
2006 Jan.. . . . . . . . . 
Feb. . . . . . . . . 
March. . . . . . . 
April . . . . . . . . 
May . . . . . . . . 
June . . . . . . . . 
July. . . . . . . . . 
Aug. . . . . . . . . 
Sept.. . . . . . . . 
Oct. . . . . . . . . 
Nov. . . . . . . . . 
Dec. . . . . . . . . 
0.3 –0.4 –5.2 5.8 2.9 –0.4 0.8 –3.6 –1.4
1.2 1.2 0.3 1.4 0.3 1.0 –0.51.8 2.7
–0.9 –0.8 –6.2 0.6 0.6 –1.7 –5.1 11.4 –0.9
0.9 1.4 –2.2 0.1 1.3 0.7 7.6 1.7 –1.2
–1.4 –1.0 –12.0 0.6 –2.3 –0.8 –0.4 11.8 –2.1
–2.6 –3.3 –10.2 3.9 –0.9 –3.5–9.4 6.8 –1.7
–0.6 –0.8 –1.1 0.1 1.4 –1.9 –10.0 6.3 0.7
1.3 2.3 –1.0 –1.8 4.2 –0.3 –0.3 21.5–0.7
1.3 1.5–0.5 1.5 3.6 1.0 –0.4 1.4 –0.4
0.7 1.5–4.0 –0.9 3.1 –0.1 7.7 –4.2 –2.3
0.50.9 1.1 –1.0 –0.6 2.7 8.1 6.6 –2.5
1.2 1.7 –5.2 1.0 –0.6 –0.8 14.4 4.0 0.9
–2.0 –5.0 –1.4 9.9 6.1 –9.8 10.8 –23.5 –4.2
2.9 3.2 6.7 0.7 0.7 2.1 5.1 0.0 6.2
5.1 5.2 12.0 2.5 0.1 7.7 9.1 16.1 5.9
3.8 3.9 13.1 –0.2 –2.2 6.3 2.6 17.2 6.8
2.7 4.4 4.7 –6.1 –2.7 6.8 5.6 20.2 1.5
0.6 0.9 10.3 –4.0 3.50.9 –7.2 21.2 –0.9
2.3 2.8 3.9 0.0 0.0 1.3 7.9 12.2 3.5
0.52.2 –13.8 –0.4 –3.1 –3.6 –4.7 6.5 9.4
–0.2 –0.4 –7.3 3.8 1.7 –0.1 –8.4 –8.1 1.1
–3.7 –5.1 –2.2 1.9 –3.5 –3.4 –8.3 –13.8 –2.2
2.1 2.3 –9.1 5.6 1.8 1.4 1.7 –14.7 4.8
–0.5–0.8 –11.7 4.3 1.4 1.2 –12.1 –8.9 0.8
0.4 0.3 –5.1 2.2 1.4 3.7 –8.9 26.0 –3.2
1.3 3.2 –9.8 –2.6 –4.7 0.6 21.6 19.0 2.3
–5.5 –6.0 –19.6 2.2 –3.5 –5.6 –12.1 –1.7 –5.4
–3.2 –3.7 –14.1 3.9 –7.7 –1.8 –5.8 23.1 –1.5
–2.1 –3.0 –8.1 5.0 3.4 –5.0 –2.7 2.1 –4.1
–2.4 –3.1 –8.52.8 1.6 –3.8 –18.7 –2.3 0.6
–5.1 –6.4 –9.3 2.0 1.2 –7.7 –15.0 –7.0 –5.4
3.5 4.1 4.1 1.5 1.9 5.7 –11.2 18.7 5.8
0.51.2 3.2 –3.2 1.0 –1.2 –3.6 14.7 2.2
3.7 5.5 1.5 –3.1 10.8 0.0 –1.3 18.8 1.7
1.4 2.0 –2.0 0.1 3.7 0.8 1.4 30.3 –2.0
–1.1 –0.6 –3.0 –2.6 –0.9 –1.8 –0.9 16.0 –2.0
1.51.6 –3.9 2.7 1.0 1.8 –6.0 2.3 3.8
–1.2 –2.5–1.6 4.4 6.0 –1.8 –5 .4 –7.0 –6.4
3.8 5.4 3.7 –2.8 3.9 3.2 9.0 9.2 2.4
–3.0 –1.2 –12.6 –7.7 4.6 –6.6 16.4 –12.5–10.4
2.0 1.3 4.8 4.6 2.3 3.8 –4.9 –1.0 2.0
3.0 4.3 –4.6 0.3 2.6 2.513.1 1.5 1.4
1.9 3.9 8.7 –7.8 –2.1 6.56.3 8.0 –0.2
2.6 2.2 –2.1 5.6 2.4 2.6 19.3 20.8 –0.5
–2.6 –3.0 –3.2 –0.3 –2.1 –1.0 4.1 –2.4 –6.5
2.53.8 –11.0 1.9 1.7 –0.1 19.6 10.0 0.9
–1.9 –2.6 1.9 –0.2 –3.1 –3.6 5.7 1.5 –1.3
3.1 4.1 –5.2 1.5 –0.2 1.6 18.2 0.8 3.4
* Provisional data.
Source: NSSG.Statistical section
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Source: NSSG. Revised index of retail sales volume (on the basis of a new NSSG sample for the year 2000).
Table I . 5
Retail sales volume (retail trade turnover at constant prices)












2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2004 III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2005 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2006 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
2006 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.8 4.53.6 4.6 5 .3
4.3 5.3 0.9 3.8 7.5
4.57.1 1.4 3.9 4.7
3.0 5.6 1.3 0.6 –1.1
4.7 8.1 3.2 3.4 5.4
3.56.5 3.1 0.9 2.8
2.8 8.2 0.3 –4.8 –4.9
4.1 4.2 1.4 6.2 0.2
3.3 7.3 –0.6 0.4 –1.1
1.8 3.1 3.6 0.9 0.7
4.1 8.7 –5.6 2.2 9.0
9.0 11.6 0.8 18.4 –1.5
11.0 11.8 –2.3 25.4 1.4
3.0 7.2 –3.8 –3.4 2.2
6.54.8 5 .6 12.9 10.0
5.5 6.4 0.2 9.0 8.0
5.8 8.6 –3.5 9.7 4.9
4.3 6.7 –5.3 7.9 4.5
5.0 8.2 5.7 1.3 4.5
6.4 13.6 2.52.2 3.6
3.3 3.4 4.9 4.7 7.9
4.3 7.6 2.53.4 5 .2
6.3 9.9 7.9 3.4 4.7
2.7 6.1 0.4 –0.4 4.6
2.0 4.2 1.8 –0.1 0.1
–2.8 6.7 –17.6 –14.8 –8.2
4.7 7.4 14.8 –3.0 –4.3
6.7 10.7 3.8 4.2 –2.0
3.6 2.9 0.55 .0 –4.6
4.9 5.1 3.5 9.1 5.5
4.0 4.7 0.4 4.6 0.2
4.1 9.3 –2.8 0.5–1.3
3.8 9.3 –0.2 –1.9 –2.6
2.1 3.6 1.4 2.4 0.3
2.4 2.9 6.1 1.3 –1.5
1.6 3.50.9 1.6 –2.0
1.52.8 3.7 –0.1 4.4
0.3 4.0 0.4 –8.1 4.0
5.9 14.3 –9.6 0.0 8.6
6.0 8.0 –5.8 14.0 14.3
9.9 13.3 11.2 11.8 7.2
7.0 10.3 –5.9 14.4 –7.8
10.1 11.0 –4.6 29.0 –4.0
10.7 10.3 –4.8 27.6 –0.3
10.512.0 –4.1 21.9 0.6
11.9 13.1 2.1 26.4 3.5
5.1 3.9 5.1 14.6 –5.8
6.7 1.1 7.7 27.4 1.5
Food-beverages-
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Table I . 6
Demand and gross domestic product at market prices
(1995 constant prices)
Annual percentage changes
* According to the provisional quarterly national accounts data published by the NSSG , which, however, refer to the revised GDP and are not comparable with the data in
the table, it turns out that in 2006 GDP at constant prices increased by 4.3%, private consumption by 3.5%, public consumption by 2.0%, gross fixed capital formation by
9.5%, exports of goods and services by 5.8% and imports of goods and services by 7.1%.
Source: NSSG/National Accounts, March 2006. For 2006, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Updated Stability and Growth Programme 2006-2009 (December 2006).
Private consumption 3.6 4.54.7 3.7 3.8
Public consumption  7.5–2.1 2.8 3.1 2.1
Gross fixed capital formation: 5.7 13.7 5.7 –1.4 9.1
Housing 8.8 7.3 –0.6 –1.4 18.0
Other construction 0.7 13.2 6.0 –6.1 10.1
Equipment 6.9 18.3 8.0 0.55 .5
Other 21.0 3.4 7.0 14.53.0
Stocks and statistical discrepancy (% of GDP) 0.50.4 0.4 0.3 0.0
Domestic final demand 5.0 5.5 4.7 2.3 4.5
Exports of goods and services –7.7 1.0 11.53.0 5 .1
Exports of goods –7.1 4.2 –2.58.2 12.0
Exports of services –8.1 –1.3 21.8 –0.1 0.7
Final demand 2.7 4.8 5.8 2.4 4.6
Imports of goods and services –0.8 4.8 9.3 –1.2 6.5
Imports of goods 3.7 7.7 9.0 –0.1 6.6
Imports of services –18.7 –10.0 11.0 –7.6 5.9
GDP at market prices 3.8 4.8 4.7 3.7 4.0
2005 2004 2003 2002 2006*Statistical section
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Table I I . 1
Balance of payments
(Million euro)
1 (+) net inflow, (–) net outflow.
2 (+) decrease, (–) increase.
3 Reserve assets, as defined by the European Central Bank, comprise monetary gold, the reserve position in the IMF, special drawing rights and Bank of Greece claims in
foreign currency on non-euro area residents. Excluded are euro-denominated claims on non-euro area residents, claims in foreign currency and in euro on euro area res-
idents and the Bank of Greece share in the capital and reserves of the ECB.
* Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Greece.
January – December December
2004 20052006* 2004 20052006*
π CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (I.A+I.B+I.C+I.D)




Trade balance excluding oil and ships
























I.D.  CURRENT TRANSFERS BALANCE (1.D.1–1.D.2)
π.D.1 Receipts
General government (mainly EU transfers)
Other (emigrants' remittances, etc.)
π.D.2 Payments
General government (mainly to the EU)
Other
πI CAPITAL TRANSFERS BALANCE  (πI.1–II.2)
πI.1 Receipts
General government (EU transfers)
Other 
πI.2 Payments
General government (mainly to the EU)
Other
III CURRENT ACCOUNT AND CAPITAL TRANSFERS 
BALANCE (π+ππ)
IV FINANCIAL ACCOUNT BALANCE  (πV.∞+πV.µ+πV.C+πV.D)
IV.∞ DIRECT INVESTMENT1
By residents abroad








IV.D CHANGE IN RESERVE ASSETS2
V ERRORS AND OMISSIONS
RESERVE ASSETS3
–10,717.1 –14,637.5 –23,640.3– 1 ,842.4– 2 ,521.0– 2 ,815.2
–25,435.8 –27,558.9 –35,286.3– 2 ,389.0– 2 ,841.3– 3 ,225.3
–4,511.1 –6,629.2 –8,761.3 –339.7 –976.7 –779.2
–20,924.7 –20,929.7 –26,525.0 –2,049.3 –1,864.6 –2,446.1
39.1 –952.1 –3,390.5 –253.7 –194.4 –421.6
–20,963.8 –19,977.6 –23,134.5–1,795 .6 –1,670.2 –2,024.5
12,653.31 4 ,200.91 6 ,154.31 ,237.01 ,328.81 ,244.3
1,544.7 2,257.7 2,939.8 143.6 162.6 161.3
1,194.9 1,373.1 1,631.8 122.8 61.3 73.5
9,913.7 10,570.1 11,582.7 970.6 1,104.9 1,009.5
38,089.04 1 ,759.85 1 ,440.63 ,626.04 ,170.14 ,469.6
6,055.8 8,886.9 11,701.1 483.3 1,139.3 940.5
1,155.8 2,325.2 5,022.3 376.5 255.7 495.1
30,877.4 30,547.7 34,717.2 2,766.2 2,775.1 3,034.0
15,467.01 5 ,497.11 5 ,356.5 655.6 602.8 434.8
26,742.52 7 ,359.52 8 ,393.51 ,726.81 ,763.71 ,644.3
10,347.8 10,835.5 11,386.1 228.8 230.0 200.6
13,307.0 13,871.4 14,324.7 1,212.3 1,279.6 1,130.5
3,087.7 2,652.6 2,682.7 285.7 254.1 313.3
11,275.51 1 ,862.41 3 ,036.91 ,071.21 ,160.91 ,209.5
2,310.4 2,445.7 2,392.7 231.9 240.0 255.9
5,728.2 6,237.7 6,991.3 497.6 637.0 613.7
3,236.9 3,179.0 3,652.9 341.8 283.9 339.9
–4,377.4– 5 ,676.1– 7 ,118.8 –410.2 –629.7–688 .1
2,810.63 ,273.53 ,626.1 241.1 292.4 374.1
280.0 287.1 318.1 26.7 29.4 30.8
2,530.6 2,986.4 3,308.0 214.4 262.9 343.4
7,188.08 ,949.61 0 ,744.9 651.3 922.11 ,062.3
188.9 219.8 280.7 16.7 27.4 27.0
6,999.1 8,729.8 10,464.2 634.5894.7 1,035 .2
3,629.03 ,100.43 ,408.2 301.3 347.3 663.4
6,356.06 ,876.46 ,847.4 601.2 599.8 924.8
4,080.3 4,615.5 4,462.4 418.0 376.6 732.1
2,275.7 2,261.0 2,385.0 183.2 223.2 192.7
2,727.03 ,776.03 ,439.2 299.9 252.6 261.4
2,216.8 2,921.4 2,472.7 247.6 196.6 178.8
510.3 854.6 966.5 52.3 55.9 82.6
2,386.12 ,048.63 ,041.3 274.5 361.9 454.3
2,618.32 ,324.93 ,310.7 291.2 386.9 477.2
2,463.9 2,137.1 3,116.5 275.9 369.8 456.8
154.4 187.8 194.2 15.2 17.0 20.3
232.2 276.3 269.51 6 .72 5 .02 2 .9
69.82 2 .93 2 .21 .33 .73 .0
162.4 253.4 237.3 15.3 21.3 19.9
–8,331.0 –12,588.9 –20,599.0– 1 ,567.9– 2 ,159.1– 2 ,360.9
8,098.01 2 ,606.62 0 ,363.71 ,638.11 ,992.72 ,148.1
863.6 –679.0 953.85 7 .747 .7–27 1 .9
–828.8 –1,166.7 –3,321.6 –66.9 –91.6 –536.5
1,692.4 487.7 4,275.4 124.6 139.3 264.6
13,727.57 ,322.68 ,115.43 ,243.3 –212.42 ,651.5
–11,489.4 –18,459.7 –6,961.2 –1,266.1 –1,176.7 2,076.0
25,216.9 25,782.3 15,076.6 4,509.5 964.3 575.6
–9,104.15 ,914.01 1 ,518.5– 2 ,368.92 ,124.4 –381.5
–6,215.7 –6,301.5 –5,851.0 5,140.5 6,807.0 2,657.5
–2,888.4 12,215.5 17,369.5 –7,509.4 –4,682.6 –3,038.9
–1,027.4 –447.0 –447.7 –222.7 –330.0 –237.6
2,611.04 9 .0 –224.070 6 .03 3 .0 150.0
233.0 –17.7235 .3– 70 .3 166.4 212.7
1,994.01 ,945.02 ,169.0ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 150
* The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is the value of a representative basket of foreign currencies, each of which is weighted on the basis of its importance in
the country's external trade. Up to end-2000, the NEER of the drachma was calculated weighting the individual bilateral exchange rates of the drachma against the
other currencies, as these rates were formulated in the foreign exchange market. On 1 January 2001 Greece adopted the euro. The revised NEER index comprises
Greece's 28 major trading partners (including the other 12 euro area countries, including Slovenia) and the weights are calculated on the basis of imports and exports
of manufacturing goods (categories 5-8 of the Standardised International Trade Classification – SITC 5-8) in the period 1999-2001, also taking account of competition
in third countries. This index should not be confused with the effective exchange rate of the euro, which is calculated on the basis of the external trade of the euro
area as a whole.
1 Positive values indicate an appreciation of the euro, negative ones a depreciation.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table I π . 2







2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2004 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2005 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2006 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
2006 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
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0.9456 5.6  5.6  118.06 8.6  8.6  7.4305 –0.3  –0.3  0.62883 1.1  1.1 
1.1312 19.6  19.6  130.97 10.9  10.9  7.4307 0.002  0.002  0.69199 10.0  10.0 
1.2439 10.0  10.0  134.44 2.7  2.7  7.4399 0.1  0.1  0.67866 –1.9  –1.9 
1.2441 0.02  0.02  136.851.8  1.8  7.45 18 0.2  0.2  0.68380 0.8  0.8 
1.2556  0.93  0.93  146.02 6.7  6.7  7.4591 0.1  0.1  0.68173 –0.3  –0.3 
1.2497 5.1  16.5  133.97 3.5  5.0  7.4495 0.2  0.3  0.67987 –2.5  1.5 
1.2046 –3.6  5.9  132.20 –1.3  –1.9  7.4393 –0.1  0.2  0.66704 –1.9  –4.9 
1.2220 1.4  8.6  134.38 1.6  1.7  7.4367 –0.03  0.1  0.67216 0.8  –3.8 
1.2977 6.2  9.1  137.11 2.0  5.9  7.4343 –0.03  –0.03  0.69507 3.4  –0.4 
1.3113 1.0  4.9  137.01 –0.1  2.3  7.4433 0.1  –0.1  0.69362 –0.2  2.0 
1.2594 –4.0  4.5  135.42 –1.2  2.4  7.4463 0.04  0.1  0.67856 –2.2  1.7 
1.2199 –3.1  –0.2  135.62 0.1  0.9  7.4588 0.2  0.3  0.68344 0.7  1.7 
1.1884 –2.6  –8.4  139.41 2.8  1.7  7.4586 –0.004  0.3  0.67996 –0.5  –2.2 
1.2023 1.2  –8.3  140.51 0.8  2.6  7.4621 0.05  0.3  0.68625 0.9  –1.1 
1.2582 4.7  –0.1  143.81 2.3  6.2  7.4581 –0.1  0.2  0.68778 0.2  1.4 
1.2743 1.3  4.5  148.09 3.0  9.2  7.4604 0.0  0.0  0.67977 –1.2  –0.5 
1.2887 1.1  8.4  151.72 2.5  8.8  7.4557 –0.1  0.0  0.67314 –1.0  –1.0 
1.3119 –2.2  4.0 135.63 –2.5  1.1 7.4405 0.1  –0.1 0.69867 0.5  0.9
1.3014 –0.8  2.9 136.55 0.7  1.3 7.4427 0.03  –0.1 0.68968 –1.3  1.9
1.3201 1.4  7.7 138.83 1.7  4.3 7.4466 0.1  –0.04 0.69233 0.4  3.1
1.2938 –2.0  7.9 138.84 0.002  7.6 7.4499 0.04  0.1 0.68293 –1.4  2.6
1.2694 –1.9  5.7 135.37 –2.5  0.7 7.4443 –0.1  0.1 0.68399 0.2  1.8
1.2165–4.2  0.2 132.22 –2.3  –0.57.4448 0.01  0.1 0.66895 –2.2  0.7
1.2037 –1.0  –1.9 134.75 1.9  0.5 7.4584 0.2  0.3 0.68756 2.8  3.3
1.2292 2.1  1.0 135.98 0.9  1.1 7.4596 0.02  0.3 0.68527 –0.3  2.4
1.2256 –0.3  0.3 136.06 0.1  1.2 7.4584 –0.02  0.3 0.67760 –1.1  –0.5
1.2015 –2.0  –3.8 138.05 1.5  1.5 7.4620 0.05  0.3 0.68137 0.6  –1.5
1.1786 –1.9  –9.3 139.59 1.1  2.6 7.4596 –0.03  0.4 0.67933 –0.3  –2.8
1.1856 0.6  –11.6 140.58 0.7  1.0 7.4541 –0.1  0.3 0.67922 –0.02  –2.3
1.2103 2.1  –7.7 139.82 –0.5  3.1 7.4613 0.1  0.3 0.68598 1.0  –1.8
1.1938 –1.4  –8.3 140.77 0.7  3.1 7.4641 0.04  0.3 0.68297 –0.4  –1.0
1.2020 0.7  –8.9 140.96 0.1  1.57.4612 –0.04  0.2 0.68935 0.9  –0.4
1.2271 2.1  –5.2 143.59 1.9  3.4 7.4618 0.01  0.2 0.69463 0.8  1.7
1.2770 4.1  0.6 142.70 –0.6  5.4 7.4565 –0.07  0.2 0.68330 –1.6  –0.1
1.2650 –0.9  4.0 145.11 1.7  9.8 7.4566 0.001  0.2 0.68666 0.5  2.6
1.2684 0.3  5.4 146.70 1.1  8.9 7.4602 0.048  0.0 0.68782 0.2  0.0
1.2811 1.0  4.2 148.53 1.3  9.2 7.4609 0.010  0.0 0.67669 –1.6  –1.3
1.2727 –0.7  3.8 148.99 0.3  9.57.4601 –0.011  0.0 0.675 11 –0.2  –0.4
1.2611 –0.9  5.0 149.65 0.4  8.4 7.4555 –0.061  –0.1 0.67254 –0.4  –1.3
1.2881 2.1  9.3 151.11 1.0  8.2 7.4564 0.012  0.0 0.67397 0.2  –0.8
1.3213 2.6  11.4 154.82 2.5  10.1 7.4549 –0.020  0.0 0.67286 –0.2  –0.9














Bilateral exchange rates of the euro*
(Units of national currency per euro, period averages)
* Positive values indicate an appreciation of the euro, negative ones a depreciation. 
Sources: Bank of Greece and European Central Bank (ECB). 
2002  . . . . . .
2003  . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . .
2004 I  . . . . .
II . . . . .
III  . . . .
IV  . . . .
2005 I  . . . . .
II . . . . .
III  . . . .
IV  . . . .
2006 I  . . . . .
II . . . . .
III  . . . .
IV  . . . .
2005 Jan.  . . .
Feb. . . .
March  .
April  . .
May . . .
June  . .
July  . . .
Aug.  . .
Sept.  . .
Oct.  . .
Nov.  . .
Dec.  . .
2006 Jan.  . . .
Feb. . . .
March  .
April  . .
May . . .
June  . .
July  . . .
Aug.  . .
Sept.  . .
Oct.  . .
Nov.  . .
Dec.  . .
2007 Jan.  . . .
Period






























Table I I . 3(continued)
Bilateral exchange rates of the euro*
(Units of national currency per euro, period averages)
* Positive values indicate an appreciation of the euro, negative ones a depreciation.
Sources: Bank of Greece and European Central Bank (ECB). 
2002  . . . . . .
2003  . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . .
2004 I  . . . . .
II . . . . .
III  . . . .
IV  . . . .
2005 I  . . . . .
II . . . . .
III  . . . .
IV  . . . .
2006 I  . . . . .
II . . . . .
III  . . . .
IV  . . . .
2005 Jan.  . . .
Feb. . . .
March  .
April  . .
May . . .
June  . .
July  . . .
Aug.  . .
Sept.  . .
Oct.  . .
Nov.  . .
Dec.  . .
2006 Jan.  . . .
Feb. . . .
March  .
April  . .
May . . .
June  . .
July  . . .
Aug.  . .
Sept.  . .
Oct.  . .
Nov.  . .
Dec.  . .
2007 Jan.  . . .
9.16 –1.0  –1.0  1.467 –2.9  –2.9  7.51 –6.7  –6.7  1.738 0.3  0.3  1.484 7.0  7.0 
9.12 –0.4  –0.4  1.521 3.7  3.7  8.00 6.6  6.6  1.738 0.02  0.02  1.582 6.6  6.6 
9.12 0.001  0.001  1.544 1.5  1.5  8.37 4.6  4.6  1.690 –2.7  –2.7  1.617 2.2  2.2 
9.28 1.7  1.7  1.548 0.3  0.3  8.01 –4.3  –4.3  1.632 –3.5  –3.5  1.509 –6.7  –6.7 
9.25 –0.3  –0.3  1.573 1.6  1.6  8.05 0.5  0.5  1.667 2.1  2.1  1.424 –5.6  –5.6 
9.18 1.9  0.02  1.569 1.0  7.0  8.63 5.0  14.0  1.634 –1.7  –9.7  1.648 5.3  1.7 
9.14 –0.4  0.03  1.537 –2.0  1.3  8.26 –4.3  3.9  1.691 3.5  –4.7  1.637 –0.7  3.1 
9.16 0.1  –0.1  1.536 –0.1  –0.6  8.39 1.5  1.7  1.723 1.9  0.8  1.600 –2.3  3.0 
9.01 –1.6  0.04  1.533 –0.2  –1.3  8.20 –2.3  –0.3  1.713 –0.5  3.1  1.584 –1.0  1.1 
9.07 0.7  –1.2  1.549 1.0  –1.3  8.24 0.5  –4.5  1.688 –1.5  3.3  1.608 1.6  –2.4 
9.21 1.5  0.7  1.544 –0.3  0.4  8.05 –2.3  –2.6  1.639 –2.9  –3.1  1.568 –2.5  –4.3 
9.37 1.7  2.3  1.553 0.6  1.1  7.88 –2.1  –6.0  1.605 –2.0  –6.8  1.467 –6.4  –8.3 
9.47 1.1  5.1  1.547 –0.4  0.9  7.88 –0.04  –3.9  1.598 –0.4  –6.7  1.396 –4.9  –11.9 
9.35 –1.3  3.1  1.559 0.8  0.7  8.02 1.8  –2.6  1.627 1.8  –3.6  1.389 –0.4  –13.6 
9.30 –0.6  1.0  1.563 0.3  1.3  7.83 –2.4  –2.7  1.684 3.5  2.7  1.411 1.5  –10.0 
9.23 –0.7  –1.4  1.577 0.9  1.5  8.06 2.9  2.3  1.683 0.0  4.8  1.428 1.2  –2.6 
9.14 –1.0  –3.6  1.593 1.0  2.9  8.27 2.6  5.0  1.674 –0.5  4.7  1.467 2.7  5.1 
9.050.7  –1.0 1.5 47 0.7  –1.2 8.21 –0.1  –4.4 1.715 –1.8  4.7 1.606 –1.7  –1.8
9.09 0.4  –1.0 1.550 0.2  –1.5 8.32 1.3  –5.2 1.667 –2.8  2.5 1.613 0.4  –4.1
9.09 0.04  –1.6 1.549 –0.05  –1.1 8.19 –1.6  –4.1 1.681 0.8  2.7 1.606 –0.4  –1.5
9.17 0.9  0.02 1.547 –0.1  –0.5 8.18 –0.1  –1.5 1.674 –0.4  3.7 1.599 –0.5  –0.5
9.19 0.3  0.7 1.545 –0.2  0.3 8.08 –1.2  –1.5 1.657 –1.0  –2.7 1.594 –0.3  –3.6
9.26 0.8  1.3 1.539 –0.4  1.3 7.89 –2.3  –4.7 1.587 –4.2  –9.2 1.511 –5.2  –8.4
9.43 1.8  2.5 1.558 1.2  2.0 7.92 0.3  –6.5 1.600 0.8  –6.6 1.473 –2.5  –9.2
9.34 –0.9  1.7 1.553 –0.3  0.9 7.92 –0.05  –5.0 1.614 0.9  –5.8 1.482 0.6  –7.4
9.33 –0.1  2.7 1.550 –0.2  0.4 7.81 –1.4  –6.6 1.601 –0.8  –8.0 1.445 –2.5  –8.3
9.42 0.9  4.0 1.549 –0.04  0.4 7.83 0.3  –4.9 1.594 –0.4  –6.5 1.415 –2.1  –9.3
9.56 1.5  6.3 1.545 –0.3  1.5 7.83 –0.1  –3.8 1.603 0.6  –5.0 1.394 –1.4  –10.3
9.43 –1.4  5.0 1.548 0.2  0.7 7.97 1.8  –3.0 1.598 –0.3  –8.5 1.378 –1.2  –15.6
9.31 –1.3  2.9 1.549 0.1  0.2 8.04 0.8  –2.1 1.615 1.1  –5.8 1.402 1.8  –12.7
9.34 0.3  2.8 1.558 0.6  0.5 8.06 0.3  –3.1 1.610 –0.3  –3.4 1.372 –2.2  –14.9
9.40 0.6  3.4 1.569 0.7  1.3 7.98 –1.0  –2.6 1.654 2.7  –1.6 1.392 1.4  –13.4
9.33 –0.7  1.8 1.575 0.4  1.8 7.84 –1.7  –4.1 1.666 0.7  –0.5 1.405 1.0  –12.1
9.33 –0.04  1.5 1.556 –1.2  0.7 7.80 –0.5  –3.5 1.671 0.3  0.9 1.417 0.9  –11.1
9.23 –1.0  –0.3 1.560 0.2  1.4 7.86 0.7  –0.5 1.710 2.3  7.7 1.409 –0.6  –6.8
9.22 –0.2  –2.2 1.569 0.5  0.7 7.94 1.1  0.2 1.687 –1.4  5.4 1.430 1.5  –2.9
9.21 –0.1  –1.4 1.578 0.6  1.6 7.99 0.7  1.0 1.679 –0.5  4.0 1.434 0.2  –3.2
9.27 0.6  –0.7 1.584 0.4  2.2 8.26 3.3  5.7 1.684 0.3  5.2 1.420 –0.9  –1.7
9.25 –0.1  –1.8 1.590 0.4  2.6 8.40 1.7  7.2 1.673 –0.6  5.0 1.424 0.2  0.6
9.10 –1.6  –4.8 1.592 0.2  3.1 8.24 –1.8  5.3 1.668 –0.3  4.1 1.463 2.8  5.0
9.04 –0.7  –4.2 1.597 0.3  3.2 8.16 –1.1  2.3 1.681 0.8  5.2 1.521 3.9  10.4
9.08 0.5  –2.5 1.615 1.2  4.3 8.28 1.5  3.0 1.660 –1.3  2.8 1.528 0.5  9.0
Period
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2002  . . . . . . . .
2003  . . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . . .
2004 Jan. . . . . .
Feb.  . . . .
March  . .
April . . . .
May  . . . .
June  . . . .
July . . . . .
Aug.  . . . .
Sept. . . . .
Oct.  . . . .
Nov. . . . .
Dec. . . . .
2005 Jan. . . . . .
Feb.  . . . .
March  . .
April . . . .
May  . . . .
June  . . . .
July . . . . .
Aug.  . . . .
Sept. . . . .
Oct.  . . . .
Nov. . . . .
Dec. . . . .
2006 Jan. . . . . .
Feb.  . . . .
March  . .
April . . . .
May  . . . .
June  . . . .
July . . . . .
Aug.  . . . .
Sept. . . . .
Oct.  . . . .
Nov. . . . .
Dec. . . . .
341.2 2,158.3 2,499.4 1,075.7 1,406.3 4,981.4 226.9 470.5 127.6 5,806.4
397.9 2,329.2 2,727.1 1,039.2 1,529.6 5,295.8 208.7 581.5 92.7 6,178.7
468.4 2,480.5 2,948.9 1,040.5 1,642.9 5,632.3 228.8 604.9 102.3 6,568.2
532.8 2,946.8 3,479.6 1,123.7 1,549.6 6,152.9 221.9 615.8 126.2 7,116.8
592.2 3,154.6 3,746.8 1,416.6 1,559.7 6,723.1 239.8 613.3 194.2 7,770.4
389.1 2,313.8 2,702.9 1,021.7 1,547.2 5,271.7 214.6 591.7 95.6 6,173.6
393.5 2,309.8 2,703.3 1,016.4 1,553.8 5,273.5 228.6 599.2 97.0 6,198.4
399.6 2,345.9 2,745.5 1,005.6 1,559.1 5,310.2 219.4 602.6 94.5 6,226.7
409.4 2,361.3 2,770.7 1,006.3 1,567.5 5,344.5 225.5 611.0 99.5 6,280.5
416.6 2,372.0 2,788.7 1,015.4 1,573.4 5,377.4 221.9 609.0 96.2 6,304.5
423.0 2,410.4 2,833.4 989.0 1,585.6 5,408.0 217.7 609.2 100.1 6,335.0
436.2 2,398.6 2,834.8 1,000.4 1,593.3 5,428.5 223.0 613.0 97.8 6,362.3
433.4 2,362.3 2,795.7 1,003.5 1,598.9 5,398.0 226.0 624.1 99.2 6,347.3
438.0 2,419.1 2,857.1 993.1 1,600.9 5,451.1 217.6 609.5 100.4 6,378.4
444.4 2,421.6 2,866.0 1,019.4 1,605.0 5,490.4 230.7 617.1 99.0 6,437.1
448.7 2,465.0 2,913.7 1,003.7 1,611.5 5,528.9 225.1 613.5 103.1 6,470.5
468.4 2,480.5 2,948.9 1,040.5 1,642.9 5,632.3 228.8 604.9 102.3 6,568.2
459.9 2,506.1 2,966.0 1,015.4 1,655.9 5,637.3 228.7 616.4 99.2 6,581.7
463.6 2,506.6 2,970.1 1,013.0 1,660.3 5,643.4 227.0 615.4 114.1 6,599.9
471.8 2,525.8 2,997.6 1,017.7 1,665.2 5,680.4 227.0 614.5 106.0 6,627.8
481.1 2,550.0 3,031.1 1,034.8 1,672.5 5,738.4 226.3 627.8 120.9 6,713.4
485.8 2,578.3 3,064.1 1,035.7 1,678.7 5,778.4 239.2 634.8 113.5 6,766.0
496.6 2,808.0 3,304.5 1,027.4 1,520.2 5,852.1 238.9 621.3 118.5 6,830.7
506.4 2,814.7 3,321.1 1,042.5 1,525.7 5,889.4 238.6 635.1 119.2 6,882.9
500.9 2,767.7 3,268.7 1,054.3 1,530.0 5,853.0 249.2 639.7 121.0 6,862.8
507.1 2,815.4 3,322.5 1,078.4 1,532.0 5,933.0 234.4 631.5 119.9 6,918.7
510.5 2,838.8 3,349.3 1,088.7 1,532.2 5,970.3 241.4 629.0 121.4 6,962.0
514.5 2,864.0 3,378.5 1,085.9 1,531.3 5,995.7 239.3 629.6 130.0 6,994.7
532.8 2,946.8 3,479.6 1,123.7 1,549.6 6,152.9 221.9 615.8 126.2 7,116.8
520.8 2,930.2 3,451.0 1,113.8 1,565.8 6,130.6 237.0 608.4 143.5 7,119.4
524.9 2,921.0 3,445.9 1,134.9 1,569.3 6,150.0 235.0 610.2 152.7 7,147.9
532.3 2,937.6 3,469.8 1,162.1 1,571.0 6,202.9 235.9 603.1 163.1 7,205.0
540.3 2,981.7 3,522.0 1,201.5 1,569.4 6,292.9 249.7 613.1 163.9 7,319.5
543.6 3,000.9 3,544.5 1,189.2 1,568.6 6,302.2 258.2 621.6 173.7 7,355.7
553.7 3,045.0 3,598.7 1,208.8 1,565.8 6,373.2 245.1 616.5 161.7 7,396.6
562.7 3,010.9 3,573.6 1,233.0 1,562.7 6,369.3 250.5 627.4 160.3 7,407.4
559.0 2,957.5 3,516.5 1,267.9 1,562.7 6,347.1 264.9 639.7 179.2 7,430.9
563.2  3,016.8  3,579.9  1,304.8  1,558.9  6,443.6  263.8  645.6  178.9  7,531.9 
567.1  2,995.8  3,562.9  1,343.1  1,551.8  6,457.8  261.2  643.2  194.4  7,556.6 
571.5  3,035.3  3,606.8  1,368.7  1,543.5  6,519.0  260.8  636.8  199.4  7,615.9 
592.2 3,154.6 3,746.8 1,416.6 1,559.7 6,723.1 239.8 613.3 194.2 7,770.4
1 Monetary aggregates comprise monetary liabilities of MFIs and central government (Postal Savings Bank, Ministry of Finance) vis-à-vis non-MFI euro area residents
excluding central government. 
2 M3 and its components exclude non-euro area residents' holdings of money market fund units, money market paper and debt securities with an initial maturity of
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2002  . . . . . . .
2003  . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . .
2004 Jan. . . . . .
Feb.  . . . .
March  . .
April . . . .
May  . . . .
June  . . . .
July . . . . .
Aug.  . . . .
Sept. . . . .
Oct.  . . . .
Nov. . . . .
Dec. . . . .
2005 Jan. . . . . .
Feb.  . . . .
March  . .
April . . . .
May  . . . .
June  . . . .
July . . . . .
Aug.  . . . .
Sept. . . . .
Oct.  . . . .
Nov. . . . .
Dec. . . . .
2006 Jan. . . . . .
Feb.  . . . .
March  . .
April . . . .
May  . . . .
June  . . . .
July . . . . .
Aug.  . . . .
Sept. . . . .
Oct.  . . . .
Nov. . . . .
Dec. . . . .
71.7 15.2 56.5 28.9 2.3 20.0 10.7 0.2 133.8
79.517.6 61.9 32.3 2.0 10.8 15 .7 0.5140.8
91.7 20.7 71.0 33.4 1.9 9.5 15.2 0.5 152.3
99.2 24.8 74.4 51.8 4.4 2.7 4.9 0.4 163.4
100.1 26.0 74.1 69.3 2.9 1.6 5.8 0.5 180.2
79.517.2 61.6 32.5 2.1 10.6 15 .2 0.5139.7
79.6 17.3 62.3 32.1 2.1 10.515 .2 0.5 139.9
82.1 17.8 64.3 31.8 2.1 9.515 .8 0.4 141.6
81.4 17.8 63.6 33.52.2 9.1 15 .9 0.4 142.5
82.5 17.0 65.5 32.2 2.1 8.9 15.6 0.4 141.8
84.9 18.3 66.6 32.4 2.1 9.4 15.8 0.4 145.0
85.5 18.3 67.2 33.0 2.1 9.3 15.9 0.4 146.2
84.9 17.7 67.2 33.2 2.1 9.6 15.8 0.4 146.1
86.0 18.7 67.3 33.4 2.1 10.515 .3 0.5 147.8
86.4 18.9 67.533.6 2.0 10.4 15 .4 0.5 148.2
87.519.6 67.9 33.8 2.0 10.1 15 .3 0.5149.1
91.7 20.7 71.0 33.4 1.9 9.5 15.2 0.5 152.3
90.4 19.8 70.6 37.8 2.0 5.6 14.9 0.5 151.2
91.9 20.8 71.1 39.4 2.0 4.4 14.6 0.515 2.8
90.9 20.4 70.6 41.0 2.0 4.2 14.2 0.4 152.6
91.1 20.2 70.9 42.3 2.6 3.8 13.0 0.515 3.4
91.520.2 71.2 42.6 2.8 4.1 12.5 0.515 3.9
96.8 23.9 72.9 42.2 3.1 3.7 10.9 0.4 157.2
93.8 21.8 72.0 44.4 3.3 3.3 10.7 0.4 155.9
93.5 21.2 72.3 45.6 3.6 3.3 10.1 0.3 156.4
94.8 22.5 72.3 46.2 3.9 3.3 7.3 0.4 155.9
95.5 23.2 72.3 49.2 4.1 2.6 6.2 0.4 158.0
94.9 23.1 71.8 50.6 4.5 2.7 5.5 0.4 158.6
99.2 24.8 74.4 51.8 4.4 2.7 4.9 0.4 163.4
95.8 22.7 73.1 53.8 4.4 2.6 4.7 0.4 161.7
95.3 22.6 72.7 55.1 4.5 2.5 4.7 0.4 162.5
95.3 22.7 72.6 56.8 4.1 2.5 4.6 0.5 163.9
95.6 22.3 73.3 57.9 4.0 2.4 4.6 0.6 165.1
95.8 22.6 73.2 59.0 3.7 2.4 4.9 0.6 166.5
99.2 25.1 74.0 60.4 3.6 2.5 5.2 0.6 171.5
98.0 24.2 73.8 61.7 3.52.1 5 .3 0.6 171.1
97.0 23.4 73.6 63.3 3.4 2.0 5.4 0.6 171.7
96.8 23.4 73.3 63.7 3.3 2.1 5.5 0.5 171.9
95.3 23.1 72.3 65.4 3.2 1.9 5.6 0.5 171.9
95.3 23.4 71.9 66.8 3.0 1.6 5.7 0.5 173.0
100.1 26.0 74.1 69.3 2.9 1.6 5.8 0.5 180.2
1 Including savings deposits in currencies other than the euro.
2 ∆he Greek M3 (as any other euro area national M3) can no longer be accurately calculated, since part of the quantity of the euro banknotes and coins that have been
put into circulation in a euro area country is held by residents of other euro area countries and/or by non-residents. Due to these technical problems, the compilation of
the Greek M0, M1, M2 and M3 was interrupted in January 2003.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table III.2
Greek contribution to the main monetary aggregates of the euro area
(Outstanding balances in billion euro, not seasonally adjusted)
End of period
Debt securi-
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2002  . . . . . . . . . . .
2003  . . . . . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . . . . . .
2004 Jan. . . . . . . . .
Feb.  . . . . . . .
March . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May  . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . .
July . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept. . . . . . . .
Oct.  . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2005 Jan. . . . . . . . .
Feb.  . . . . . . .
March . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May  . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . .
July . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept. . . . . . . .
Oct.  . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2006 Jan. . . . . . . . .
Feb.  . . . . . . .
March . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May  . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . .
July . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept. . . . . . . .
Oct.  . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
104,761.1 87,732.3 17,028.8 13,367.3 60,406.1 30,987.7
115,750.1 98,119.3 17,630.8 15,395.8 65,141.1 35,213.2
128,424.6 110,206.7 18,217.9 18,274.2 73,954.2 36,196.1
156,857.7 135,797.3 21,060.4 22,180.2 79,800.8 54,876.1
173,370.4 151,321.5 22,048.9 23,525.0 77,858.2 71,987.2
114,996.0 96,977.6 18,018.4 14,874.7 64,645.4 35,476.0
115,491.9 97,036.0 18,455.9 15,089.7 66,332.2 34,070.0
117,571.4 98,647.3 18,924.1 15,479.0 67,322.0 34,770.4
118,835.4 99,526.4 19,309.0 15,687.6 66,697.8 36,450.0
118,645.4 99,905.7 18,739.7 14,995.6 68,548.9 35,100.9
120,997.2 102,774.4 18,222.8 16,078.1 69,641.4 35,277.7
122,396.3 103,778.518,617.8 16,368.9 70,186.6 35 ,840.9
122,065.6 103,347.9 18,717.7 15,579.5 70,397.0 36,089.1
123,471.3 104,687.8 18,783.6 16,727.8 70,396.8 36,346.7
123,971.8 105,394.3 18,577.5 16,840.4 70,593.6 36,537.8
124,875.8 106,408.6 18,467.2 17,304.0 70,903.5 36,668.3
128,424.6 110,206.7 18,217.9 18,274.2 73,954.2 36,196.1
131,749.7 114,232.0 17,517.7 17,586.6 73,515.5 40,647.6
134,088.9 116,771.1 17,317.8 17,866.2 74,096.0 42,126.7
134,801.8 116,303.2 18,498.7 17,521.9 73,527.1 43,752.9
136,854.8 118,087.9 18,766.9 17,333.7 74,453.1 45,068.0
137,472.3 118,223.8 19,248.5 17,189.9 75,046.6 45,235.8
142,951.8 123,548.2 19,403.6 20,868.4 77,036.6 45,046.9
142,705.3 122,700.2 20,005.1 19,144.9 76,318.4 47,241.9
143,733.0 123,239.3 20,493.7 18,436.6 76,764.9 48,531.5
146,180.7 125,211.8 20,968.9 19,789.0 77,143.1 49,248.6
150,136.2 129,055.6 21,080.6 20,542.2 77,351.8 52,242.2
151,140.9 129,736.1 21,404.8 20,228.8 77,297.6 53,614.4
156,857.7 135,797.3 21,060.4 22,180.2 79,800.8 54,876.7
155,334.6 134,509.7 20,824.9 20,097.8 78,361.8 56,875.1
156,125.0 134,733.6 21,391.4 19,797.5 78,114.4 58,213.2
157,740.9 136,352.9 21,388.0 20,229.3 77,611.2 59,900.5
158,730.2 137,689.9 21,040.3 19,707.4 78,160.7 60,862.1
159,942.6 138,812.0 21,130.6 20,063.9 77,829.2 62,049.5
164,328.2 143,200.2 21,128.0 22,398.2 78,543.2 63,386.8
164,473.3 143,231.3 21,242.0 21,667.6 78,137.8 64,667.9
164,706.1 143,088.1 21,618.0 20,710.577,844.8 66,15 0.8
164,750.2 143,309.9 21,440.3 20,693.0 77,479.1 66,578.1
164,848.2 143,096.0 21,752.2 20,410.6 76,266.5 68,171.1
166,195.3 144,335.6 21,859.7 21,116.2 75,520.4 69,558.6
173,370.4 151,321.5 22,048.9 23,525.0 77,858.2 71,987.2
1 Other Monetary Financial Institutions (OMFIs) comprise credit institutions (other than the Bank of Greece) and money market funds.
2 Including blocked deposits.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table πππ.3
Greece: deposits of domestic firms and households with OMFIs,1 by currency and type
(Outstanding balances in million euro, not seasonally adjusted)
Total
deposits
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1 Comprising manufacturing and mining.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table πππ.4
Domestic MFI loans to domestic enterprises and households, by branch of economic activity
(Balances in million euro)
2001 . . . . . . . . 
2002 . . . . . . . . 
2003 . . . . . . . . 
2004 . . . . . . . . 
2005 . . . . . . . . 
2006 . . . . . . . . 
2004 Jan. . . . . . 
Feb.. . . . . 
March . . . 
April . . . . 
May  . . . . 
June . . . . 
July . . . . . 
Aug. . . . . 
Sept. . . . . 
Oct. . . . . 
Nov. . . . . 
Dec. . . . . 
2005 Jan. . . . . . 
Feb.. . . . . 
March . . . 
April . . . . 
May  . . . . 
June . . . . 
July . . . . . 
Aug. . . . . 
Sept. . . . . 
Oct. . . . . 
Nov. . . . . 
Dec. . . . . 
2006 Jan. . . . . . 
Feb.. . . . . 
March . . . 
April . . . . 
May  . . . . 
June . . . . 
July . . . . . 
Aug. . . . . 
Sept. . . . . 
Oct. . . . . 
Nov. . . . . 
Dec. . . . . 
74,027.4 50,198.7 3,724.2 12,614.9 15,524.3 2,171.3 16,164.0 23,828.7 15,652.2 7,852.0 324.5
86,510.5 55,012.2 3,224.7 14,364.0 15,670.8 2,903.2 18,849.5 31,498.3 21,224.7 9,755.4 518.2
101,178.1 60,979.3 3,082.7 15,865.1 16,514.4 3,488.2 22,028.9 40,198.8 26,534.2 12,409.6 1,255.0
117,201.7 65,566.3 3,248.0 15,675.6 18,821.6 4,040.0 23,781.1 51,635.4 33,126.8 17,053.8 1,454.8
136,981.1 71,282.9 2,954.0 15,753.8 19,958.4 4,189.8 28,426.9 65,698.2 43,199.4 20,850.0 1,648.8
156,896.4 76,659.8 3,051.0 16,371.4 20,572.0 4,194.1 32,471.3 80,236.6 52,502.5 25,599.2 2,134.9
102,748.9 61,939.3 3,055.4 16,005.1 16,822.7 3,536.8 22,519.3 40,809.6 26,902.8 12,690.8 1,216.0
103,899.7 62,373.0 3,042.0 15,948.2 17,060.8 3,587.7 22,734.3 41,526.7 27,334.5 13,041.9 1,150.3
105,263.2 62,632.0 3,095.5 15,831.8 17,012.4 3,661.6 23,030.7 42,631.2 27,894.2 13,442.3 1,294.7
106,447.1 62,865.3 3,150.5 15,734.1 17,134.7 3,703.2 23,142.8 43,581.8 28,465.8 13,798.6 1,317.4
108,835.0 64,279.3 3,242.6 15,950.4 17,773.5 3,766.9 23,545.9 44,555.7 29,080.6 14,169.3 1,305.8
109,806.8 64,817.5 3,324.8 15,831.1 17,952.6 3,801.5 23,907.5 44,989.3 29,035.7 14,585.6 1,368.0
111,624.2 65,449.6 3,348.0 15,997.2 18,214.6 3,862.7 24,027.1 46,174.6 29,822.1 14,985.2 1,367.3
111,905.0 64,948.0 3,376.4 15,740.2 18,062.7 3,841.8 23,926.9 46,957.0 30,244.2 15,327.8 1,385.0
113,392.1 65,419.2 3,402.8 15,743.6 18,335.8 3,865.3 24,071.7 47,972.9 30,832.5 15,722.9 1,417.5
114,868.1 65,943.5 3,397.8 15,988.2 18,687.8 3,987.5 23,882.2 48,924.6 31,404.7 16,114.1 1,405.8
115,636.5 65,492.4 3,303.2 15,755.2 18,612.8 3,930.4 23,890.8 50,144.1 32,138.9 16,580.3 1,424.9
117,201.7 65,566.3 3,248.0 15,675.6 18,821.6 4,040.0 23,781.1 51,635.4 33,126.8 17,053.8 1,454.8
118,387.3 65,985.6 3,237.8 15,645.2 18,921.1 4,079.3 24,102.2 52,401.7 33,672.4 17,275.8 1,453.5
118,906.4 65,521.9 3,161.6 15,623.8 19,104.7 4,129.9 23,501.9 53,384.5 34,281.6 17,610.7 1,492.2
120,704.9 66,096.9 3,079.3 15,565.9 19,309.8 4,180.8 23,961.1 54,608.0 35,091.5 17,995.6 1,520.9
123,037.2 67,097.9 3,059.3 15,926.1 19,565.9 4,211.2 24,335.4 55,939.3 35,878.7 18,550.0 1,510.6
124,228.8 67,257.5 3,038.1 15,872.9 19,520.5 4,225.7 24,600.3 56,971.3 36,610.2 18,896.4 1,464.7
125,452.3 68,474.1 3,096.1 15,918.8 20,142.8 4,293.7 25,022.7 56,978.2 36,102.8 19,386.6 1,488.8
127,215.3 69,613.6 3,119.2 16,123.2 20,352.3 4,135.7 25,883.2 57,601.7 37,238.6 18,897.0 1,466.1
127,788.5 69,212.3 3,123.3 15,838.2 20,027.5 4,110.4 26,112.9 58,576.2 37,850.0 19,245.1 1,481.1
129,507.9 69,305.5 2,939.4 15,674.2 19,985.6 4,073.7 26,632.6 60,202.4 39,022.1 19,628.5 1,551.8
131,111.7 69,462.4 2,884.1 15,757.2 19,905.6 4,089.4 26,826.1 61,649.3 40,000.4 20,080.7 1,568.2
133,136.0 69,791.5 2,919.6 15,712.5 19,717.1 4,184.2 27,258.1 63,344.5 41,244.2 20,511.7 1,588.6
136,981.1 71,282.9 2,954.0 15,753.8 19,958.4 4,189.8 28,426.9 65,698.2 43,199.4 20,850.0 1,648.8
137,731.3 70,999.2 2,948.7 15,690.0 19,672.8 4,205.7 28,482.0 66,732.1 44,010.6 21,047.7 1,673.8
139,714.7 71,491.8 2,957.3 15,747.6 19,389.1 4,248.8 29,149.0 68,222.9 44,873.8 21,637.5 1,711.6
142,633.3 72,960.5 3,086.1 15,955.2 19,843.2 4,356.4 29,719.6 69,672.8 45,919.6 22,045.2 1,708.0
144,593.1 73,944.8 3,098.7 16,399.3 20,160.3 4,352.3 29,934.2 70,648.3 46,612.7 22,344.3 1,691.3
145,477.5 74,372.3 3,105.7 16,661.9 19,876.8 4,377.7 30,350.2 71,105.2 46,539.9 22,815.5 1,749.8
148,322.9 76,259.8 3,192.4 16,900.2 20,531.4 4,416.8 31,219.0 72,063.1 46,929.0 23,275.7 1,558.4
150,012.0 76,374.7 3,203.6 16,706.6 20,573.2 4,350.0 31,514.3 73,637.3 48,165.4 23,610.7 1,861.2
150,031.2 76,033.8 3,204.1 16,658.0 20,371.5 4,301.8 31,498.4 73,997.4 48,138.4 23,956.0 1,903.0
152,943.1 77,450.6 3,239.2 16,769.4 20,916.6 4,337.6 32,187.8 75,492.5 49,140.0 24,394.4 1,958.1
153,584.8 76,893.8 3,226.8 16,627.6 20,662.5 4,346.0 32,030.9 76,691.0 49,923.5 24,709.6 2,057.9
152,551.9 74,519.8 3,141.2 16,223.8 19,823.8 4,213.5 31,117.5 78,032.1 50,672.3 25,283.7 2,076.1
156,896.4 76,659.8 3,051.0 16,371.4 20,572.0 4,194.1 32,471.3 80,236.6 52,502.5 25,599.2 2,134.9
End of period Total
Agri-
culture Industry1 Trade Tourism
Households Businesses 
Other Total Housing Consumer Other
Grand
totalStatistical section
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Table πππ.5
ECB and Bank of Greece interest rates
(Percentages per annum)
1999 1 Jan. 2.00 3.00 4.50 1999 14 Jan. 11.50 9.75 12.00 13.50
4 Jan.2 2.753.00 3.25 21 Oct. 11.00 9.75 11.5 0 13.00
22 Jan. 2.00 3.00 4.50 16 Dec. 10.25 9.25 10.75 12.25
9 April 1.50 2.50 3.50 27 Dec. 10.25 9.00 10.75 11.50
5Nov. 2.00 3.00 4.00
2000 4 Feb. 2.253.254.25 2000 27 Jan. 9.50 8.50 9.75 11.00
17 March 2.50 3.50 4.50 9 March 8.75 8.00 9.25 10.25
28 April 2.75 3.75 4.75 20 April  8.00 7.50 8.75 9.50
9 June 3.254.255 .25 29 June  7.25 – 8.259.00
28 June3 3.25 4.25 5.25 6 Sept. 6.50 – 7.50 8.25
1 Sept. 3.50 4.50 5.50 15 Nov.  6.00 – 7.00 7.75
6 Oct. 3.75  4.75  5.75  29 Nov.  5.50 – 6.50 7.25
13 Dec.  4.75 – 5.75 6.50
27 Dec.  3.75– 4.75 5 .75
2001 11 May  3.50  4.50  5.50 
31 Aug.  3.25  4.25  5.25 
18 Sept. 2.753.754.75
9 Nov. 2.253.254.25
2002 6 Dec. 1.752.753.75
2003 7 March 1.50 2.50 3.50
6 June 1.00 2.00 3.00
2005 6 Dec. 1.252.253.25
2006 8 March 1.50 2.50 3.50
15June 1.75 2.75 3.75
9 Aug. 2.00 3.00 4.00
11 Oct. 2.253.254.25
13 Dec. 2.50 3.50 4.50
With
effect from:1
























1 From 1 January 1999 to 9 March 2004, the date refers to the deposit and marginal lending facilities. For main refinancing operations, changes in the rate are effective from
the first operation following the date indicated. The change on 18 September 2001 was effective on that same day. From 10 March 2004 onwards, the date refers to the
deposit and marginal lending facilities and to the main refinancing operations (changes effective from the first main refinancing operation following the Governing Council
discussion), unless otherwise indicated.
2 On 22 December 1998 the ECB announced that, as an exceptional measure between 4 and 21 January 1999, a narrow corridor of 50 basic points would be applied between
the interest rate for the marginal lending facility and that for the deposit facility, aimed at facilitating the transition of market participants to the new monetary regime.
3 On 8 June 2000, the ECB announced that, starting from the operation to be settled on 28 June 2000, the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem would be conducted
as variable rate tenders. The minimum bid rate refers to the minimum interest rate at which counterparties may place their bids. 
4 On 29 June 2000 the second tier of the deposit facility was abolished; the interest rate thereafter applies to the unified deposit acceptance account.
Sources: ECB and Bank of Greece.ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 158
2002  . . . . . . . . . . .
2003  . . . . . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . . . . . .
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2006 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2007 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
3.50 4.06 4.45 4.78 5.12 5.24 5.52 . . . 
2.34 2.82 3.37 3.83 4.27 4.32 4.91 . . . 
2.27 2.87 3.37 3.81 4.26 4.53 4.77 . . . 
2.33 2.652.92 3.22 3.5 9 3.80 3.92 4.14
3.44 3.58 3.72 3.87 4.07 4.16 4.23 4.42
2.21 2.71 3.34 3.81 4.37 4.33 4.94 . . . 
2.17 2.91 3.28 3.90 4.354.28 4.91 . . . 
2.06 2.71 3.26 3.71 4.17 4.43 4.75. . . 
2.16 2.90 3.453.90 4.354.72 4.88 . . . 
2.30 3.08 3.63 4.07 4.49 4.86 5.01 . . . 
2.41 3.19 3.73 4.154.5 54.89 5 .03 . . . 
2.36 3.07 3.61 4.03 4.44 4.79 4.93 . . . 
2.30 2.91 3.43 3.854.28 4.63 4.78 . . . 
2.37 2.91 3.40 3.79 4.22 4.56 4.70 . . . 
2.32 2.76 3.253.654.11 4.47 4.61 . . . 
2.33 2.66 3.12 3.53 3.97 4.33 4.47 . . . 
2.30 2.59 2.98 3.36 3.77 4.10 4.24 . . . 
2.31 2.72 2.96 3.29 3.69 3.99 4.12 . . . 
2.31 2.80 2.97 3.34 3.69 3.94 4.04 . . . 
2.34 2.88 3.06 3.56 3.92 4.12 4.24 4.49
2.27 2.70 3.06 3.37 3.76 3.98 4.11 4.38
2.19 2.5 52.89 3.21 3.60 3.82 3.954.21
2.10 2.352.70 3.02 3.44 3.66 3.79 4.05
2.17 2.42 2.753.06 3.46 3.71 3.84 4.10
2.22 2.49 2.79 3.07 3.47 3.69 3.82 4.08
2.22 2.42 2.66 2.92 3.30 3.52 3.64 3.91
2.41 2.66 2.88 3.11 3.453.64 3.754.00
2.69 2.91 3.153.36 3.67 3.84 3.94 4.14
2.78 2.953.14 3.31 3.5 7 3.73 3.82 4.02
2.84 2.99 3.17 3.32 3.60 3.71 3.79 3.98
2.91 3.09 3.30 3.50 3.77 3.86 3.94 4.14
3.11 3.38 3.50 3.74 3.95 4.02 4.11 4.29
3.22 3.61 3.72 4.01 4.23 4.32 4.41 4.60
3.31 3.63 3.80 4.054.30 4.38 4.48 4.69
3.41 3.70 3.93 4.07 4.31 4.41 4.50 4.72
3.54 3.78 3.98 4.10 4.33 4.42 4.50 4.72
3.61 3.72 3.88 3.98 4.19 4.29 4.37 4.58
3.72 3.71 3.81 3.89 4.06 4.154.21 4.39
3.80 3.77 3.87 3.93 4.08 4.154.21 4.35
3.87 3.77 3.82 3.86 3.98 4.054.09 4.23
3.92 3.84 3.89 3.93 4.04 4.12 4.17 4.30
4.06 4.01 4.08 4.13 4.28 4.33 4.38 4.51
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table πππ.6
Greek government paper yields
(Percentages per annum, period averages)
Yield on government bonds
20-year 15-year 10-year 7-year 5-year 3-year
Yield on
one-year
Treasury bills 32-year PeriodStatistical section
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Period Savings2 Overnight1,2
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . 0.93 0.92 2.48 0.63 2.49 2.24
2004  . . . . . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . . . . . .
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug. . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug. . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2006 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug. . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
0.93 0.92 2.48 0.63 2.49 2.24
0.91 0.90 2.29 0.55 2.17 1.98
0.91 0.88 2.23 0.60 2.09 2.00
1.02 0.98 2.86 0.79 2.81 2.67
0.88 0.86 2.26 0.55 2.18 1.99
0.88 0.87 2.18 0.57 2.17 1.98
0.89 0.87 2.29 0.54 2.13 1.95
0.89 0.88 2.26 0.56 2.13 1.97
0.90 0.89 2.24 0.56 2.23 1.95
0.91 0.90 2.29 0.54 2.16 1.97
0.91 0.91 2.32 0.56 2.18 1.97
0.92 0.91 2.31 0.60 2.19 1.96
0.93 0.92 2.33 0.53 2.12 1.97
0.94 0.93 2.350.5 3 2.17 1.98
0.950.94 2.36 0.5 1 2.18 2.00
0.96 0.94 2.30 0.55 2.20 2.01
0.96 0.952.250.5 6 2.08 1.97
0.950.94 2.19 0.5 52.07 1.97
0.93 0.91 2.22 0.55 2.02 1.97
0.89 0.86 2.22 0.55 2.07 1.98
0.89 0.87 2.20 0.56 2.04 1.99
0.89 0.86 2.21 0.58 2.07 1.99
0.88 0.86 2.20 0.60 2.07 1.98
0.89 0.86 2.19 0.59 2.08 1.98
0.89 0.87 2.19 0.70 2.09 1.98
0.89 0.87 2.22 0.652.10 1.97
0.90 0.87 2.27 0.652.11 1.99
0.91 0.88 2.39 0.71 2.32 2.18
0.93 0.90 2.44 0.69 2.33 2.23
0.93 0.90 2.450.652.352.25
0.99 0.95 2.58 0.73 2.57 2.42
0.98 0.952.63 0.73 2.61 2.5 0
0.98 0.952.66 0.73 2.5 7 2.47
1.02 0.98 2.76 0.752.70 2.60
1.02 0.98 2.84 0.74 2.79 2.60
1.04 1.00 2.950.83 2.96 2.74
1.051.00 3.03 0.83 2.97 2.85
1.11 1.06 3.24 0.93 3.153.02
1.09 1.04 3.26 0.89 3.24 3.09
1.14 1.09 3.47 0.92 3.48 3.30
1 Weighted average of the current account rate and the savings deposit rate.
2 End-of-month rate.
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Greece: bank rates on new euro-denominated deposits of euro area residents






2003  . . . . . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . . . . . .
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2006 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
14.41 10.57 10.47 4.51 4.78 6.86 5.29 3.98
13.81 9.55 9.86 4.30 4.51 7.01 4.98 3.67
13.36 8.47 9.06 4.06 4.156.90 5 .08 3.62
13.45 7.89 8.58 4.20 4.28 7.18 5.76 4.37
13.92 9.82 9.94 4.36 4.68 6.74 5.12 3.92
13.97 9.94 9.99 4.354.63 6.855 .16 4.09
14.00 9.44 9.87 4.37 4.63 7.13 4.88 3.45
14.06 9.56 9.85 4.36 4.55 7.11 5.15 3.49
13.79 9.82 10.07 4.33 4.54 7.02 4.91 3.45
13.89 9.71 10.05 4.30 4.54 7.06 4.89 3.58
13.84 9.60 9.67 4.24 4.43 7.03 4.84 3.53
13.77 9.70 10.05 4.34 4.53 7.06 4.95 3.52
13.62 9.37 9.91 4.23 4.43 7.054.87 3.80
13.72 9.68 9.87 4.29 4.457.02 4.86 3.83
13.759.40 9.72 4.23 4.36 7.055 .06 3.61
13.41 8.58 9.36 4.21 4.37 6.97 5.04 3.77
13.42 8.859.39 4.23 4.39 6.954.89 3.5 4
13.72 8.99 9.62 4.20 4.34 6.95 5.08 3.53
13.51 8.53 9.43 4.15 4.27 6.94 5.00 3.70
13.74 8.58 9.37 4.13 4.23 6.94 5.09 3.58
13.63 8.88 9.13 4.12 4.21 6.89 4.96 3.47
13.48 8.16 8.78 4.07 4.18 6.87 4.82 3.46
13.14 8.45 9.35 4.06 4.14 6.82 5.01 3.50
13.16 8.48 9.39 4.11 4.18 6.84 5.12 3.50
13.23 8.36 8.79 3.99 4.05 6.82 5.06 3.57
13.07 8.32 8.68 3.94 4.01 6.855 .06 3.79
13.09 8.28 8.56 3.88 3.93 6.93 5.41 3.84
13.07 7.78 8.26 3.86 3.91 7.00 5.41 3.93
13.18 7.77 8.30 3.92 4.00 6.94 5.26 3.70
13.18 8.06 8.51 3.89 3.97 6.99 5.44 3.74
13.22 8.09 8.44 3.92 4.02 7.13 5.50 4.15
13.24 7.82 8.48 3.93 4.08 7.09 5.57 3.92
13.22 7.84 8.66 4.00 4.157.10 5 .61 4.17
13.458.09 8.754.22 4.32 7.18 5 .654.41
13.41 7.85 8.59 4.28 4.36 7.19 5.70 4.40
13.60 7.99 8.77 4.51 4.53 7.26 5.88 4.27
13.58 8.03 8.85 4.50 4.54 7.26 5.91 4.72
13.72 8.158.87 4.64 4.62 7.37 6.14 4.83
13.81 8.19 8.86 4.50 4.52 7.25 6.15 4.94
13.80 6.82 7.82 4.07 4.26 7.356.30 5 .16
1 Charges are not included.
2 Weighted average of interest rates on loans to households through credit cards, open loans and current account overdrafts.
3 End-of-month rate.
4 Weighted average of interest rates on corporate loans through credit lines and sight deposit overdrafts.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table πππ.8
Greece: bank rates on new euro-denominated loans to euro area residents
(Percentages per annum, period averages, unless otherwise indicated)
Consumer loans
Loans to households1 Loans to non-financial corporations1
With a floating rate or an initial
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Central government 15,605 14,424 10,467
Percentage of GDP 9.38 .05 .4
– State budget 15,377 14,7937 11,5008
(Ordinary budget)4 8,841 10,033 7,020
(Public investment budget) 6,536 4,760 4,480
– OPEKEPE5,6 228 –369 –1,033
1 This table shows the borrowing requirement of central government on a cash basis. The borrowing requirement of public entities is calculated by the NSSG on the
basis of detailed data collected directly from these entities through a special quarterly survey concerning their financial results (revenue-expenditure) and their finan-
cial situation (loans, investment in securities, deposits etc.).
2 As shown by the movement of relevant accounts with the Bank of Greece and credit institutions.
3 Excluding the repayment of Greek government debts to the Social Insurance Institute (IKA) through bond issuance (Law 2972/2001, Article 51). These debts amount-
ed to € 3,927.9 million and were repaid in three instalments (2002: € 1,467.4 million, 2003: € 1,549.5 million and 2004: € 911 million).
4 Including the movement of public debt management accounts.
5Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid. It replaced DIDAGEP (Agricultural Markets Management Serv ice) as of 3 September 2001.
6 OPEKEPE account's balance for 2006 is high, because the Ministry of Rural Development, through a loan of about € 600 million in December, effected advance pay-
ments to farmers. This amount will be offset within 2007 by OPEKEPE, when final payment orders to the beneficiaries will have been issued.
7 Including a grant of about € 2,586 million to hospitals, expenditure of € 1,055.2 million for the capital increase of the Agricultural Bank of Greece, as well as receipts
of € 1,239.3 million from the sale of 16.4% of OPAP shares and € 826 million from the sale of 10% of OTE shares.
8 Including € 149.7 million from National Telecommunications and Post Commission revenue settlement, € 299.3 million from the decrease in the capital of the
Greek Postal Savings Bank, € 34 million from the decrease in the capital of the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE), € 290 million from additional dividends paid by
the Deposits and Loans Fund, € 323 million from the sale of ATE shares, € 597.4 million from the sale of Greek Postal Savings Bank shares and € 364.4 million
from the sale of Emporiki Bank shares.
* Provisional data and estimates.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table IV.1
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Table IV.2
Financing of borrowing requirement of central government
(Million euro)
1 Comprising domestically issued Treasury bills and government bonds as well as bonds convertible into equity.
2 Excluding government bond issuance for the repayment of debts to IKA (Law 2972/2001, Article 51). Also see footnote 3 in Table IV.1.
3 Comprising changes in central government accounts with the Bank of Greece and other credit institutions, as well as the change in the OPEKEPE account.
4 Comprising government borrowing abroad and securities issuance abroad and excluding non-residents' holdings of domestically issued government bonds.
5Comprising the change in government deposits with foreign banks.
* Provisional data.















Greek Treasury bills and government bonds1,2 16,829 107.8 15,325 106.2 11,342 108.4
Change in balances of central government 
accounts with the credit system3 –901 –5.8 –1,224 –8.5 –1,145 –10.9
External borrowing4 –323 –2.1 323 2.2 270 2.6
Total 15,605 100.01 4 ,424 100.01 0 ,467 100.0Statistical section
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 28  2/07 163
1 For comparability purposes, tax refunds are included in expenditure and have not been deducted from revenue. This practice has been adopted by the Ministry of
Economy and Finance in recent years.
2 From 2003 onwards, interest and amortisation payments are recorded in the off-budget item “Ministry of National Defence Programmes for the procurement of
military equipment”.
3 Comprising € 149.7 million from National Telecommunications and Post Commission revenue settlement, € 299.3 million (not included in the budget for 2006) from
the decrease in the capital of the Greek Postal Savings Bank, € 34 million from the decrease in the capital of ATE and € 290 million from additional dividends paid
by the Deposits and Loans Fund.
4 Including a grant of € 330 million to OTE's personnel insurance fund (TAP-OTE) and the settlement of a € 345 million liability of the Greek State to ATE. These expendi-
tures were not included in the estimates of the Ministry of Economy and Finance for 2005, as published in the Introductory Report on the 2006 Budget.
* Provisional data.






2007 2006*/05 2006* 2005
Percentage changes
π. REVENUE1 47,446   52,399   55,260   10.4 5.5
1. Ordinary budget 44,760   48,685   51,370   8.8 5.5
(of which: extraordinary revenue) 7723
2. Public investment budget 2,686   3,714   3,890   38.3 4.7
– (Own revenue) 63   … 140  
– (Revenue from the EU) 2,623   … 3,750  
ππ. EXPENDITURE1 58,764   60,770   64,310   3.4 5.8
1.1 Ordinary budget 51,2404 52,586   55,560   2.6 5.7
(Interest payments)2 9,774   9,589   9,750   –1.9 1.7
1.2 Ordinary budget primary expenditure 41,4664 42,997   45,810   3.7 6.5
(of which: tax refunds) 2,554   2,392   2,200   –6.3 –8.0
2. Public investment budget 7,524   8,184   8,750   8.8 6.9
πππ. STATE BUDGET RESULTS  –11,318   –8371 –9,050  
Percentage of GDP –6.3 –4.3 –4.3
1. Ordinary budget –6,480   –3,901   –4,190  
2. Public investment budget –4,838   –4,470   –4,860  
IV. PRIMARY DEFICIT (–)/SURPLUS(+) –1,544   1,218   700  
Percentage of GDP –0.9 0.6 0.3
AMORTISATION PAYMENTS2 21,752   17,856   –17.9
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE PROGRAMMES
FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT2 1,400   2,067   47.6
Budget for
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